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ABSTRACT 
On November 4, 2004, President George W. Bush won re-election.  According to exit 
polls, a majority of people who voted for Bush over his opponent, Senator John Kerry, 
did so because they believed that Bush was the “moral values” candidate.  In this 
dissertation, I assess the moral persona that the President rhetorically constructed during 
his first term in office.  To do so, I utilize Kenneth Burke‟s cluster and pentad tools to 
analyze Bush‟s statements on embryonic stem cell research, 9/11 and the ensuing War on 
Terror, and same-sex marriage, three issues that the elite press explicitly identified as 
being “moral values” during Bush‟s first term. 
The analyses reveal that Bush‟s rhetoric frames the ethical struggle as being between 
himself and an elite/powerful few others.   The majority of Americans are thus stripped of 
their agent status and the corresponding ability to act and left to feel the effects of a 
“moral” decision that is made in their absence yet affects their very being.  I term this sort 
of ethics “elitist ethics” as ethics and morality are made to seem like a power struggle 
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CULTURE WAR VICTORY?: CONTEXTUALIZING BUSH‟S WIN IN TERMS OF 
CULTURE WAR THEORY AND BURKEAN METHOD 
 
“[M]any voters picked President Bush because of „moral values.‟ . . . [E]vangelical 
voters who supported Bush were concerned with traditional values in matters such as 
marriage” (Barlow, 2004). 
 
Introduction 
 President George W. Bush‟s 2004 win over his challenger, Democratic Senator 
John Kerry, was surprising not because Kerry lost, but because of the way that Bush won.  
According to exit polls taken after the November 4, 2004, United States presidential 
election, in which incumbent George W. Bush secured a second term, the primary issue 
on which the majority of the people voted was “moral values” 
(www.cnn.com/election/2004).  Twenty-two percent of those polled said that the main 
factor that led them to vote for Bush and against Democrat John Kerry was “moral 
values” (noticeably absent was any sort of elaboration on what constituted “moral” or 
“values”).  Indeed, “moral values” was more influential than the economy (20% of the 
people voted based on the economy, and Kerry won on the issue), terrorism (19% of 
people voted based on terrorism, and Bush won on the issue), or Iraq (15% of the people 
voted based on the war in Iraq, and Kerry won on the issue).
1
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 In the previous election, between Bush and then-Vice President Al Gore, the most salient issue was the economy (18% of people 
voted based on the economy, and Democrat Al Gore won it), and the second most important issue was education (15% of people voted 
based on education, and Gore won it).  Looking over the exit polls themselves (see Edison Media Research, 2004; Voter News 
Service, 2000), it is worth noting that “moral values” was not even one of the choices in the 2000 exit polls, but, as noted above, it was 
not only present on the 2004 exit polls, but became known as the most salient issue. 




 Bush‟s fight for re-election and his ultimate win was, arguably, another battle in 
what Hunter (1991) has termed the “Culture Wars” in American public life.  However, as 
I show throughout this dissertation, Bush‟s rhetoric, in many ways, negated many key 
orthodox/conservative principles that helped to construct the orthodox/conservative moral 
community that fought in the culture wars throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s.  To 
better understand how this negation occurred, I begin this introduction by discussing the 
culture wars as they were explained by Hunter (1991) and those influenced by his work.  
I also assess how the culture wars in the 1980s and 1990s, while fought mainly by elites, 
created a space in which lay people could act or foster a moral community. 
 For Hunter (1991) and his those influenced by his work (e.g., Bolce & DeMaio 
[1999]; Evans [1997]; Hopson & Smith [1999]; Jensen [1995]; Layman & Green [2001]; 
McConkey [2001]), American political struggles over issues like abortion, rights for 
same-sex couples, war, and (for the purpose of this dissertation, to a lesser extent) 
education, child-rearing, and the arts, illustrate that there are two major competing moral 
worldviews in the United States.  Those with an orthodox worldview believe that there is 
a transcendent Truth, shared with Americans through holy texts (Hunter, 1991).  For 
those with an orthodox worldview, one only need to consult a holy text to know the 
“right” view to have on abortion and same-sex rights.  The holy text (mainly the Bible) 
says that life begins at conception, so abortion is wrong (Hunter, 1991).  Likewise, the 
holy text says that sex should be reserved for marriage, and marriage is only between one 
man and one woman, so same-sex relationships are morally wrong (Hunter, 1991).   




 Conversely, for progressives, there are many versions of truth, for truth is found 
primarily in lived experience (Hunter, 1991).  Unlike the orthodox, who turn to religious 
texts for help in making moral decisions, progressives often turn to science.  Progressives 
assert that "personhood begins at or close to the moment of birth, at least until science 
can prove otherwise" (Hunter, 1991, p. 126), so, until there is evidence of being at an 
earlier point, abortion is morally permissible, and the choice to have an abortion should 
be left up to the woman.  Similarly, for progressives, science has only shown that people 
have a biological need for sex.  There is no proof that this biological need is only for 
someone of the opposite sex, so same-sex relationships are viewed as a morally 
acceptable way of fulfilling a biological need (Hunter, 1991).   
 Hunter (1991) asserts that these two worldviews cross traditional religious 
boundaries.  In the orthodox camp, there are evangelical Christians working alongside 
conservative Catholics and Jews (and, though Hunter [1991] never accounts for how, a 
few secular conservatives are also orthodox).  Those in the orthodox camp share the 
belief that there is Truth about moral issues, and they believe that God wants them to 
protect his Truth.  In the progressive camp, there are secularists working alongside liberal 
Christians, Catholics, and Jews.  Those in the progressive camp share the belief that lived 
experience constitutes morality and that truth is based on experiences and thus varies 
from person to person.   
The people on both sides are able to enact their morality by taking part in 
grassroots campaigns.  Jensen (1995) explains how the lay members of the Christian 
Coalition campaigned for Republicans on the grassroots level in 1994, taking the 




campaign for “morality” to their own neighborhoods.  And Diamond (1995) asserts that 
“only after the Christian Right passed through its phase of collaboration with the U.S. 
military and foreign policymakers and grew into a grassroots movement focused on 
domestic policy issues did the liberal establishment see a threat from a „radical right‟” (p. 
306).  It was the grassroots movements focused on domestic issues like same-sex rights 
and abortion that really fueled the Republican Congressional victories in 1994 (Diamond, 
1995; Jensen, 1995; Lakoff, 1996).
2
   The grassroots movements allowed lay people to 
work on behalf of their beliefs, to do their part to have their own morality recognized as 
legitimate on a broader scale.  Importantly (at least in the context of this dissertation), 
grassroots efforts allowed lay people to actively change the situation in America. 
 For Hunter (1991), the ultimate goal of both sides is to control the electorate, or, 
in his words, “define America.”  Since each side believes that it is right and the other is 
not only wrong, but so wrong that it is threatening the future of America, each side wants 
their people controlling the government.  This need for control helps to explain why 
Diamond (1995), Lakoff (1996), and Jensen (1995) claim that the mid-term 
Congressional elections in 1994 are important to understand for anyone interested in 
studying morality in America.  In November 1994, Republicans, led by Representative 
Newt Gingrich, promoter of “family values” and “morality,” (Jensen, 1995), won 
majorities in both houses of Congress.  Jensen (1995) hypothesizes that the win may have 
come as a result of the rise of political correctness and the Right‟s assertion that political 
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 During this same time, of course, progressives were active on the grassroots level.  Hunter (1991) 
provides the example of same-sex rights rallies and pro-choice rallies aimed at ensuring the election of 
progressive/liberal candidates who will protect choice and same-sex rights.  However, since the orthodox 
conservatives are the focus of this project, I focus mainly on them from this point forward. 




correctness was the newest way to legitimize same-sex relationships, single motherhood, 
and abortion.  For the Right, the 1994 victories signaled a win in the fight to restore 
morality in America. 
 However, even with major wins in both houses of Congress, those with an 
orthodox worldview never accomplished their goal of getting an orthodox “pro-morality” 
president in the White House.  This, arguably, changed in 2000 with the election of 
President George W. Bush.  As press accounts illustrate, Bush was a conservative man 
who identified himself as pro-life (Fox, 2001; Toner, 2001), opposed to same-sex 
marriage (Bush, 2004a), and an outspoken Christian (Buruma, 2004; Steinfels, 2006).  
And so it seemed that, with the election of President George W. Bush, the orthodox 
conservatives got everything that they wanted, everything that they had fought for.  Or 
had they? 
 In this dissertation, I assess the moral persona that President Bush constructed 
during his first term in office.  To assess this moral persona, I address the following 
questions: 
1) What was it about President Bush and/or his policies that fostered an 
identification between himself and the orthodox/conservative Right, especially 
conservative Christians? 
2) What sort of moral/ethical persona does the President construct through his 
rhetoric? 
3) Does President Bush constitute a moral community to follow him? 




Throughout this dissertation, I explain the ways in which President Bush constitutes a 
new sort of moral persona, an ethical elitist in which moral/ethical issues are reduced to a 
power struggle between an elite few.  Through his elitism, the President really does not 
constitute a moral community to follow him.  This lack of active participation on the part 
of the American citizenry makes the fact that the so many on the Right felt consubstantial 
with the President worthy of study.  As I will show, the people were literally left with 
very little ability to act.  When viewed in the context of the culture wars, in which a space 
was created for all people to act morally according to their worldview, Bush was the 
opposite of what the early value pioneers had envisioned, for he stripped everyone, 
progressive and orthodox alike, of their ability to act.  And yet those same protectors of 
traditional morality helped him to become the “moral values” candidate in 2004. 
Text Selection 
 In order to understand how voters came to view Bush as the “moral values” 
candidate, that is, how Bush rhetorically constructs his moral persona, I chose to analyze 
speeches and statements delivered by Bush himself in his first term.  I chose to focus on 
those issues that have clearly been tied to “moral values” in either the elite press (i.e., the 
Boston Globe, the New York Times, and the Washington Post) or in academic accounts.  
This resulted in three areas of study, which, in the interest of organization, I address 
chronologically.  I discuss each one in turn.   
 The first area of study deals with Bush‟s controversial August 2001 mandate 
regarding the future of federal funding of embryonic stem cell research: “I have 
concluded that we should allow federal funds to be used for research on these existing 




[embryonic] stem cell lines, where the life and death decision has already been made” 
(Bush, 2001d).  The President permitted research on 64 lines of embryonic stem cells 
that, due to the research process, could never become a life, but he banned any further 
research.  The President offered a public speech (“President Discusses Stem Cell 
Research”) on the issue and a corresponding op-ed in the New York Times (“Stem Cell 
Research and the Preservation of Life”).  These two statements from Bush himself 
comprise my primary texts.  In both of these texts, the President focuses the majority of 
his justification on the claim that the embryos being used in the research are human lives, 
and his definition of the embryos as lives was a major reason that so many people were 
so angry with his decision (Goodstein, 2001).  In addition, I rely upon news accounts 
from the elite press (Boston Globe, New York Times, Washington Post) to establish the 
background information needed to fully understand the symbolic action in the texts (i.e., 
what embryonic stem cells are, why the President made his statements at the time that he 
did, and how the orthodox conservative community felt about the decision). 
The second area of study deals with the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the 
ensuing War on Terrorism in both Afghanistan and Iraq.  I begin by analyzing the 
rhetoric that the President gave from the Oval Office on the evening of September 11, 
2001.  These early statements introduce the attacks as terrorist in nature and begin to 
build the case for a War on Terror.  To better contextualize the narrative that the 
President constructed about the events of September 11
th
, the second speech analyzed is 
Bush‟s September 12, 2001, briefing about the attacks following his meeting with his 
national security team.  The third speech is Bush‟s September 13, 2001, press release 




about the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance.  Bush‟s September 14, 2001, speech 
on the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance rounded out my September 11
th
 texts.   
I also looked at two addresses that Bush gave to commemorate the events of September 
11, 2001: Bush‟s “Remarks to the Nation One Year Later,” which was delivered on 
September 11, 2002, and Bush‟s September 11, 2004, Radio Address.  These texts allow 
me to describe the narrative that the President constructed about the events of September 
11
th
.  This narrative, I argue, is critical for understanding the President‟s statements about 
the War on Terror, which I split into Afghanistan and Iraq.  Specifically, I rely upon two 
speeches that Bush gave about the war in Afghanistan, his “Address to the Nation on 
Initial Military Operations in Afghanistan,” delivered October 7, 2001, and his “War on 
Terrorism” speech from November 8, 2001.  In both of these speeches, the President 
focuses on how the Taliban regime is hiding terrorists who helped to plan the 9/11 attacks 
and is torturing the citizens of Afghanistan.  The war with Afghanistan is thus framed as 
having the single goal of eradicating the Taliban regime, which will have the dual benefit 
of finding terrorists bent on destroying the United States and ending the suffering of the 
citizens of Afghanistan.  To understand the moral persona put for in the Iraq speeches, I 
also rely upon Bush‟s “Remarks on Iraq,” which was delivered on October 7, 2002, and 
outlined the President‟s case for going to war with Iraq, mainly by showing that the 
country was a nuclear threat.  I also utilize Bush‟s “Address to the Nation on Initial 
Military Operations in Iraq,” which was delivered on March 19, 2003.  In these speeches, 
the President builds on an idea similar to one expressed in the Afghanistan speeches.  He 
explains how a corrupt leader is destroying the people living in the country while 




simultaneously offering a continued threat to the United States.  Thus, I analyze four War 
on Terror speeches, two addressing the war with Afghanistan and two addressing the war 
with Iraq.   These analyses are supplemented with press accounts from the Boston Globe, 
the New York Times, and the Washington Post, which are used to establish the 
background information needed to fully understand the symbolic action in the texts (i.e., 
the public response to both wars). 
 The third and final area of study deals with Bush‟s call for a Constitutional 
amendment defining marriage as being between one man and one woman.  Specifically, I 
analyze the President‟s earliest statements about how marriage should be limited to one 
man and one woman, which were offered in February 2004 (“President discusses 
Mass/San Francisco Marriage Issues in Remarks with Tunisian President” and “President 
Calls for Constitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage”).  I also analyze Bush‟s 
speeches from summer 2004 in which the President calls for a Constitutional Amendment 
defining marriage as being between one man and one woman for the purpose of 
preserving society (“President‟s Remarks via Satellite to the Southern Baptist 
Convention,” “President‟s Remarks on the Sanctity of Marriage Vote,” “Radio address” 
[July 10, 2004], “Statement of Administration Policy on S.J. Res.1—Marriage Protection 
Amendment,” and “Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 3313—Marriage 
Protection Act of 2004”).  Once again, press accounts from the Boston Globe, the New 
York Times, and the Washington Post are used to explain the background of same-sex 
marriage in the United States that led to the President‟s proclamation, the outcome of the 




Senate vote on the Marriage Protection Amendment, and the conservative/orthodox 
response to the Senate vote. 
Theoretical Framework 
The first research question deals directly with identification.  Press accounts (e.g., 
Barlow, 2004; Mooney & Mishra, 2004) explain how conservative Christians turned out 
in large numbers to vote for President Bush in 2004.  When asked why they were so in 
favor of Bush, conservative Christians reported that they supported Bush because, like 
them, he is a Christian (Barlow, 2004; Mooney & Mishra, 2004).  In other words, 
conservative Christians identified with President Bush.  Burke (1969b) wrote extensively 
about identification.  In fact, as I will explain shortly, it is a guiding principle throughout 
his work.  Burke (1969b) is thus clearly an appropriate choice for analyzing how and why 
conservative Christians identified with Bush. 
With regards to the second research question, most any discussion of a moral 
persona fits squarely under Burke‟s (1969a) agent, which refers to the “person or kind of 
person [who] performed the act” (p. xv).
3
  An agent focus is different from an act focus, 
however, as the analysis centers on the person committing the act rather than the act 
itself.  In the case of “moral character,” the person himself (in this case) is believed to be 
moral because of intrinsic characteristics.  These intrinsic characteristics are then 
transformed into overt action, but it is traits of the individual that lead to an agent focus.  
I believe that since I am discussing the rhetorical construction of a moral persona, 
Burke‟s (1969a) agent must be taken into account.  However, agent is more fully 
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 The act and the agent will be explained more in-depth later in the introduction when I discuss Burke‟s 
pentad.  For now, it is only important to know that the agent is an actor, someone who does something. 




understood when examined in conjunction with scene, act, agency, and  purpose, as, for 
Burke (1969a), emphasizing one over the other helps the critic to better understand the 
symbolic action in the text.  The analysis of agents other than Bush, when taken in 
combination with the other parts of the pentad, helps to answer the third research 
question regarding whether the President constitutes a moral community to follow him.  
Thus, Burke‟s (1969a) analytical tools are also appropriate for answering the second and 
third research questions. 
 To help explicate Burke‟s theoretical assumptions that relate directly to his 
theoretical tools that I employ in this dissertation, I would like to focus on Burke‟s (1966) 
definition of the human being: 
Being bodies that learn language, thereby becoming worldlings, humans are the 
symbol-making, symbol-using, symbol misusing animal, inventor of the negative, 
separated from our natural condition by instruments of our own making, goaded 
by the spirit of hierarchy, acquiring foreknowledge of death, and rotten with 
perfection. (p. 16)  
 
From the above definition, some overarching assumptions become apparent.  First and 
foremost, morality is not absolute.  Morality is the result of language, for it is defined and 
learned through language.  Definitions of right and wrong (with “wrong” being the 
negative of right
4
 ) are linguistic, definitions created and used by the “symbol-using, 
symbol-misusing animal” (Burke, 1966, p. 16).  The importance placed upon morality in 
the political sphere can be attributed to the drive for perfection as the appeals to morality 
show that morality is considered a good to which all should strive, a good for which all 
should vote. 
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 Foss, Foss, and Trapp (2002) add, as a parenthetical to Burke‟s definition of human being, that they 
equate “inventor of the negative” with “moralized by the negative” (p. 212), once again underscoring the 
relevance of Burke to the study of “moral values.” 




 In the following theoretical framework, I will rely upon Burke‟s definition of the 
human being as I briefly outline some of Burke‟s key assumptions that are important to 
my proposed project. 
Humans are the Symbol-Making, Symbol-Using, Symbol-Misusing Animal 
 One of Burke‟s key distinctions is that which he draws between action and 
motion.   For Burke (1984), “human conduct, being in the realm of action and end (as 
contrasted with the physicist‟s realm of motion and position) is most directly discussible 
in dramatistic terms.   By „dramatistic‟ terms are meant those that begin in theories of 
action” (p. 274).  For Burke people use language to act, and language itself is an act 
(Burke, 1969a; 1984).  Language, as both an act and a reason to act, is uniquely human.  
Through language/symbols, people have a way to act and a way to describe the need to 
act.  Thus, the underlying theory in Burke‟s work is that people act. 
 The act is contrasted with motion, with a realm in which humans are acted upon 
by outside forces with little or no control over those forces.  Later Burkean scholars (for 
instance, Ling [1970]; Tonn, Endress, & Diamond [2005]) discuss the act as being 
contemplative. Whilst objects in motion are not thinking as they are only being acted 
upon, actors, in deciding how to act, are contemplating the act.  In the case of action, 
human actors are cognizant of their behaviors and, hence, responsible for them.  
Conversely, in the case of motion, outside forces are acting upon the individual, leaving 
the individual with no control over her/his actions.   
 
 




Inventor of the Negative 
 The majority of Burke‟s writings on the negative, especially the negative as it 
pertains to morality, come from a series of articles he wrote for The Quarterly Journal of 
Speech in 1952 and 1953.  In these three articles, Burke (1952a) begins with the 
assumption that “language adds the peculiar possibility of the Negative” (p 252) and that 
the “thou-shalt-nots” become the “essence of the negative” (p. 253).  It is the negative 
that is closely linked to notions of what is right and what is wrong, as the “thou-shalt-not” 
of the negative (i.e., the wrong) contains within it a sense of what “thou-shalt” (i.e., the 
right). 
 Burke (1952a; 1952b) then begins to tie the negative to the act and to morality.   
With regards to the act, Burke (1952a) points out that “the Tribal No basically resides in 
the realm not of sensory image, but of super-sensory idea [and] . . . idea is the realm of 
action” (p. 260).  Burke (1952b) continues by explaining that “the negative is . . . in the 
verbal sense, an act” (p. 447).  With regards to morality, the negative gives us “the ability 
to distinguish between right and wrong” (Burke, 1952a, p. 261).  The right is moral, the 
wrong is immoral.   
 Burke (1952b) goes on to posit that “the thou-shalt-not‟s of moral law retreat 
behind the positive accents of a noble righteousness” (p. 450).  In other words, the 
negative, the thou-shalt-not-act-a-certain-way imperative, is often hid behind a positive, 
behind an explanation of how one should act.  After all, in telling people how they should 
rightly act, there is a hidden admonition of how they should not act.  Thus, for Burke 




(1952b), “moral law is „negative‟” (p.  451), and it always contains an implicit assertion 
of what people should not do (see also Burke, 1973).   
 Burke‟s (1953) third article on the negative takes the analysis of the negative one 
step further.  Here, Burke (1953) argues that “Death itself, as the privation of life, is the 
Great Negative. . . . [T]he idea of death can lead solemnity and authority to other 
motives, or can provide an ideal seriousness that dwarfs other motives by comparison” 
(p. 80).  Burke (1953) shows that the negative grounds most action in some way.  
Furthermore, Burke (1953) ties the negative to one of his other main interests, the act.  
The negative, which emerges from language, is distinguishable from motion as it is 
created by people to serve a certain end (living being one such end, as the above 
quotation illustrates).  For Burke (1953), “no” is an act word.  It is telling people what 
they cannot do and/or what they can do.  Hence, it guides action.  The negative is 
intricately tied to Burke‟s notions of hierarchy and identification. 
Goaded by the Spirit of Hierarchy . . . and Rotten with Perfection 
 One of Burke‟s (1969b) overarching ideas is that of entelechy (borrowed from 
Aristotle), “which classifies a thing by conceiving of its kind according to the perfection 
(that is, finishedness) of which that kind is capable” (p. 14).  One sort of entelechy, 
described by Burke (1973) in his essay “Rhetoric of Hitler‟s Battle,” is that of inborn 
dignity: “In both religious and humanistic patterns of thought, a „natural born‟ dignity of 
man [or woman] is stressed.  And this categorical dignity is considered to be an attribute 
of all men [or women], if they will but avail themselves of it, by right thinking and right 




living” (p. 202).  From the quotation, we can deduce that, depending upon how rightly 
one thinks and how rightly one lives, some people will be more dignified than others.  
 Burke (1969b) discusses “the entelechial tendency, the treatment of the „top‟ or 
culminating stage as the „image‟ that best represents the entire „idea‟” (p. 141), which 
shows that entelechy is tied to hierarchy, another overarching theme in Burke‟s work.  
Burke (1969b) claims that hierarchy is “inevitable” and “indigenous to all well-rounded 
human thinking” (p. 141).  For Burke  (1969a), hierarchy results in feelings of “ill will,” 
elsewhere called guilt, which, in turn, “leads to the scapegoat (the use of dyslogistic 
terms for one‟s own traits as manifested in an „alien‟ class” (p. 142).  The use of the 
scapegoat, or victimage, is one of two ways that a person can alleviate his or her guilt and 
find symbolic rebirth.  I tie this to symbolic action because placement on a hierarchy 
depends upon language, as do the purification rituals that people use when they feel 
guilty about their place on the hierarchy.   The purification ritual may begin through 
rhetoric. 
For Burke (1969b), rhetoric cannot be separated from identification because “you 
persuade a man [or woman] only insofar as you can talk his [or her] language by speech, 
gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, [or] idea, identifying your ways with his [or 
hers]” (p. 55).  Thus, rhetoric cannot succeed if the speaker is unable to find some sort of 
common ground with his/her listeners.  This common ground is the basis of 
identification.  Burke (1969b) begins his description of identification by positing that “A 
is not identical with his [or her] colleague, B.  But insofar as their interests are joined, A 
is identified with B.  Or he [or she] may identify himself [or herself] with B even when 




their interests are not joined, if he [or she] assumes that they are or is persuaded to 
believe so” (p. 20).  As this explanation shows, identification can occur in two ways.  
First of all, two people/groups could have a common interest.  On the other hand, they 
may not, but a powerful rhetor convinces the person/group that they do share an interest 
with the rhetor.  At any rate, “to identify A with B is to make A „consubstantial‟ with B . . 
. in acting together, men [or women] have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, 
attitudes that make them consubstantial” (Burke, 1969b, p. 21).   To tie this in with 
hierarchy, it would seem that consubstantial individuals have similar interests that lead to 
their perceived placement on a linguistically-constructed hierarchy. 
 Indeed, consubstantiality is extended to groups in Burke‟s (1969b) Rhetoric of 
Motives. As Burke (1969b) explains,  
The Rhetoric deals with the possibilities of classification in its partisan aspects; it 
considers the ways in which individuals are at odds with one another, or become 
identified with groups more or less at odds with one another . . . [because] 
„identification‟ is, by the same token, through roundabout, to confront the 
implications of division. (p. 22) 
 
By identifying with one person, an agent is necessarily identifying against that person‟s 
enemy.  Thus, the power of the negative evidences itself in Burke‟s (1969b) discussion of 
identification as identification partly involves identifying against what one is not.  And, 
like the negative, this construction of what is good, what we should strive for, what we 
should identify with, is constructed in and through language.  It is symbolic action. 
 The main power of identification for Burke (1969b) comes from those uses of 
identification that go unnoticed.  Burke‟s (1972) “prime example is the word „we‟, as 
when the statement that „we‟ are at war includes under the same head soldiers who are 




getting killed and spectators who hope to make a killing in war stocks” (p. 28).  Thus, for 
Burke (1972), identification is often subtly imbedded in inclusive language choices.  In 
keeping with the idea that with every symbol of identification there is a simultaneous 
symbol of division, it would seem that there is also a sort of identification at work when a 
speaker refers to “them.”  If the “we” is an oft-unnoticed way of encouraging 
identification,
5
 it stands to reason that the “they” may be an oft-unnoticed way of creating 
an other, the one that the “we” opposes.  Indeed, the “we” can be said to be setting up a 
hierarchy via identification and negation as the “we” is placing itself in a superior 
position to the “they.” 
 Burke‟s interrelated concepts of the negative, hierarchy, and identification are 
important in my study.  For instance, Bush relies a great deal on the negative in order to 
explain the actions of others and to justify his own actions.  I believe that one of the most 
prominent examples of the negative and identification against can be seen in Bush‟s 9/11 
and War on Terror rhetoric.  
Bush‟s War on Terror rhetoric repeatedly draws upon the national identity shared 
by most of the listeners in the speech that he gave on the evening of September 11, 2001: 
“Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a 
series of deliberate and deadly terrorist attacks . . . terrorist attacks can shake the 
foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America” 
(Bush, 2001a).  In the face of the threat of terror, “Americans from every walk of life 
unite in our resolve for justice and peace” (Bush, 2001a).  In these early references, Bush 
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the “royal we” (see, for instance, Franklin, 2007). 




is identifying with his listeners.  All Americans, “from every walk of life” (Bush, 2001a), 
were affected by the attacks.  The attacks were an assault against all Americans.  All 
Americans should identify with the President, who, like the rest of the people living in 
the United States, was affected by the attacks on “our freedom, our very way of life” 
(Bush, 2001a).  Americans are all united “in the middle hour of our grief” (Bush, 2001e).  
These references to our exemplify Burkean (1969b) identification.  
As I show throughout the dissertation, however, there are many places in which 
the President fosters an identification between himself and the populace, and many places 
where he does not.  Identification is key to understanding how Bush does (or does not) 
constitute a moral community to follow him.  In many cases, this identification takes the 
form of identifying against someone or something. 
 In summary, Burke is useful for understanding human beings.  Through the above 
synopsis, I have shown that human beings are, most importantly, the symbol-using 
animal.  People use (and misuse) language to achieve a variety of ends, including 
identification (or disidentification) with various people and/or institutions.  It is because 
of language that human beings have linguistically-constructed hierarchies on which they 
place themselves, and it because of symbol usage that people are “rotten with perfection,” 
always striving to be better than possible, which results in feelings of failure.  To better 
understand the process through which symbols come to do these things, that is, to better 
comprehend the way in which symbols act, Burke has provided rhetorical critics with a 
series of tools for analysis.  In this dissertation I use two such tools, pentadic analysis and 




cluster analysis, and I now turn to an in-depth discussion of each of these tools and how 
they have been used by other critics. 
Burkean Tools 
As the above discussion illustrates, Burke is useful for rhetorical critics because 
his tools allow the critic to trace the symbolic action in a text.  Two Burkean tools that 
are particularly useful for tracing symbolic action are clusters and the pentad.  These two 
tools are particularly well-suited to my project as Burke himself links them with some of 
the key ideas I am interested in.  My first research question deals with identification.  
Burke‟s (1969b) writings on identification and rhetoric deal specifically with the 
rhetorics of good and evil, with the ways in which some people identify with some 
rhetors and distance themselves from  others.  Cluster analyses allow the critic to better 
understand identification as it is cluster and agon terms that build the narratives of good 
and evil with which people identify (or, in the case of the agon, identify against).  
Identification, moreover, involves one agent becoming consubstantial with another agent.  
The agent is one part of Burke‟s (1969a) pentad.  To fully understand how one agent is 
consubstantial with another, then, the critic also needs to conduct a pentad analysis.  
In one of his earliest works, Attitudes Towards History, Burke (1961) introduced 
his notion of clusters as, “what images b, c, d the poet introduces whenever he [or she] 
talks with engrossment of subject a . . . by charting clusters, we get our cues as to the 
important ingredients subsumed in „symbolic mergers‟” (p. 232).  Symbolic mergers 
allow the critic to see, in a rhetorical narrative, what terms are being rhetorically linked to 
other terms, and it is a joining of the terms that creates dramatic suspense (Burke, 1973).  




Hence, for Burke, cluster analysis consists of tracking which terms seem to correspond 
with one another as doing so can help the critic to better understand historical events (see, 
for instance, Conrad [1982]).  Burke (1961) himself discusses how terms can cluster 
together and show how one is or is not suitable for the presidency (for a similar analysis 
on the application of Burke to presidential rhetoric, see Berthold [1976]).  
 Burke‟s description of cluster analysis was expanded upon in the lengthy essay 
“Philosophy of Literary Form,” where Burke (1973) claims that “the work of every writer 
contains a set of implicit equations.  He [or she] uses „associational clusters‟.  And you 
may, by examining his [or her] work, find „what goes with what‟ in these clusters—what 
kind of acts and images and personalities and situations go with his [or her] notions of 
heroism, villainy, consolation, despair, etc.” (p. 20).  Hence, every work contains words 
that equate with other words, and the words in them can be used interchangeably as they 
equate with one another.  Burke (1973) points out the importance of these equal terms for 
a critic, “by inspecting his [or her] work „statistically‟, we or he [or she] may disclose by 
objective citation the structure of motivation operating here.  There is no need to „supply‟ 
motives.  The interrelationships themselves are his [or her] motives.  For they are his 
situation, and situation is but another word for motive” (p. 20). 
 The words in a given cluster can be used interchangeably.  As Burke (1973) 
explains, “the part is used for the whole, the whole for the part, the container for the thing 
contained, the cause for the effect, the effect for the cause” (pp. 25-26).  Being all 
clustered together allows the terms to stand in completely for one another.  Of particular 
relevance to a study combining the cluster and pentad analysis tools, events can comprise 




the cluster and be used interchangeably: “If event 2, for instance, follows from event 
1and leads into event 3, each of these events may synedochially represent the others” 
(Burke, 1973, p. 28).  In other words, acts can become linked in a cluster.  A focus on 
action takes the overview of clusters one step further, as Burke (1973) argues that  such a 
focus leads to “not only the matter of „what equals what,‟ but also the matter of „from 
what to what‟” (p. 38).  Every act leads somewhere, and a cluster can help to show the 
critic where a particular action leads.  A cluster analysis can illuminate the symbolic 
action in a text.  Important to my study, a cluster analysis can reveal the “good” side of 
the rhetorical narrative/drama that is being constructed in the rhetoric, revealing the 
“good” actions, motivations, and characters in a rhetorical narrative.  For Burke (1973), a 
cluster/agon analysis has its “emphasis upon the act” (p. 90). 
 For Burke (1973), there is always an “opposing cluster” (p. 34).  This is part of 
his “total drama as the agon [cluster] is analytically subdivided into competing principles 
of protagonist and antagonist” (Burke, 1973, p. 76).  In other words, the analysis of 
clusters is two-fold.  The critic must first analyze what terms are clustering about the 
protagonist, and then what terms are clustering around the antagonist.  Through studying 
the cluster and the agon, Burke (1973) argues that “we should watch for „critical points‟ 
within the work, as well as at the beginnings and endings.  There are often „watershed 
moments,‟ changes of slope, where some new quality enters” (p. 78).   
Following Burke (1973), cluster and agons work together to create rhetorical 
drama with which people can identify. To extend this to my study, there are four critical 
moments in Bush‟s first term in office, the embryonic stem cell research funding 




decision, the terrorist attacks of September 11
th
 and the resulting War on Terror, and the 
vow to ban same-sex marriage if given the chance.  I believe that September 11
th
 is 
particularly illustrative of clusters and agons, and how they work together to build a 
dramatic narrative.  Burke (1984) claims that clusters and agons offer “new ways of 
putting the character of events together [as] an attempt to convert people. . . . [and] to 
alter the nature of our responses” (pp. 86-87).
6
  The way in which Bush discusses the 
attacks and those (allegedly) responsible for the attacks creates an “evil terrorist” agon 
based on violence and war.  The cluster terms, consequently, focus on “good American” 
attributes like caring and peace.  The American audience identifies with the “good” 
construction, for they see themselves as caring and peaceful, very unlike the violent, war-
mongering terrorist others.  The narrative created through clusters and agons reaches a 
commonsensical resolution for the audience (see Burke, 1973; 1984).  In the case of 9/11, 
the commonsensical solution seems to be identifying with the rhetorical heroes and 
villains in the 9/11 drama and, ultimately, identifying with the proposed War on Terror. 
 At any given time, any one term in the cluster is “temporarily featured” (Burke, 
1973, p. 27).  This featured term is the called the god-term (see, for instance, Rueckert, 
1982).  This term is the one that comes to the fore, the term around which all of the others 
cluster.  Since, for Burke (1973), every cluster has a corresponding agon, the feature term 
in the agon is called the devil-term.  Analyses of these terms (see, for instance, Berthold, 
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 The idea of clusters is  also explored in Grammar of  Motives, where  Burke (1969a) points out that 
“whenever  in philosophy I see two terms of equal importance being merged into a third term that will 
somehow contain the nature of both, I always ask myself: „Which of the two terms was foremost?‟ For I 
will expect the genius of this term to weight the third term” (p. 140; for a very similar statement, see Burke, 
1973, p. 59).  This is an interesting addendum to the writing on cluster analysis (a term that Burke [1969a] 
does not use in this passage) as it may be that  there is an intervening term between the cluster and the 
agon, and understanding this term may result in a stronger analysis of the cluster and the agon. 




1976) have tended to call the god-term that which appears the most in the cluster and the 
devil-term that which appears the most in the agon cluster.  If no term quantitatively 
dominates, scholars tend to look for the term that is used in tandem with other cluster 
terms with the most frequency. 
Moreover, cluster analyses reveal the underlying rhetorical narrative with which 
the audience can identify, and the pentad reveals how those who identify with the 
narrative are treated as active agents (or are not treated as active agents) in the texts.  I 
now turn to the theoretical assumptions and applications of Burke‟s (1969a) pentad 
method. 
 In Grammar of Motives, Burke (1969a) suggests that clusters, 
should also be present as equations intrinsic to the structure of any act.  That is, as 
motives behind the structure of either an esthetic or practical act, there must be an 
implicit set of equations: assumptions as to what kind of act equals heroism, what 
kind equals villainy, what kind contains the likelihood of reward, punishment, etc. 
(p. 108) 
 
For Burke (1969a), then, the act draws upon a cluster of terms, and the cluster of terms 
determines the appropriateness of the act.  The focus on the act is really what links cluster 
analysis and pentad analysis in my study.  The pentad is focused on the act as the act is 
the central term of the pentad for Burke (1969a).  In my study, I analyze the way in which 
the cluster/agon drama creates a rhetorical narrative with which people can identify, and 
then I conduct the pentad analysis to assess how the rhetoric creates a space in which the 
people can act and thus become agents in Burke‟s (1969a) sense, or how the rhetoric 
strips the people of the right to act, making them less than agents.  When people no 
longer have the ability to act, they become part of the background, part of what is being 




acted upon or acted upon behalf of.  Thus, the two methods combined are appropriate for 
analyzing the rhetoric in my study.   
 Burke (1969a) laid out his most-utilized theoretical tool, the pentad, in his book A 
Grammar of Motives.  For Burke (1969a),  
In a rounded statement about motives, you must have some word that names the 
act (names what took place in thought or deed), and another that names the scene 
(the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred); also, you must 
indicate what person or kind of person (agent) performed the act, what means or 
instruments he [or she] used (agency) and the purpose. (p. xv) 
 
These five terms form Burke‟s dramatistic pentad.  In using the pentad for analysis, 
Burke (1969a) suggests that, while all five of the terms will always be present, most fade 
to the background.  Most often, motives can be understood by analyzing the ratio 
between two of the pentadic terms.  For Burke (1969a), ratio refers to “a formula 
indicating a transition from one term to another [where] such a relation necessarily 
possesses the ambiguities of the potential, in that the second terms is a medium different 
from the first” (p. 262).  As I explain the five terms, keep in mind that one or two are 
generally featured in any rhetorical text. 
 For Burke (1969a), scene refers to “the background of the act, the situation in 
which it occurred” (p. xv).  The scene is the context in which an act occurs, and, although 
it may not be featured, it is always present (see Burke, 1973).  Important for later studies, 
scene relates to motion in Burke‟s (1969a; 1984) action/motion dichotomy.  A focus on 
scene takes the focus off of the actor and the action, resulting in the use of motion-laden 
terms.  As Ling (1970) and later Tonn, Endress, and Diamond (2005) found, a focus on 
scene can absolve an agent of guilt by reducing action to motion.  A scenic focus makes 




what is happening to the actor the result of outside forces over which the person has no 
control.  S/he is simply being acted upon, and there is nothing that she or he can do about 
it.   This simultaneously revokes the actor status of the individual as she or he is no 
longer acting at all. 
 The next part of the pentad, the act, is the term to which Burke (1969a) pays the 
most attention.  Briefly defined, the act refers to “what took place in thought or deed” 
(Burke, 1969a, p. xv).  Contemplation is considered part of the act, as are observable 
actions.  It may be because the act is so encompassing for understanding motives that it is 
Burke‟s (1969a) most featured term.  For Burke (1969a), the act, arguably the most 
important pentadic term, is “creative or generative” (p. 249).   
 Importantly, the act ties most closely to one of Burke‟s most fundamental 
assumptions, the distinction between action and motion.  In discussing the act, Burke 
(1969a) posits that the “dramatist stress upon act suggest an origin in verbs” (p. 249).  
Grammatically, verbs are action words, but they are only fully understood as such when 
placed in relation to a subject (i.e., an agent who is conducting the action) and possibly 
where the action is taking place (the scene), both of which are nouns, which exist, but, 
without verbs, do nothing.  This brings the discussion back to Burke‟s (1969a) 
action/motion dichotomy.  Without doing anything, a subject/agent is just existing, and 
anything that happens to him or her can be attributable to outside forces, much like I 
discussed with American civilians during the Iraq war in the scene discussion above. 
 The act, then grammatically keeps the focus on action, on verbs, on what is being 
done or has been done.  Burke (1969a), however, takes his discussion of the act one step 




further, arguing that “it says in effect not simply that the future will be but that it is, since 
it is implicit in the structure of the future” (p. 258).  In other words, present actions set the 
scene for future actions as every present act contains within it an implicit structure of 
future actions.  Here, Burke (1969a) can be read as once again showing the interplay 
between act and scene as a present action sets the scene for future actions.  Every present 
act contains within it an implicit structure of future actions.  Importantly, it is in the act 
that we have “dramatic „suspense‟” that comes from “formally relating all incidents to 
one organizing principles that prevails through the diversity of detail” (Burke, 1969a, p. 
259). 
 Keep in mind that a key assumption underlying Burke‟s work is that people act.  
Thus for Burke (1969a), agent refers to the “person or kind of person [who] performed 
the act” (p. xv).  An agent focus is different from an act focus, however, as the analysis 
centers on the person committing the act rather than the act itself.  For Burke (1969a), 
words like “mind, spirit, soul, or myself,” and words like “ideas” (p. 179) all point to an 
agent focus.  After all, it is human beings who have minds, spirits, souls, a conception of 
individual identity, thoughts, and ideas; notice the way in which the last three of these 
(identity, thoughts, and ideas) all rely upon language, which reinforces the linguistic 
focus of a Burkean analysis. 
 For Burke (1969a) technological advances (e.g. weapons of mass destruction, the 
capacity for embryonic stem cell research) have expanded the scope of the agent.  Burke 
(1969a) suggests that “technology, as applied science, invites us to put the major stress 
upon knowledge.  And the problem of knowledge . . . falls directly under the head of 




agent” (p. 176), and “one is well-advised to look for scientistic stress in any terminology 
that has its start in modern idealism” (p. 223).  Furthermore, the link between knowledge 
and the agent is problematic for the act-centered Burke (1969a) because “insofar as 
[ideas] are expressed scientistically, in terms of knowledge rather than in terms of action, 
dramatism admonishes us that they are to be discounted” (p. 226).  And, Burke (1969a) 
claims that it is through language that humans have such a thing as cause and effect.  For 
Burke (1969a), “we can say that people interpret natural sequences in terms of cause and 
effect not because of something in the natural scene requiring this interpretation, but 
because they are the sort of agents that see things in terms of necessary relations” (p. 
187).  Burke (1969a) places the ability for such critical thinking skills solely on the 
symbol-using, symbol-misusing animal, the human agent. 
 Burke (1969a) posits that idealist philosophies tend to center on the agent.  To 
illustrate the link between idealism and a focus on the agent, and to further differentiate 
the act from the agent, Burke (1969a) uses the United States Constitution as an example.  
For Burke (1969a), the United States is a very idealistic society, and  
the idealistic perspective is further accentuated, in the United States, by the fiction 
that the will of the people today is consubstantial with the will of the founding 
fathers.  Those who established the Constitution are co-agents with those who 
perpetuate it—and the document itself, considered as a structure of motivations, is 
a creature of the human will.   Hence, though it is a ground of act, its essential 
feature is its derivation from the attitudes of human agents. (p. 175) 
 
Here, the focus is on the people, not on the actions that they are continuing.  What is 
striking about Burke‟s (1969a) example is that it serves to illustrate the link between 
identification and agent.  With identification, one agent is becoming consubstantial with 




another, or one group of agents is becoming consubstantial with another group (see 
Burke, 1969b).   
 The idea that identification is agent-centered is key to understanding the analyses 
in all three of my body chapters as I focus on the ways in which the President attempts to 
constitute a moral community to follow him, or, in Burkean terms, how the people 
identify with the President as a moral person and with his “moral” agenda. 
 Agency refers to “the means or instruments” (Burke, 1969a, p. xv) used to carry 
out an act.  As an instrument, means have “no intrinsic interests” (Burke, 1969a, p. 279) 
in what they are being used for.  After all, interest would fit under the definition of agent, 
and agent implies a symbol-using being.  Agencies are (generally) non-human 
objects/entities used as ways to achieve an end.
7
  Burke (1969a) comes to equate agency 
with motion: “Since agents act through the medium of motion, the reduction of action to 
motion can be treated as Agency” (p. 286).  Hence, it would seem that, given his focus on 
symbolic action and the action focus of dramatism, Burke (1984) would not approve of 
an agency-driven rhetoric as it would take the focus off of the action.  Indeed, as Burke 
(1969a) points out, 
once Agency has been brought to  the fore, the other terms readily accommodate 
themselves to its rule.  Scenic materials become the means which the organism 
employs in the process of growth and adaptation.  The organism itself is a 
confluence of means, each part being at the service of the other parts. (p. 287) 
 
Of particular relevance here is the complete absence of actors.  Losing his normal focus 
upon the actions of human agents, Burke (1969a) rhetorically justifies his statements 
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about agency as he begins illustrating its effects using strictly biological terms.  A focus 
on agency takes out the action and, by extension, the actor.  Throughout the dissertation, I 
will show a commonality between scene and agency as a focus on either one serves to 
diminish the active status of the agent. 
 In the introduction to A Grammar of Motives, Burke (1969a) defines purpose as 
the reason why a particular action is undertaken.  Burke (1969a) expands upon this 
definition in the purpose chapter of A Grammar of Motives.  There, Burke appears to link 
purpose to ideology.  Burke (1969a) likens purpose to mysticism in that both, “uni[fy] the  
individual with some cosmic or universal purpose . . . for it develops an ideal of passive 
contemplation in which the distinctions of individuality disappear” (p. 287-288;  italics in 
original).   People, in other words, act according to an overarching purpose that unites a 
large number of people.  As an example, Burke (1984) discusses how, after Freud, many 
focused on sex as a motive/purpose for action, though this sort of unifying focus would 
have been unthinkable in the time of Saint Augustine as his society was unified around 
religion.  The people in each time were thus unified around an overarching idea about 
being (Burke, 1969a; 1984).  Ideology is nothing more than an implicitly agreed-upon 
idea about the way things are, so, basically, purpose is linked to ideology.    
This link between purpose and ideology is more explicitly developed by Charland 
(1987).  For Charland (1987) the audience is actively constituted through the rhetoric.  
Through the constitutive rhetoric, the people form a collective identity.  This constitution 
of a collective identity (or ideology) can be read as a purpose of the rhetoric.  
Consequently, in this dissertation the most purposive texts are those which are clearly 




furthering a particular ideology, the embryonic stem cell  research texts (which espouse a 
pro-life ideology) and the anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric (which  espouses a 
conservative ideology).   
In this section, I have explained Burke‟s cluster/agon analysis tool and his pentad 
analysis tool more in-depth.  In my project, I use the two analytical tools in tandem to 
better understand possible reasons that so many members of the Christian Right identified 
with President George W. Bush.  Throughout the dissertation analysis chapters, I begin 
my analysis by conducting a cluster/agon analysis.  From this analysis, I am able to see 
the good versus evil narrative that is built through the cluster/agon terms.  I argue that the 
cluster and agon terms create both a hero with which the people can identify, and an 
enemy that the people can identify against, though these identifications are not absolute.  
For instance, both the embryonic stem cell research rhetoric and the anti-same-sex 
marriage rhetoric very closely follow the conservative pro-life rhetoric and the 
conservative anti-same-sex relationship rhetoric that preceded it (meaning that many 
progressives did not agree with the rhetoric).  In many cases, the god-term in the cluster 
is an agent (or agents), which ties the cluster analysis to the pentad analysis.  I posit that 
the agent is crucial for understanding both how the Christian Right came to identify so 
closely with President Bush and how President Bush constructed his moral persona.  The 
agent, when taken in combination with the act, is crucial for understanding how the 
President does (or does not) constitute a moral community to follow him.  Basically, the 
cluster analysis combined with the pentad analysis allows me to answer my three 
research questions.  




Outline of Dissertation Chapters 
 To answer my research questions, I divide the remainder of this dissertation into 
the following chapters: 
1) In Chapter two, I attempt to assess the reasons for the public‟s disunity with Bush 
following his decision to use tax money to support further research on the 
embryonic stem cell lines already in existence but to ban federal funds being used 
for any additional embryonic stem cell research.  The cluster/agon analysis 
reveals the good versus evil narrative in the rhetoric.  Bush is the rhetorically-
constructed hero who is working tirelessly to protect valuable human lives from 
being destroyed by “callous” scientists who are creating and destroying life 
simply to further their own research agendas.  After explaining the narrative in the 
texts, I then conduct a pentad analysis to better understand the ethical/moral 
persona the President rhetorically constructs, and I assess whether or not the 
President constituted a moral community to follow him.  The pentad analysis 
reveals that the President‟s rhetoric creates a disempowering scene/agent ratio in 
which the embryos are accorded more agent status than those who could, 
potentially, benefit from the stem cells research in question.  I argue that, in 
denying people the right to make their own decision about their healthcare, the 
President creates an elitist moral persona. The right to make decisions is taken 
away from those directly affected by the issues and left in the hands of an elite 
few.  Because so few unified behind the narrative, I suggest that the President 
failed to constitute a moral community to follow him. 




2) In Chapter three, I analyze the President‟s earliest responses to the attacks of 
September 11
th
, his announcement regarding the war with Afghanistan, and his 
build-up to and announcement of the war with Iraq in an attempt to determine 
why the President lost unity with the populous between the Afghanistan war and 
the Iraq war.  In the cluster analysis, I assert that the President‟s rhetoric identifies 
the President with the rest of Americans.  Like the rest of the people living in the 
United States, the President felt the effects of the September 11
th
 attacks.  Like the 
rest of the people living in the United States, the President wanted to help the 
country rebuild.  This idea of a consubstantial populous working together to help 
rebuild America and avoid future attacks continues throughout the war in 
Afghanistan speeches, where American civilians are able to help with the war 
effort in the United States while the American military is fighting abroad.  The 
pentad analysis thus reveals that there is a strong agent-act focus in both the 9/11 
rhetoric and the war in Afghanistan speeches.   However, there is a dramatic shift 
in the war in Iraq speeches.  The Iraq rhetoric renders American agents part of the 
still-vulnerable scene, and they are left with little opportunity to help with the war 
effort.  In other words, the entire terrorism narrative, a narrative that emerged on 
September 11
th
 and continued through the war in Afghanistan, is altered.  I argue 
that in the 9/11 and Afghanistan war speeches the people are part of a utilitarian 
moral community in which each person can work to better the United States, but 
that in the War on Terror the President does not really constitute a moral 




community to follow him as the  people are not really constituted as agents at all 
but as merely part of the still-vulnerable US homeland scene.   
3) In Chapter four, I assess the moral persona that Bush develops in his anti-same-
sex marriage rhetoric and whether or not the President constitutes a moral 
community to follow him.  As I show through both the cluster analysis and the 
pentad analysis, the President‟s anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric is markedly 
different than the orthodox anti-same-sex marriage that flourished during the 
culture wars of the 1980s and the 1990s.   Through the cluster-agon analysis, I 
assess the dramatic narrative in the rhetoric and how it fosters an identification 
with the populace.  In a vein similar to the culture wars anti-same-sex marriage 
rhetoric, the rhetorical narrative fosters an identification with members of society 
who fear the changes that same-sex marriage will bring to American society.  
After understanding the good/evil narrative in the texts, I conduct a pentad 
analysis.   This second analysis reveals that, unlike the culture wars rhetoric, 
Bush‟s anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric focuses on different agonistic agents.   
Bush‟s rhetorically constructed nemeses, the nemeses who, if left unchecked, will 
ruin American society as Americans currently know it, are not the gays and 
lesbians seeking to marry but the judges who are allowing them to do so.   The 
rhetoric creates a disempowering scene-act ratio in which the decision to marry is 
moved to the legislative sphere and the only people allowed to act are those 
occupying bureaucratic positions.   I argue that, in denying people the right to 
make their own decision about their own marriages, the President creates an elitist 




moral persona. The right to make decisions is taken away from those directly 
affected by the issues and left in the hands of an elite few.  Because the rhetoric 
leaves no space for those either in favor of or those opposed to same-sex marriage 
to act, I argue that the President does not constitute a moral community to follow 
him.  
4) In the conclusion, I consider the ways in which traditional ethical theories are 
inadequate for assessing the rhetoric of President George W. Bush, which re-
affirms the importance of viewing Bush‟s rhetoric through the lens of elitist 
ethics.  To illustrate why this study has implications for those interested in the 
study of rhetorical ethics, I offer suggestions and very preliminary sample 
analyses of other rhetorics that may be interesting to examine in terms of elitist 
ethics, two case examples from conservative rhetoric and one case example from 
progressive rhetoric.   I conclude by assessing the ways in which this study is of 
particular interest to those interested in rhetorical scholarship and the work of  
Burke as this study draws out Burke‟s discussion of the links between the act, the 



















CONTRADICTORY ETHICAL DEFINITIONS: POSSIBLE REAONS THAT MANY 
PRO-LIFERS DID NOT IDENTIFY WITH BUSH‟S EMBRYONIC STEM CELL 
RESEARCH POLICIES 
 




 On August 9, 2001, President George W. Bush, well-known as a pro-life president 
(see Fox, 2001; Toner, 2001), addressed the nation to announce that he had made a 
decision about federal funding of embryonic stem cell research: “I have concluded that 
we should allow federal funds to be used for research on these existing [embryonic] stem 
cell lines, where the life and death decision has already been made” (Bush, 2001d).  The 
President permitted research on 64 lines of embryonic stem cells that, due to the research 
process, could never become a life, but he banned any further federal funding for the 
research.  As Spielvogel (2005) explains, Bush‟s decision to partially ban/partially fund 




 As Wade (2001b) explains, embryonic stem cells are unique.  They are the 
building blocks of the human body and are responsible for beginning the generation of 
every cell in the human body.  Scientists believe that they are “a sort of magic clay that 
can be shaped into organs and tissues” (Wade, 2001b, p. F1), that can thus, in theory, 
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provide possible treatment for degenerative illnesses like Alzheimer‟s and traumatic 
spinal cord injuries by regenerating the damaged tissue.  The majority of the embryonic 
stem cells are derived from fertility clinics, where women have opted not to have them 
implanted and the embryos are “destined to be destroyed” (Weiss, 2001, p. A1).  The 
President‟s decision to limit any future research to the 64 lines already in existence was 
met with criticism from the scientific community.  Scientists argued that more lines 
would be needed in order to fully research the potential of embryonic stem cells and that 
the President‟s limit was severely impeding the research process because the stem cells 
are more likely to mutate (and thus become less useful) the longer that they stay in 
laboratory dishes (Stolberg, 2001; Weiss, 2001). 
 By Bush‟s (2001d) own acknowledgement, “scientists . . . believe that rapid 
progress in this area will only come with federal funds.  Federal funds help attract the 
best and brightest scientists.  They ensure new discoveries are widely shared at the largest 
number of research facilities and that the research is directed toward the greatest public 
good.”  In other words, Bush (2001d; 2001g) knew the importance of embryonic stem 
cell research and the potential that it held for alleviating a vast array of debilitating 
conditions, and he knew the importance of federal funding for this research.  Indeed, 
because there is no definitive proof that embryonic stem cells will provide cures, many 
private agencies do not fund the research due to the fact that they could be funding a 
fruitless endeavor, so Bush‟s decision to limit federal funding, in effect, limited 
embryonic stem cell research overall (Weiss, 2001). 




 Given the potential embryonic stem cells hold, it may not come as a surprise that 
the masses did not identify with the President following his decision.  As Goldstein 
(2001) and Wade (2001d) explain, the President not only upset the vast majority of 
Democrats, but even many Republicans, specifically pro-life Republicans, did not agree 
with the ruling.  As a conservative, Bush was generally consubstantial with the pro-
lifers.
9
  However, Bush‟s embryonic stem cell research mandate split the conservative 
pro-life movement into three distinct groups.  The first group, which was represented by 
the National Right to Life Committee, the Moral Majority, and the Christian Coalition, 
agreed with the decision on the grounds that, as the President pointed out, with the 64 
existing lines, the life and death decision had already been made.   In Burkean (1969b) 
terms, this first group identified with the President and his policies, for they could see the 
issue from same perspective as the President.  The second group, which was represented 
by the Catholic Church, smaller Christian Right organizations, and smaller anti-abortion 
groups, disagreed with the decision to fund any of the research on the grounds that “stem 
cell research is the equivalent of killing a human being” (Wade, 2001b).  In Burkean 
(1969b) terms, they could not unify with the President‟s (alleged) sanctioning of 
experimenting on “lives,” and this caused them to disagree with the decision.  A third 
group, represented by Nancy Reagan,
10
 pro-life Republican Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah, 
and, most recently, former Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, who is also pro-life 
(Connelly, 2005), felt that the President should not have put a ban on funding subsequent 
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embryonic stem cell research.  In Burkean (1969b) terms, this third group did not identify 
with the President or his decision not to fund research that could, plausibly, help millions 
of people suffering from debilitating illnesses.   
 In other words, the President‟s embryonic stem cell research funding decision 
caused disunity in the orthodox/conservative pro-life base.  In this chapter, I assess some 
possible reasons for this disunity.  Moreover, to tie this chapter to the dissertation, I 
address two additional questions in the conclusion: 1) What moral persona does President 
Bush construct in his embryonic stem cell research addresses; and 2) Does he constitute a 
moral community to follow him? 
 To answer these questions, I analyze the two statements that Bush gave to explain 
his decision regarding the funding of embryonic stem cell research.  On August 9, 2001, 
President Bush offered his statements to the nation about his decision to partially 
ban/partially fund embryonic stem cell research.  On August 12, 2001, Bush wrote an op-
ed piece in the New York Times in which he further explained the rationale for the 
decision that he announced on August 9
th
.  In both of these texts, the President focuses 
the majority of his justification on the claim that the embryos being used in the research 
are human lives, and his definition of the embryos as lives was a major reason that so 
many people were so angry with his decision (Goodstein, 2001). 
Justification of Burkean Tools 
As may be apparent from the above background information, the focus of this 
chapter is on the public‟s lack of identification with the President.  For Burke (1969b), 
rhetoric cannot be separated from identification, because “you persuade a man [or 




woman] only insofar as you can talk his [or her] language by speech, gesture, tonality, 
order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his [or hers]” (p. 55).  Thus, 
rhetoric cannot succeed if the speaker is unable to find some sort of common ground with 
his/her listeners.  This common ground is the basis of identification.  Burke (1969b) 
begins his description of identification by positing that “A is not identical with his [her] 
colleague, B.  But insofar as their interests are joined, A is identified with B.  Or he [she] 
may identify himself [herself] with B even when their interests are not joined, if he [she] 
assumes that they are or is persuaded to believe so” (p. 20).  As this explanation shows, 
identification can occur in several ways.  First of all, two people/groups could have a 
common interest.  On the other hand, they may not, but a powerful rhetor convinces the 
person/group that they do share an interest with the rhetor.  At any rate, “to identify A 
with B is to make A „consubstantial‟ with B . . . in acting together, men [women] have 
common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them consubstantial” 
(Burke, 1969b, p. 21).  As evidenced by the press accounts discussed above, much of the 
populace did not identify with the President and his embryonic stem cell research 
policies.  The fact that so many orthodox conservatives did not unify behind the President 
and his stem cell policy is particular surprising.  After all, Bush was the “moral values” 
candidate, the President who, in theory, gave the orthodox/conservatives the orthodox, 
“moral values” President they had wanted for years.  Yet, on his very first “moral” 
mandate, the President‟s rhetoric resulted in disunity among the orthodox conservatives.   
To better understand why the President‟s embryonic stem cell research policy 
failed to promote unity among the orthodox conservatives, I begin by analyzing the 




cluster and agon terms in the rhetoric, as these terms form the narrative with which the 
audience can identify or not identify (Charland, 1987).  The cluster and agon analysis, 
however, only reveals one possible reason that so much of the populace, including many 
orthodox conservatives, did not identify with the President following his embryonic stem 
cell research funding announcement.  To better understand other possible reasons that the 
public, and the orthodox conservatives in particular, were not united with the President, I 
then analyze how the cluster terms function pentadically in the rhetoric, and the pentad 
analysis reveals fissures in the narrative that, ultimately, result in a loss of identification 
with Bush and his policies.  I conclude this chapter by addressing the ethic that the 
President is using in the embryonic stem cell research speeches and how this ethic may 
have contributed to the disunity in the orthodox/conservative base.  Finally, to tie this 
chapter to the dissertation, I assess whether or not the President constituted a moral 
community to follow him. 
Cluster Analysis 
 Bush‟s embryonic stem cell research addresses contain in them both a cluster set 
of terms and an agon set of terms.  For Burke (1973), the use of a cluster and a 
corresponding agon builds rhetorical drama by constructing a story centering around 
“good” (represented by the terms in the cluster) and “evil” (represented by the terms in 
the agon) (see also Berthold, 1976).  Per both Burke (1973) and Berthold (1976), I will  
first discuss the cluster, which in this case deals with the terms surrounding Bush‟s use of 
“human life,” and then I will discuss the agon, which in this case deals with the terms 
surrounding the President‟s description of the scientists as the destroyers of human life. 




Cluster: The Ethical Imperative of Protecting Valuable Human Lives 
 In order to justify his embryonic stem cell research decision, Bush (2001d; 2001g) 
needs to show how the embryo is a life.  Bush (2001g) explains that “life, including early 
life, is biologically human, genetically distinct and valuable.”  The embryos are “the 
seeds of the next generation” (Bush, 2001d).  Bush thus explains that life begins at 
conception, so the embryos being used in the in the process are human lives.  And, as 
human lives, each of the embryos is a unique individual: “Like a snowflake, each of these 
embryos is unique, with the unique genetic potential of an individual human being” 
(Bush, 2001g). 
 Having set up the embryos as human lives, Bush then moves on to showing how, 
as human lives, the embryos have inherent value.  In a statement that links his own 
position with that of the Christian God (the importance of which I will explain 
momentarily and throughout subsequent chapters in the dissertation), Bush (2001d) 
claims, “I believe that human life is a sacred gift from our Creator.  I worry about a 
culture that devalues life and, as your President I have an important obligation to foster 
and encourage respect of life in America and throughout the world.”  Having already set 
up the embryos as human lives, Bush‟s statements about such lives being “a sacred gift 
from our Creator” show that Bush believes that such lives have value, a value bestowed 
upon them by the God that created them.  All people, regardless of age, are a creation of 
the Christian God, and, as such, all people, regardless of age, have inherent and sacred 
value given to them by their creator, the Christian God.  For the purpose of this 
dissertation, it is worth noting that Bush‟s statements about the value of human life 




underscore his religious beliefs, which here seem to be functioning rhetorically to 
encourage identification with the President on the part of those who share his faith. 
 Having established the embryos as human lives with inherent sacred value, Bush 
(2001d; 2001g) moves on to explaining the moral/ethical imperative of protecting these 
valuable and sacred human lives.  Bush (2001d) states that,  
Many people are finding out that the more they know about stem cell research, the 
less certain they are about the right ethical and moral conclusions. . . . One the 
first issue, are these embryos human life—one researcher told me that he believes 
that this five-day-old cluster of cells is not an embryo, not yet an individual, but a 
pre-embryo.  He argued that it has the potential for life, but it is not a life because 
it cannot develop on its own.  An ethicist dismissed that as a callous attempt at 
rationalization.  “Make no mistake,” he told me, “that cluster of cells is the same 
way that you and I, and all the rest of us, started our lives.” 
 
From this quotation, it is clear that Bush sides with the ethicist.  Like the President, the 
ethicist believes that the embryos are human lives, and, as human lives, unique 
individuals.  However, unlike the ethicist, who phrases his discussion of the issue 
scientifically (through focusing on the process by which “you and I, and all the rest of us, 
started our lives”), Bush justifies his decision religiously (as shown above, Bush claims 
the embryos are a gift from “our Creator,” the Christian God).   Given the rest of the 
cluster information, that Bush establishes the embryo as a “human life” with “value,” the 
use of “ethicist” is functioning rhetorically to unite the President with those who do not 
necessarily share his religious beliefs and, hence, do not necessarily believe his religious 
justification. 
 In this statement about the ethicist, Bush is very subtly telling “less certain” 
(Bush, 2001d) or confused people the “ethical” choice to make regarding embryonic stem 
cell research.  The “less certain” people seem to be those who do not share the 




President‟s faith in the Christian God, faith that led the President (and those who identify 
with him on religious grounds) to claim that the embryos are lives.  Bush‟s use of an 
ethicist, a secular figure, serves as a way to reach out to those who do not share the 
President‟s Christian faith to show them that stopping federal funding of embryonic stem 
cell research is the right and ethical decision. 
 The ethicist and the Christian God are both placed in strong opposition to the 
scientists conducting the research.  Bush rhetorically constructs the scientist in the quote 
as cold, as someone who offers a “callous attempt at rationalization” (Bush, 2001d), and 
the President dismisses the scientist‟s argument by pointing out the “ethical” viewpoint, 
that the embryos are “human lives,” and, as such have inherent “value.”  Given this 
ethical viewpoint, the moral imperative is to not allow research on these lives.  It is not 
until much later in the speech that Bush announces that he will not allow further research 
on embryonic stem cells that have not already been destroyed, but he is already setting 
that up as the moral choice, making his end mandate seem like the common sense, 
“moral” one to make, the one that values and protects human life. 
 Combined, these cluster terms, moral, value, and human life, create a narrative 
with which the audience could identify.  The people could identify with the President and 
what he vows to do, perform the moral action of protecting the sanctity of human life.  
The rhetorical narrative set up by these terms is as follows: Bush is a good Christian man 
who values life as a gift from the Christian God.  If the audience members identify with 
Bush and vow to protect these sacred, God-given lives, then they are acting morally and 
in accordance with the Christian God.  However, for those who are not united with Bush 




in his rhetorically constructed quest to save valuable human lives, they are disagreeing 
with the Christian God and allowing for the destruction of his creation. 
 Alternatively, for those who do not share the President‟s faith, Bush is a good 
man who consulted an ethicist before rendering his embryonic stem cell research 
decision, and, with the ethicist, realized that the embryos are human lives that deserve to 
be protected.  In this case, if the listener identifies with Bush and vows to engage in the 
moral action of protecting these valuable human lives, then the listener is acting morally 
and working to “preserve our humanity” (Bush, 2001d).  However, if the listener does not 
identify with Bush and the ethicist, then the listener is identifying with the scientists and 
sanctioning the destruction of human lives in the name of scientific advancement.  Thus, 
regardless of the listener‟s beliefs, identifying with the President and his policies is made 
to seem like the right/moral/ethical thing to do.  If the listener has identified with Bush 
and his narrative, the listener will understand that the embryo is a life and, as such, has a 
moral right to be valued and protected. 
 However, the use of the ethicist may be one of the reasons that the President‟s 
embryonic stem cell research rhetoric resulted in disunity among the 
orthodox/conservative base.  As Hunter (1991) explains in Culture Wars, orthodox 
morality is a direct result of an absolute/unchanging reading of holy texts.   Orthodox 
conservatives are pro-life because, following their holy text (mainly the Bible), life is 
sacred because God created it.  The President‟s use of the secular ethicist, however, takes 
the focus off of the claim that is so central to his orthodox base, namely, that God created 




the human lives in question.  By taking the focus off of God, the President‟s argument 
may have lost strength in the eyes of his conservative Christian base. 
Agon: Immoral Researchers Cloning and Selling (non)Human Lives  
 As I explained in the cluster, for Bush, the embryos are lives because life begins 
at conception.   For the scientists in the agon, then, life begins at a later phase: “[O]ne 
researcher told me that he believes this five-day-old cluster of cells is not an embryo, not 
yet an individual   . . . He argued that it has the potential for life but is not a life because it 
cannot develop on its own” (Bush, 2001d).  The agon is constructed around the idea that 
life begins at some point after conception.   
 Interestingly, Bush‟s own definitions may help to explain why so much of the 
populace did not identify with him and his embryonic stem cell research policies.  Recall 
from the cluster analysis that Bush believes that life begins at conception, that the 
embryos in question (which are, based on Bush‟s [2001d, 2001g] statements, are about 
five days past fertilization), are human lives.  However, the President‟s narrative does not 
clearly address when the scientists believe that life begins.  This allows for anyone who 
believes that life begins at any point later than five days past fertilization to identify with 
the scientists, whose work is merely based on the idea that life begins at some undefined 
point later than five days after fertilization. 
Because, in the agon narrative, the embryos are not human lives, they are not 
unique individuals.  Bush further explicates the “callous” behavior of the researchers by 
showing how they could use embryonic stem cell research to engage in cloning, a 




practice to which most Americans are opposed (see, for instance, Milligan, 2001; 
Stohlberg, 2001).  As Bush (2001d) explains: 
The initial stem cell researcher was at first reluctant to begin his research, fearing 
it might be used for human cloning.  Scientists have already cloned a sheep.  
Researchers are telling us that the next step could be to clone human beings, to 
create individual designer stem cells, essentially to grow another you to be 
available in case you need another heart or lung or liver.  I strongly oppose human 
cloning, as do most Americans.  We recoil at the idea of growing human beings 
for spare body part or creating human life for our own convenience. 
 
Bush‟s (2001d) discussion of scientists and their plans for cloning stands in stark contrast 
to his discussion of his own goal of protecting the individuals embodied in the tiny 
embryos.  The President‟s discussion of cloning and its possible ties to embryonic stem 
cell research strengthens the callousness of the other in the agon and, as a result, 
strengthens the good characterization built through the cluster terms.  With cloning, Bush 
(2001d) explains how researchers could “grow another you,” which would strip the 
cloned individual (and the clone for that matter) of its individuality.  Keep in mind that, 
for Bush (2001d; 2001g), each human life is an individual, endowed with sacred value by 
the creator.  Cloning is thus reprehensible because it is stripping people of their sacred 
individuality, sacred individuality bestowed upon them by the creator, sacred 
individuality that gives them value.  When Bush (2001d; 2001g) links cloning to 
embryonic stem cell research, he gives the audience the chance to identify against the 
more disturbing practice.   The audience may follow the rhetoric and use common sense 
to link cloning to embryonic stem cell research. 
 Following the narrative, not only could embryonic stem cell research lead to 
cloning, but it could also create a market for embryos and clones, a place where scientists 




are “growing human beings for spare body parts . . . creating life for our convenience” 
(Bush, 2001b).   The scientists are rhetorically constructed as acting in the interest of 
consumers who have so devalued human life that they are shopping for body parts, and 
the embryos in question provide one way to create the body parts for which people are 
shopping.  The embryos can be used “to create another you” (Bush, 2001d), and the other 
“you” would have, in theory, everything that the individual could possibly need.   
 Interestingly, it is not only the callous scientists who are creating a market for the 
embryos.  In what may prove a narrative inconsistency, Bush (2001d) explains how, 
A large number of these embryos already exist.  They are the product of a process 
called in vitro fertilization, which helps so many couples conceive children.  
When doctors match sperm and egg to create life outside of the womb . . . Once a 
couple successfully has children, or if they are unsuccessful, the additional 
embryos remain frozen in laboratories . . . and a few have been implanted in an 
adoptive mother and born, and are today healthy children. 
 
As this quotation shows, “couples” (which, when read in context, seems to imply 
heterosexual couples) are also in the market for embryos.  They are using the embryos to 
help them “conceive children.”  Following Bush‟s narrative, it seems acceptable to shop 
for embryos from “doctors” (see above quote) but not from scientists who are using them 
“to create spare body parts.”  The President critiques the scientists for using embryos for 
consumerism, but then explains, in a nearly positive way, how “doctors” are doing the 
same thing to help “couples” conceive children.  In other words, the President‟s near 
critique of creating a market for embryos falls apart as he uses a heteronormative 
discourse to justify the same idea of making and selling embryos.  Apparently, following 
the rhetoric, it is acceptable to sell embryos to aid in procreation, but it is not acceptable 
to sell them in order to possibly help people suffering from debilitating illnesses.  






 From the analysis of the cluster and the agon terms in the rhetoric, I have shown 
that there is a strong tension between two sets of agents, Bush and the scientists, and each 
set of agents is defining life in a way that legitimizes their respective viewpoints.  
However, to this point I have only shown two possible reasons that the 
orthodox/conservatives did not unify together with Bush and his embryonic stem cell 
research policies, namely that the scientists‟ unclear definition of when life begins allows 
for anyone who believes that life begins anywhere past five days of fertilization to 
identify with them over the President, and the unclear consumerism narrative that 
underscores the rhetoric.  Neither of these findings, however, clearly explicates the moral 
persona that Bush rhetorically constructs or how he does (or does not) constitute a moral 
community to follow him.  To better understand the ethical and moral issues constructed 
in the texts, I use Burke‟s (1969a) pentad to analyze Bush‟s embryonic stem cell research 
rhetoric.  I argue that the President‟s focus on only two sets of agents creates a 
disempowering scene-act ratio that leaves much of the population, except for the 
President and the scientists, unable to act at all in the texts, and this disempowerment of 
the masses helps me to explain the elitist moral persona that the President rhetorically 
constructs in these texts.   In this section, I begin by analyzing the scene, then turn to the 
act, agency, agent, and purpose.  I conclude by assessing the moral persona that the 
President constructs and the ways in which he does (or does not) constitute a moral 
community to follow him. 
 





 For Burke (1969a), scene refers to “the background of the act, the situation in 
which it occurred” (p. xv).  In keeping with Burke‟s (1973) cluster/agon drama, there are 
two contrasting scenes in Bush‟s embryonic stem cell research addresses, and the two 
gain strength from being juxtaposed against one another. 
Bush‟s Scene: The Womb 
 Bush‟s (2001d) address on embryonic stem cell research and his corresponding 
op-ed piece on the issue (2001g) rely upon appeals to the womb as the natural scene for 
the embryos, and the inconsistency of these scenic appeals may help to explain why so 
many Americans did not identify with the President and his decision.  Bush (2001d) 
spends considerable time discussing his belief that embryonic stem cells belong in the 
womb: “doctors match sperm and egg to create life outside the womb . . . embryos are 
planted in the mother . . . a few have been implanted in an adoptive mother and born, and 
are today healthy children.”  In all of these accounts, it seems that there is a natural place 
for the embryos, a woman‟s womb.  The scenic focus becomes apparent through the 
“planted in” and “implanted” references.  The womb is the vessel, the place where, 
following Bush‟s (2001d) rhetoric, the embryos belong.  Embryos do not belong in 
laboratories, they are meant to be “planted in the mother” so that they can be “born.”  
Scientists‟ Scene: The Laboratory 
 The scientists carry out their work in their laboratory.  The scientists‟ scene is 
thus the laboratory in which life is created and discarded in the name of science, a place 
where “scientists have created human beings in test tubes solely to experiment on them” 




(Bush, 2001d).  Following Bush‟s (2001d) rhetoric, the embryos belong in the womb, a 
place where they can “grow [into] healthy children.”  The womb is thus nurturing, a place 
where the embryos are able to progress naturally.  The laboratory, in contrast, is the 
setting in which lives are created and ended.  The laboratory thus replaces the womb as 
the receptacle for the embryos, a place in which the embryos are denied the right to 
progress through the natural cycle and become “children.”  Following the rhetoric, the 
embryos will either be housed in a womb or in a laboratory, and one choice leads to life, 
the other to death. 
 Interestingly, both the womb-as-scene and the laboratory-as-scene illustrate 
Burke‟s (1972) concept of entelechy.  Entelechy refers to a perfect end point.  In the case 
of Bush‟s embryonic stem cell research rhetoric, the embryos, regardless of how they are 
used, reach a very clear scenic end point.  In the case of the womb, the end result is an 
individual.  However, in the case of the research embryos, the end point is medical waste 
(as the embryos die and not all parts are used in the research process).  The scenic 
entelechy of each side thus helps to bolster the good versus evil narrative that the 
President constructs in his embryonic stem cell research rhetoric.  The embryos can 
become a life or become trash.   For those who identify with the President‟s life 
definition, the common sense response is clear and reinforced; the embryos should end up 
becoming babies. 
Act 
 For Burke (1969a) the act refers to “what took place in thought or deed” (p. xv).   
In keeping with Burke‟s (1973) cluster/agon drama, there are three sets of acts in these 




addresses: the Christian God and his act of creating, the heroic acts of President Bush, 
and the atrocious acts of the scientists. 
God‟s Act: Create Life 
 The President‟s entire rhetorical drama centers on the idea that “human life is a 
sacred gift from our creator” (Bush, 2001d).  The first act, the act that underscores every 
subsequent act that Bush undertakes (to be described shortly), is undertaken by the 
Christian God.   The Christian God is the one who creates life, the one who endows every 
human life with sacred value.  Moreover, Bush (2001d) continues the above quote by 
claiming that “as your President I have an important obligation to foster and encourage 
respect for life in America and throughout the world.”  The President thus very nearly 
puts himself into the role of being the one who was put into office at this point in time to 
protect God‟s valuable creations.  If this is some sort of God-given role, then God‟s 
second, and closely related act, would be putting Bush in place in order to protect the 
lives that God created.   
Bush‟s Act: Protect Life 
 As I explained in the cluster section of this paper, Bush (2001d; 2001g) defines 
life as beginning at conception and, based on this definition, believes that the embryos in 
question are human lives.  Having defined the embryos as lives, Bush (2001d) offers the 
following statements: 
As a result of private research, more than 60 genetically diverse stem cell lines 
already exist.  They were created from embryos that have been destroyed, and 
they have the ability to regenerate themselves indefinitely, creating ongoing 
opportunities for research.  I have concluded that we should allow federal funds to 
be used for research on these existing stem cell lines, where the life and death 
decision has already been made. . . . This allows us to explore the promise and 




potential of stem cell research without crossing a fundamental moral line by 
providing tax payer funding that would sanction or encourage the further 
destructions of embryos that have at least the potential for life. 
 
Thus, Bush‟s most overt act in this set of text consists of partially banning/partially 
funding embryonic stem cell research.  Bush (2001d; 2001g) vows to allow federal 
money to be used to fund additional research on the sixty existing embryonic stem cell 
lines.  However, with this act comes another.  Bush is using his executive authority to 
forbid any taxpayer funding of additional embryonic stem cell research.  Once the sixty 
lines are gone, so is the federal funding.
11
 
 Through only allowing federal funds to be used for research on the existing 60 
stem cell lines, lines that, due to the research process can never become lives, the 
President is also rhetorically constructed as undertaking the act of protecting human lives.  
As I discussed in the introduction section of this paper, while Bush technically only 
banned federal funding of embryonic stem cell research, his mandate severely affected all 
embryonic stem cell research as private agencies are less willing to fund a scientific 
endeavor that may or may not work.  In other words, Bush‟s funding decision made it 
much more difficult for scientists to have their work funded, which means that they were 
not able to “destroy” as many embryos due to a lack of funding.  Since, for Bush (2001d; 
2001g), the embryos are “lives,” by making it more difficult to conduct research on them, 
the President is protecting lives. 
 Furthermore, the decision to allow federal funds to be used only for research on 
the existing 60 stem cell lines ties in with the next action that the President undertakes.  
                                                          
11
 As Stohlberg (2001) and Weiss (2001) explain, the sixty line limit in itself drew criticism from the 
scientific community and from those in favor of embryonic stem cell research as the longer the lines stayed 
in storage, the more likely they were to mutate and become useless for usage in humans. 




In order to assure that “ethical research standards are observed by all recipients of federal 
funding” (Bush, 2001g), the President “appoint[ed] a Presidential Council on Bioethics, 
chaired by Dr. Leon Kass, to advise [the] administration on moral and scientific questions 
raised by biomedical research” (Bush, 2001g).  The President set up a council of hand-
picked members to ensure that the small amount of embryonic stem cell research that is 
funded is conducted ethically, that research is only conducted on the embryonic stem 
cells that can “never become a life” (Bush, 2001d).  Rhetorically, this may have been an 
effort to avoid some of the criticism that Bush knew he may face from the pro-life Right 
who opposed any and all embryonic stem cell research, for Bush‟s panel is designed to 
ensure that no other potential lives (embryos) are destroyed in the name of science. 
 Interestingly, Bush‟s action of creating the panel and choosing its leaders serves 
another function, that of reinforcing Bush‟s rhetorically constructed role as the guardian 
of morality in the United States.  It is Bush who, following the rhetoric, knows the “right” 
ethical decision to make regarding embryonic stem cell research.  And, from this 
knowledge, it is Bush who is in a position to put together a panel to ensure that the 
research is conducted ethically, which shows that, ultimately, the President not only 
knows the ethical decision to make, but he knows which other people are ethical enough 
to oversee the research (i.e., Dr. Kass), and the President uses his official position to build 
the ethical panel.   
Scientists‟ Act: Destroy Life 
 As explained in the cluster/agon section of this chapter, the scientists do not 
believe that life begins at the moment of conception.  Thus, their act of destroying 




“lives,” is, following the rhetoric, somewhat of a morally ambiguous act, though the 
President uses his rhetoric to emphasize the heartlessness of his researcher nemeses.  
Bush (2001d) describes how the scientists “have created human embryos in test tubes 
solely to experiment on them . . . growing human beings for spare body parts.”  
According to Bush (2001g), these scientists are involved in “fetal farming [and] cloning 
to provide spare human body parts.”  The scientists‟ main act thus involves using their 
scientific knowledge to create and destroy lives. 
 Following Bush‟s (2001d; 2001g) rhetoric, all life is sacred, so the scientists‟ act 
of creating and destroying life is thus simultaneously an act of devaluing a unique 
creation of the Christian God.  For Bush (2001g), who believes that the embryos are 
human lives, “life, including early life, is biologically human, genetically distinct, and 
valuable.”  These lives are valuable, as I have shown previously, because they are a 
creation of the Christian God.  When the scientists destroy these lives or, if one believes 
the President‟s rhetoric, are using them as a stepping-stone to cloning (Bush, 2001d; 
2001g), then the scientists are stripping the lives that the Christian God created of their 
sacred individuality and inherent value. 
Agency 
 According to Burke (1969a), agency refers to “the means or instruments” (p. xv) 
used to carry out and act.  In keeping with the dramatic good versus evil narrative, Bush 
creates a dual agency in his stem cell research addresses.  On the one hand, Bush relies 
upon the agency of official authority and prayer to the Christian God to justify his 
decision, though, interestingly, there is a shift in the rhetoric where Bush rhetorically 




constructs himself as the agency for the Christian God.  On the other hand, the scientists‟ 
agency consists of science itself as the means by which American society will cease to 
value all life. 
Bush‟s Agency: Official Authority and Prayer to the Christian God 
 Bush relies upon two tools in his attempt to justify his embryonic stem cell 
research funding decision.  First of all, as reporters (Goldstein, 2001; Kornblut & 
Leonard, 2001; Seelye & Bruni, 2001) have noted, the President entered the Oval Office 
with the knowledge that he would be called upon, as President of the United States, to 
make a formal decision on the future funding of embryonic stem cell research.  Bush 
(2001d) explains the impending decision by stating that “My administration must decide 
whether to allow federal funds, your tax dollars, to be used for scientific research on stem 
cells derived from human embryos.”  After offering his decision, the President notes that 
“my administration has adopted the following policy: Federal funding for research on 
existing stem cell lines will move forward; federal funding that sanctions or encourages 
the destruction of additional embryos will not” (Bush, 2001g).  Thus, the President‟s first 
agency, and in many ways his first denial of any wrongdoing in his decision, comes from 
his appeal to his office/administration.  While it is ultimately Bush‟s choice, he uses the 
generic term of “administration” to absolve himself of personal responsibility for the 
decision that he is announcing.  “Administration” thus becomes a mean to the President‟s 
end of absolution, so it is functioning as agency. 
 Bush also uses prayer to the Christian God as a form of agency in his speeches.  
The President does not make his decision based on science or on knowledge, but on 




prayer to the Christian God and the Christian values that accompany that belief.  
Interestingly, the President‟s concession that he only reached the decision after praying 
simultaneously turns the President into a form of agency.  Bush (2001d) claims that 
“human life is a sacred gift from our Creator . . . as your President I have an important 
obligation to foster and encourage respect for life in America and throughout the world.”  
The President‟s rhetoric thus turns Bush himself into agency here.  Bush becomes the 
means by which the Christian God is protecting life in the United States and throughout 
the world.  God‟s goal is protecting the sacred lives that he has created, and Bush is one 
vessel that God uses to do so. 
Scientists‟ Agency: Lax Oversight 
 Bush dedicates considerable time to explaining how he is using his official 
authority to create a President‟s council to monitor embryonic stem cell research, a 
council that has the stated goal of ensuring that future embryonic stem cell research is 
conducted in an ethical manner.  The President‟s rhetoric leaves the impression that, prior 
to his decision to appoint the special council on ethics, there was no ethical oversight.  
Prior to 2001, the scientists were left to conduct their destructive work unchecked.  The 
lack of ethical oversight has allowed “fetal farming” (Bush, 2001g).  Without oversight, 
“scientists have already cloned a sheep” (Bush, 2001d), and, had Bush not stepped in, 
“the next step could be to clone human beings to create individual designer stem cells, 
essentially to grow another you, to be available in case you need another heart or lung or 
liver” (Bush, 2001d).  The lack of ethical oversight becomes the means by which the 
scientists were able to experiment on “lives” for so long.  It was the agency that allowed 




their “callous” research to thrive.  In keeping with the hero construction discussed in the 
cluster/agon analysis, Bush, as the hero, undertakes the act of stripping the scientists of 
the lax oversight, the agency that has allowed them to conduct so much of their “callous” 
research. 
Agent 
 Burke (1969a) describes agent as the “person or kind of person [who] performed 
the act” (p. xv).  In keeping with Burke‟s cluster/agon drama, there are two competing 
agents in these speeches.  As is apparent from the cluster/agon analysis, the two main 
agents in the rhetoric are Bush and the scientists, and the rhetoric serves to illustrate the 
good of the former and the callousness of the latter.  While I will explain each one 
momentarily, I would like to call attention to the fact that those who could benefit from 
embryonic stem cell research, people suffering from a variety of debilitating illnesses, are 
not accorded agent status in the rhetoric, the implications of which I will address in the 
conclusion of this chapter.  For now, I will mainly focus on Bush as agent, the scientists 
as agents, and the embryos as potential agents. 
Bush as Agent 
 As the cluster/agon analysis revealed, Bush (2001d; 2001g) sets himself up as the 
hero in his embryonic stem cell research narrative, and sacred lives are at stake.  The 
President constructs himself as the ultimate good, as the one who is working “to protect 
life in all its phases” (Bush, 2001d).  Bush characterizes himself as the savior of millions 
of innocent, sacred lives that will be ended by “callous” research if the President does not 
step in.  The President will do everything in his power to ensure that scientists no longer 




“create human embryos in test tubes solely to experiment on them” (Bush, 2001d), a 
move that, following Bush‟s (2001g) rhetoric, will “preserve our humanity” by ensuring 
that all future research is conducted ethically.  The President is rhetorically constructed as 
working against “callous” scientists who, as will be shown momentarily, want to destroy 
lives for their own research purposes. 
Scientists as Agents 
 In the cluster/agon analysis, I discussed how the scientists are set up as the callous 
other in Bush‟s embryonic stem cell research rhetoric.  While Bush (2001d) is crusading 
to “protect life in all its phases,” the scientists are “creat[ing] human embryos in test 
tubes solely to experiment on them . . . [and] the next step could be to clone human 
beings to create individual designer stem cells . . . growing human beings for spare body 
parts, creating life for our convenience.”  Following Bush‟s rhetoric, the scientists are 
cold individuals who are creating and destroying human lives in order to further their 
own research.  Interestingly, the good work that the scientists are doing, that of working 
to help people with horrible diseases, is obscured by Bush‟s rhetoric.  It is not only their 
work that is made to seem evil, but the scientists as well, for they have failed to “preserve 
our humanity” (Bush, 2001g). 
Embryos as (Almost) Agents 
 Perhaps the most striking aspect of the rhetoric comes from the fact that Bush 
comes close to according agent status to the embryos.  On their own in their present state, 
the embryos cannot act, so, following Burke (1969a), they are not agents.  However, 
Bush (2001d) discusses how “extracting the stem cell destroys the embryo, and thus 




destroys its potential for life.  Like a snowflake, each of these embryos is unique, with the 
unique genetic potential of an individual human being” and how “a few [of these 
embryos] have been implanted in an adoptive mother and born, and are today health 
children.”  In other words, the President discusses how the embryos, if left in their natural 
environment (i.e., the womb), would become agents, for children are agents due to their 
ability to act.  In Bush‟s (2001d; 2001g) rhetoric, the embryos are basically agents-in-
waiting, just waiting for the chance to be born and attain their full agent status.  The 
possible ramifications of the agent status of the embryos (and the lack of agent status for 
the people with illnesses waiting for treatment) are discussed in the conclusion section of 
this chapter. 
Purpose 
 For Burke (1969a), purpose refers to why an action is undertaken.  Charland 
(1987) expanded upon Burke‟s definition of purpose.  For Charland (1987), the audience 
is actively constituted through the rhetoric, and through the constitutive rhetoric, the 
people form a collective identity.  This constitution of a collective identity (or ideology) 
can be read as a purpose of the rhetoric.  Basically, purpose is linked to ideology.  In the 
case of embryonic stem cell research, the purpose of each side is, in many ways, offering 
a new name to the same culture wars debate that has been going on for decades (see 
Diamond, 1995; Hunter, 1991): When does life begin?  However, with embryonic stem 
cell research, the ramifications are, arguably, broader than they are in the on-going 
abortion debates as there are literally millions of people who could potentially benefit 
from embryonic stem cell research. 




Bush‟s Purpose: Reaffirm the Conservative Pro-Life Position that Life Begins at 
Conception 
 The President is interested in “the protection of developing life” based on his 
belief that “life, including early life, is biologically human, genetically distinct, and 
valuable” (Bush, 2001g).  Bush‟s (2001d; 2001g) purpose is thus to reaffirm the 
conservative pro-life position that life begins at conception.  Embryonic stem cell 
research, like abortion before it, raises the question of when human life begins.  Bush‟s 
rhetoric, which focuses on how the embryos are valuable lives, sacred creations of the 
Christian God, shows that the President espouses the pro-life ideology that life begins at 
conception.   Following this ideology, the embryos are lives and, as such, deserve to be 
protected. 
 The irony, of course, is that Bush‟s (2001d; 2001g) embryonic stem cell research 
addresses split the orthodox pro-life base.  For Charland (1987), new constitutive 
rhetorics can offer opportunities for new collective identities to form.  It may be that part 
of the failure of Bush‟s embryonic stem cell research addresses stemmed from the fact 
that even the pro-life movement does not completely agree with when life begins, and the 
lapse in definition that remained hidden and helped to constitute the collective identity of 
the pro-life movement in the 1960s and 1970s became apparent in Bush‟s statements on 
embryonic stem cell research.  For those who believed that the President should have 
funded research beyond the existing 60 lines, the pro-life narrative‟s lapse comes from 
steadfastly holding to the idea that all life begins at conception.  For these people, the 
embryos are not yet lives, but the pro-life narrative does not address this possibility.  For 




those who believed that the President should not have funded research on the existing 60 
lines, the pro-life narrative‟s lapse comes from the fact that the embryos in question were 
lives.  For these people, the embryos, regardless of whether they have been destroyed or 
not, are still sacred creations and, as sacred creations, should not be experimented on. 
Scientists‟ Purpose: Assert that Life Begins After Conception 
 The scientists represent the ideological opposite to the pro-lifers.  Following the 
rhetoric, the scientists believe that “this five-day-old cluster of cells is not an embryo, not 
yet an individual, but a pre-embryo. . . . [I]t has the potential for life, but it is not a life 
because it cannot develop on its own” (Bush, 2001d).  Basically, the scientists‟ purpose is 
to assert the pro-choice position that life begins after conception, that the embryos in 
question are not lives that can survive on their own accord.  Following the ideology that 
life begins after conception, research on the embryos is justifiable because it involves 
using not-yet-lives to help people who are unquestionably alive. 
 Interestingly, the above quote represents the only statement that Bush clearly 
makes regarding the scientists‟ perception of when life begins, and it is a limited 
statement at that.  Following the rhetoric, those who identify with the scientists could 
constitute a large group.  The President‟s rhetoric makes a clear demarcation of when life 
begins, at conception, and the only counter presented is that the embryos in question, 
which are only five days past fertilization, are, from the scientists‟ perspective, not yet 
lives.  Anyone who believes that life begins past the five-day point can thus identify with 
the narrative put forth by the scientists, that the not-yet-lives embryos are being used to 
hopefully help unquestionably living people who are suffering.  Thus, another possible 




reason that much of the populace did not identify with the President and his embryonic 
stem cell research policy could be due to the fact that his rhetoric allows for many people 
to identify with the rhetorically constructed nemeses. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I analyzed Bush‟s embryonic stem cell research statements, 
statements that caused disunity, even among the President‟s strong pro-life base 
(Goodstein, 2001; Wade, 2001d).   Throughout this chapter, I have addressed a few 
possible reasons that the majority of Americans could not identify with Bush and his 
embryonic stem cell research funding decision.  The first possible reason for the 
President‟s failure to unify the conservative pro-life base comes from Bush‟s inconsistent 
use of “life.”   Following the President‟s rhetoric, life is a creation of the Christian God 
and thus has inherent sacred value.  This is the line of reasoning that the President uses 
throughout the majority of his speech.  However, there is a noticeable shift in this 
definition as the President explains the work of the scientists, as the lives that are being 
destroyed are nothing more than creations of the scientists (represented by Bush‟s 
[2001d] claim that “In recent weeks we learned that scientists have created human 
embryos in test tubes solely to experiment on them”).  If it is because they are creations 
of the Christian God that most embryos have sacred value, then when the President 
focuses on the fact that many of the embryos in question are not created by God but by 
scientists, the President‟s argument loses some of its strength.  This inconsistency may 
have caused disunity among the Christian Right pro-life base who believes that all life is 
created by God (Diamond, 1995). 




 In other words, the pentad analysis revealed issues with the act that could help to 
explain why Bush‟s constituents did not identify with the President and his embryonic 
stem cell research decision, thus helping to answer the main question guiding this 
chapter.  In the introduction I asked two additional questions to tie this chapter to the rest 
of the dissertation: 1) What sort of moral persona does the President construct in his 
embryonic stem cell research addresses? 2)  Does he constitute a moral community to 
follow him?  To answer the first question, I will return to the interesting agent statuses 
that I discussed earlier in this chapter.  Recall that the rhetoric mainly centers on two 
agents, the President and the scientists.  These two agent constructions drive most of the 
pentad and form the cluster and agon, respectively.  The President is rhetorically 
constructed as the hero, as the one working tirelessly to ensure that the embryos are 
protected from “callous” researchers who are creating life just to destroy it.   The agent 
characterizations thus form the traditional “good versus evil” framework.  Alone, these 
agent characterizations, while simplistic, do not fully explain neither why Bush failed nor 
what sort of moral persona he puts forth in the rhetoric. 
 In order to fully understand both the reason that so many did not identify with the 
President and the moral persona that the President constructs in the embryonic stem cell 
research texts, I more fully explore one other agent construction in the texts and a group 
that is not accorded agent status in the rhetoric.  As I explained in the agent analysis, the 
President comes very close to granting agent status to the embryos through his focus on 
their “potential for life” (Bush, 2001d).  The President then devotes considerable time to 
explaining how many embryos have been born and have grown into kids.  The embryos‟ 




“potential for life” and their potential to be active children shows how the President 
couches his discussion of the embryos in their potential to act, making them (potential) 
agents. 
 However, those afflicted with degenerative diseases, that is, those who could 
potentially personally benefit from embryonic stem cell research, are not accorded agent 
status in the rhetoric.  Bush (2001d) mentions them once in the speech; “scientists believe 
that further research using stem cells offers great promise that could help improve the 
lives of those who suffer from many terrible diseases—from juvenile diabetes to 
Alzheimer‟s, from Parkinson‟s to spinal cord injuries.”  And these people are not 
mentioned at all in the op-ed piece. 
 By Bush‟s (2001d) own statements, the 60 existing lines could be replicated 
numerous times, meaning that one stem cell could possible save several lives, though the 
60 are certainly not enough to help everyone in need.  Ethically, Bush is not even in the 
realm of utilitarianism (see Mill, 2009) in his decision to protect the lives of the embryos 
at the expense of those who could possibly be aided by the scientific advancements that 
could be made if embryonic stem cell research were allowed to continue.  From a 
utilitarian perspective, allowing embryonic stem cell research is the greatest good for the 
greatest number of people.   Clearly, Bush does not rhetorically construct a utilitarian 
moral persona in his rhetoric. 
 So what sort of moral persona does the President construct?  As the cluster/agon 
analysis shows, the moral conflict is set up as being between Bush and the scientists, and 
all involved in the conflict are elites.  It seems that Bush is just, in the name of 




“morality,” appealing to the same elite group that has traditionally held most of the power 
in the United States.  Those who could potentially benefit from the procedure are not 
afforded the opportunity to make their own medical decisions.  Ethics is reduced to a 
power struggle between competing groups of educated people who hold more authority 
than those in mainstream society. 
 I have termed this sort of morality “elitist ethics” as ethics and morality are 
reduced to a power struggle between the affluent/elite few.   At the end of the struggle, 
those who are not in the elite few are left without the right to make their own decisions.  I 
believe that an elitist moral persona is created in Bush‟s embryonic stem cell research 
rhetoric.  By essentially banning future embryonic stem cell research, the President is not 
allowing people to make choices about their own health care.  It is as though the 
President does not trust the afflicted to do what he believes is “right” (i.e., not be part of 
research that destroys sacred human lives), so he makes sure that they are not able to 
participate in the wrong, and he uses his official authority to do so.  Along with this elitist 
moral persona is a protective moral persona.   The President‟s rhetoric frames Bush 
himself as being the one capable of doing right, and, in this case, the right thing to do is 
to protect the embryos/lives. 
 So, what sort of moral community does the President constitute to follow his 
elitist/protector moral persona?  Throughout this chapter, I have shown how no one, 
conservative/orthodox or liberal/progressive, was really satisfied with Bush‟s embryonic 
stem cell research funding decision.  In fact, through failing to unify even his pro-life 
orthodox base, the President really does not constitute a moral community to follow him.  




Throughout the rhetoric, the President seems to be trying to reach a compromise that will 
appease his orthodox pro-life base.   As I have shown throughout this chapter, he fails.   
To foster a moral community, members of that community have to unify around 
the rhetorical narrative being put forth by their moral leader.  Bush‟s rhetoric, however, 
does not create a narrative with which all of the orthodox conservatives can identify.  In 
the narrative, the scientists are described as “callous,” (Bush, 2001d), as creating and 
destroying life in the name of scientific advancement.  However, this characterization 
does not take into account the fact that the scientists are conducting their research with 
the goal of helping those who are living in agony.  Since, for some orthodox 
conservatives, the “evil” characters in the President‟s narrative are not really evil, it is 
really hard to rally behind the “good” and moral President who is working to stop the 
“callous” research from progressing.  As a result, it is very hard to create and sustain a 
moral community.   
In the next chapter I explore how Bush‟s rhetoric temporarily unifies the 
populace, orthodox and progressive alike, in the days and weeks following the September 
11
th
 attacks, but how this unity dissolves as the war in Iraq escalates.  As I will show, in 
the 9/11 and War on Terror speeches, the President relies upon a protective moral 
persona and, at times, an elitist one.  However, in Chapter 4, I argue that Bush relies upon 
the same elitist ethics in his statements on same-sex marriage as his rhetoric serves to 
disempower the gays and lesbians who are directly affected by the President‟s rhetoric 
and the decision that he is espousing, though the constitution of moral community differs 
in both Chapters 3 and 4. 








SHIFTING IDENTIFICATIONS AND MOVING FROM ACT TO SCENE: POSSIBLE 
REASONS BUSH LOST UNITY FROM AFGHANISTAN TO IRAQ 
 
“The deliberate and deadly attacks . . . against our country were more than acts of 




 In the previous chapter, I showed how President Bush upset the vast majority of 
the country by placing more importance on the lives of embryos than on the lives of 
people suffering from debilitating illnesses.  While people who identified as pro-choice 
were, by and large, angered by the way in which the President chose to protect embryos 
at the expense of people who were already living, the orthodox pro-life base was split 
into three distinct groups, with only one of the three actually agreeing with the 
President‟s decision to partially-ban, partially fund embryonic stem cell research.  The 
embryonic stem cell research decision, one of the biggest failures of Bush‟s first term, 
was in August 2001.  Just one month later, Bush would, following poll numbers, rebound 
astronomically, making speeches that, by press accounts, were a remarkable success.  The 
theme of the President‟s message was similar to the one delivered in August: life needs to 
be protected.  This time, however, nearly the entire country agreed with the President‟s 
definition of life and shared his disgust for the senseless slaughter of innocents.  




However, as the months dragged on, large numbers of citizens would cease to identify 
with the President, and I examine Bush‟s waning support in this chapter. 
Background 
 The day after the September 11
th
 attacks, reporters across the country called 
September 11, 2001, “the defining day of Bush‟s presidency” (Balz, 2001b, p. A2), “the 
greatest test of the Bush presidency” (Milbank & Allen, 2001, p. A3), and “a turn in 
Bush‟s presidency that immediately tested his capabilities as a leader and a healer” 
(Kranish, 2001, p. A6).  Reporters noted that “George W. Bush‟s presidency changed 
indelibly in the hour that it took for terrorists to demolish the twin towers of the World 
Trade Center in New York and devastate the seemingly impregnable Pentagon Building 
in Washington” (Balz, 2001b, p. A2). 
 If September 11, 2001, was in fact a test of Bush‟s presidency, and if public unity 
behind the President is one way of grading said test, then Bush‟s first actions/statements 
following the attacks can be read as a remarkable success.  As the President encouraged 
Americans to come together, Americans showed their unity with the President and with 
one another through buying and displaying American flags,
12
 adopting the slogan “United 
we stand,” and striving to “become a September the 11
th
 volunteer” (Bush, 2001d) 
through community involvement.     
                                                          
12
 CNN.com (2001) explains the magnitude of Americans buying flags and the slogan “United We Stand”:  
Sales of the American flag have spiked dramatically at some stores in the wake of Tuesday‟s 
[9/11/01] attacks.  Wal-Mart says it sold 450,000 American flags between Tuesday [9/11/01] and 
Thursday [9/13/01], after selling only 26,000 during the same period last year.  Kmart says it has 
sold 200,000  flags since last Tuesday and that many of its stores are out of stock. . . . Both 
retailers claim that red, white, and blue items are hot sellers.  Bluelight.com, Kmart‟s web site, 
says its top-selling item is one introduced only last night: a T-shirt featuring the American flag 
with the words “United We Stand.” 




 The public‟s identification with the President continued as the War on Terror 
commenced with the US-led invasion of Afghanistan.  September 11
th
 mastermind 
Osama bin Laden was believed to be hiding an Afghanistan (Kornblut, 2001c), and Bush 
ordered the invasion of Afghanistan with the goal of “evicting Saudi exile Osama bin 
Laden and his hosts, the Taliban regime” (Allen & Sipress, 2001, p. A14).  Al Qaeda was 
believed to be working to find nuclear and chemical weapons, which they and Osama bin 
Laden could use to “mount another devastating attack” (Kronblut, 2001b, p. A15; see 
also DeYoung, 2001) against the United States or other coalition nations.  Indeed, as 
Kornblut (2001c) explains, the United States was “still anxious in the wake of the 
September 11
th
 attacks” (p. A1).  In other words, following press accounts, the people 
were unified behind President Bush as the war in Afghanistan began.  Like the President, 
American citizens were still very worried about the continued threat of terrorism.    The 
populace was unified in their fear of terrorism. 
 As the conflict in Afghanistan began, the President wanted to be clear that “the 
United States is a friend to the Afghan people” (Bush, 2001b).  The conflict was thus 
framed not as being with Afghanistan per se, but rather with the Taliban regime believed 
to be hiding Osama bin Laden.  As a show of the United States‟ camaraderie with the 
Afghan populace, the President donated over $320 million in food and supplies to the 
people (Allen & DeYoung, 2001; Senger & Perlez, 2001).  Thus, through focusing his 
rhetoric solely on terrorism and a murderous regime that hid terrorists, the President was 
able to frame the conflict with Afghanistan as being more a humanitarian mission than a 




war with the entire country.  The President was “widely praised” (DeYoung, 2001) both 
nationally and abroad for his treatment of the situation in Afghanistan. 
 However, as the War on Terror entered into the Iraq war phase, the President 
faced decreased identification with the American public.   Bush alleged that there were 
strong ties between Iraq and al Qaeda, and he was worried that Saddam Hussein would 
give his weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups so that they could attack the 
United States (DeYoung, 2002).  Bush claimed that in order to disarm Iraq and protect 
the United States from another terrorist attack, Saddam Hussein had to be removed from 
power (Sanger, 2002).   
When President Bush began discussing war in Iraq, many countries who had 
supported the war in Afghanistan voiced their disagreement with going to war in Iraq.  
For example, the President lost public support from the leaders of France, Jordan, Egypt, 
Russia, China, and Japan (Sciolino, 2002).  Likewise, in the United States, the populace, 
formerly unified in their fear of terrorism, split as the proposed war with Iraq became 
more of a possibility.  As Milbank (2002) explains, “A Gallup poll released [in October 
2002] found a bare majority of Americans—53 percent—favored a ground invasion of 
Iraq, down from 61 percent in June [2001] and 74 percent last November [November 
2001]” (p. A21).  In other words, the President was losing some of the consubstantiality 
that he had shared with the public since the attacks of September 11
th
.  In this chapter, I 
attempt to account for some of the reasons that some Americans ceased to identify with 
the President and his Iraq policies.    




 The President‟s loss of unity with the American populace between the 
Afghanistan and Iraq wars leads to my main question guiding this chapter of the 
dissertation: What in Bush‟s War on Terror rhetoric accounts for the public‟s faltering 
identification with the President and his policies between the Afghanistan war and the 
Iraq war?  To tie this question into the broader dissertation issue of the rhetorical 
construction of Bush as the moral values candidate, I also address the following two 
questions in the chapter conclusion: What moral persona does Bush construct in his War 
on Terror addresses?  Does he constitute a moral community to follow him? 
Justification of Burkean Tools 
As may be apparent from the above background information, identification with 
the President and his policies is key to understanding both the President‟s 
consubstantiality with the populace as the war in Afghanistan began, and his faltering 
identification with them  as the war in Iraq neared.  For Burke (1969b), rhetoric cannot be 
separated from identification, because “you persuade a man [or woman] only insofar as 
you can talk his [or her] language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, 
idea, identifying your ways with his [or hers]” (p. 55).  Thus, rhetoric cannot succeed if 
the speaker is unable to find some sort of common ground with his/her listeners.  This 
common ground is the basis of identification.  Burke (1969b) begins his description of 
identification by positing that “A is not identical with his [her] colleague, B.  But insofar 
as their interests are joined, A is identified with B.  Or he [she] may identify himself 
[herself] with B even when their interests are not joined, if he [she] assumes that they are 
or is persuaded to believe so” (p. 20).  As this explanation shows, identification can occur 




in several ways.  First of all, two people/groups could have a common interest.  On the 
other hand, they may not, but a powerful rhetor convinces the person/group that they do 
share an interest with the rhetor.  At any rate, “to identify A with B is to make A 
„consubstantial‟ with B . . . in acting together, men [women] have common sensations, 
concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them consubstantial” (Burke, 1969b, p. 21).  
As evidenced by the public‟s unity behind Bush from September 11, 2001 through the 
Afghanistan war, people identified with the President through their shared fear of 
terrorism.  However, the President lost some consubstantiality with the populace as the 
war in Iraq approached, which shows that the community created in the days following 
the 9/11 attacks suffered disunity as the narrative that led to the community‟s creation 
changed (Charland, 1987).   
  Furthermore, most any discussion of a moral persona fits squarely under Burke‟s 
(1969a) agent, which refers to the “person or kind of person [who] performed the act” (p. 
xv).  An agent focus is different from an act focus, however, as the analysis centers on the 
person committing the act rather than the act itself.  In the case of “moral character,” the 
person himself is believed to be moral because of intrinsic characteristics.  These intrinsic 
characteristics are then transformed into overt action, but it is traits of the individual that 
lead to an agent focus. 
Text Selection 
 In order to answer the chapter‟s guiding questions, I begin by using Bush‟s 9/11 
rhetoric to illustrate the background narrative that the President developed “when we 
knew it was a terrorist attack” (Bush, 2001d), a narrative that started on September 11, 




2001.  To better understand and explicate this narrative, I use Burke‟s (1973) cluster/agon 
analytical tool.  The first speech analyzed is the one that Bush gave on September 11, 
2001, which was the one delivered from the Oval Office (there were two previous 
address on that day, from a Florida Elementary School and a Louisiana Air Force Base, 
respectively, but the Oval Office address covers the information in those speeches and 
offers more as it was delivered at the end of the day, after the attacks).  The second 
speech analyzed is Bush‟s September 12, 2001, briefing about the attacks following his 
meeting with his national security team.  The third text is Bush‟s September 13, 2001, 
press release about the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance.  Bush‟s September 14, 
2001, speech on the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance rounded out my 
September 11
th
 texts.   I also looked at two addresses that Bush gave to commemorate the 
events of September 11, 2001: Bush‟s “Remarks to the Nation One Year Later,” which 
was delivered on September 11, 2002, and Bush‟s September 11, 2004, Radio Address. 
In order to ascertain possible reasons that some members of the populace ceased 
to identify with the President and his policies during the war in Iraq, I turn to Burke‟s 
(1969a) pentad, and I apply it to Bush‟s War on Terror speeches.  Specifically, I rely 
upon two speeches that Bush gave about the war in Afghanistan, his “Address to the 
Nation on Initial Military Operations in Afghanistan,” delivered October 7, 2001, and his 
“War on Terrorism” speech from November 8, 2001.  In both of these speeches, the 
President focuses his rhetoric on how the Taliban regime in Afghanistan is hiding 
terrorists who helped to plan the 9/11 attacks and is torturing the citizens of Afghanistan.  
The war with Afghanistan is thus framed as having the single goal of eradicating the 




Taliban regime, which will have the dual benefit of finding terrorists bent on destroying 
the United States and ending the suffering of the citizens of Afghanistan. 
 I also rely upon Bush‟s “Remarks on Iraq,” which was delivered on October 7, 
2002, and outlined the President‟s case for going to war with Iraq, mainly by showing 
that the country was a nuclear threat.  I also utilize Bush‟s “Address to the Nation on 
Initial Military Operations in Iraq,” which was delivered on March 19, 2003.  In these 
speeches, the President builds on an idea similar to one expressed in the Afghanistan 
speeches.  He explains how a corrupt leader is destroying the people living in the country 
while simultaneously presenting a continued threat to the United States.  Thus, I analyze 
four War on Terror speeches, two addressing the war with Afghanistan and two 
addressing the war with Iraq.   As my brief description of each shows, at first glance the 
speeches draw on a similar narrative: A foreign power is supporting terrorism against the 
United States and sanctioning mistreatment of the country‟s own people.  The ways in 
which these narratives diverge, and Bush‟s resulting loss of identification between the 
Afghanistan speeches and the Iraq speeches, is the focus of this chapter. 
To understand why his audience identifies more with him in and his policies in 
the Afghanistan rhetoric, I will analyze the rhetoric more in-depth.  In the remainder of 
this chapter, I begin by analyzing the cluster terms and the agon terms that the President 
uses to build his War on Terror narrative, which was formed in the hours and days 
following the attacks of September 11, 2001.  The vast majority of people identify with 
the President‟s narrative as he continued to use it in the Afghanistan addresses, but many 
fail to identify with the narrative in the Iraq addresses.  To further understand the 




faltering identification with the President and his policies, I then use Burke‟s pentad to 
understand how the narrative built in the cluster begins to show fissures that ultimately 
decrease the audience‟s unity with Bush.  I conclude by assessing the ethic that the 
President is using in each set of the War on Terror speeches and how these tie to the 
broader issue of the rhetorical construction of a moral persona in Bush‟s first term in 
office. 
Cluster Analysis 
 Bush‟s 9/11 rhetoric contains both a cluster and an agon.  For Burke (1973), the 
use of a cluster and a corresponding agon builds a rhetorical drama by constructing a 
story of “good” (represented by the terms in the cluster) versus “evil” (represented by the 
terms in the agon) (see also Berthold, 1976).  Per both Burke (1973) and Berthold (1976), 
I will discuss the cluster first and then the agon, showing how the two rely upon each 
other for narrative strength. 
Cluster: Peaceful, Freedom-Loving, Americans of Character  
 Bush‟s rhetoric repeatedly draws upon the national identity shared by most of the 
listeners in the speech that he gave on the evening of September 11, 2001: “Today, our 
fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of 
deliberate and deadly terrorist attacks . . . terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of 
our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America” (Bush, 2001a).  
In the face of the threat of terror, “Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve 
for justice and peace” (Bush, 2001a).  In these early references, Bush is identifying with 
his listeners.  All Americans, “from every walk of life” (Bush, 2001a), were affected by 




the attacks.  The attacks were an assault against all Americans.  Americans should be 
united behind the President‟s plan to find terrorists and to punish them, a move that, 
following the rhetoric, will ensure peace for the United States.  These references to our 
exemplify Burkean (1969b) identification. 
 Burke expanded upon his concept of identification in Dramatism and 
Development (1972).  There, Burke (1972) notes that identification often occurs via 
language choices that go unnoticed by the masses, and the “prime example is the word 
„we‟, as when the statement that „we‟ are at war includes under the same head soldiers 
who are getting killed and spectators who hope to make a killing in war stocks” (p. 28).  
Bush‟s references to the collective “we,” to the national identity shared by all Americans, 
continue in his later 9/11 addresses.  However, after September 11, 2001, as early as 
September 12, 2001, Bush began juxtaposing the collective “we” and the more 
generalized “Americans,” against the “other,” terrorists.  For instance, Bush (2001e) 
discusses how “the American people need to know [that] we‟re facing a different enemy 
than we have ever faced. . . . The United States of America will use all our resources to 
conquer this enemy.”  Because of their shared enemy, all Americans are involved in a 
war to secure their country: “We know that there is still a danger to America.  So we will 
not relent until the terrorists who plot murder against our people are found and dealt 
with” (Bush, 2004f).  Burke (1969b) asserts that “„identification‟ is, by the same token, 
through roundabout, to confront the implications of division” (p. 22).  By identifying with 
someone, an agent is necessarily identifying against that person‟s enemy.  Thus, using 
“we,” lumping all Americans together, and showing how all Americans were affected by 




the attacks of September 11
th
 functions rhetorically to allow Bush to justify continued 
war with those perceived to be plotting against Americans as all Americans are 
rhetorically constructed as being at-risk.  
 Since all Americans were affected by the attacks, all should “respond with the 
best of America” (Bush, 2001a).  Some Americans already are.  As Bush (2001h) 
explains: 
We see our national character in rescuers working past exhaustion, in long lines of 
blood donors, in thousands of citizens who have asked to work and serve in any 
way possible.  And we have seen our national character in eloquent acts of 
sacrifice. . . . In these actions and many others, Americans showed a deep sense of 
commitment to one another and an abiding love for our country. 
 
Bush (2001h) wants all Americans, all of those in the unified “we,” to sacrifice. For 
Bush, “character” equates with a person sacrificing for the benefit of other Americans.  
Bush wants all Americans who felt the pain of the attacks (which, as shown previously, 
via the use of the collective “we,” encompasses all people who identify as Americans) to 
be willing to sacrifice themselves for the betterment of the country.  Rhetorically, the call 
to sacrifice in the name of character may be Bush‟s way of inducing the populace to 
accept a loss of personal liberties for the purpose of protecting the country from terrorism 
(for more on the sacrifice of liberties after 9/11, see Balz [2001a], Balz [2001b ], Berke 
and Elder [2001]).  Americans of character should be willing to sacrifice personal 
freedoms in the name of keeping other Americans safe and secure.  Good Americans, 
Americans of character, sacrifice their own convenience for the betterment of other 
Americans, and initially, in the days following the attack, the vast majority of Americans 
were willing to make this sacrifice (Balz, 2001a; Balz, 2001b;Berke & Elder, 2001).      




As people of character, Americans love peace.  In his September 11, 2001, 
address from the Oval Office, delivered only hours after the attacks, Bush (2001a) notes 
that, “This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for 
justice and peace.”  Once again, Bush is using the collective “Americans” (and the 
collective “we”) to show how all Americans share a desire for peace.  Even in the face of 
violence, Bush is encouraging peace and unity among the populace, at least at first.  
Peace rhetorically becomes, somewhat ironically, one of the justifications for war.  On 
September 14, 2001, in his speech commemorating the National Day of Prayer and 
Remembrance, Bush (2001h) notes, “this nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to 
anger.  This conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others; it will end in a way and 
at an hour of our choosing.”  The following year, as Bush was justifying his desire to go 
to war with Iraq, Bush (2002b) explained that the armed conflicts following the 9/11 
attacks were “guarded by peace.”  Indeed, according to Bush (2004f), the goal of the wars 
was to “bring the peace and security we all want.”   
Of course, as Bush‟s (2001a) above quote about peace illustrates, the President‟s 
rhetoric links peace to justice.  For the President, justice involves retribution, going to 
war against those responsible for the attacks.  The retaliatory attack, if successful, would 
disempower the groups responsible for the September 11
th
 attacks.  In doing so, the 
retaliatory strikes would also return peace to the United States as the people once again 
would be able to live free from fear, in a state of peace. 
In addition to being peaceful, “we‟re the brightest beacon for freedom and 
opportunity in the world” (Bush, 2001a).  According to Bush (2001h), the terrorists 




“attacked America because we are freedom‟s home and defender,” and “we will not 
allow this enemy to win the war by changing our way of life or restricting our freedoms” 
(Bush, 2001f).  The attacks are thus framed not only as being against all Americans, but 
against all America stands for.  Indeed, “freedom and democracy are under attack” (Bush, 
2001f).  Americans, those in the unified “we,” value freedom.  Americans exist as free 
people.  Thus, even those who were not directly in the attacks suffered as the attacks tore 
at Americans‟ sense of freedom, at Americans‟ identity.  Rhetorically, this identification 
with freedom is one of the biggest justifications that Bush offers for the War on Terror.  
The terrorists are working to destroy not only the lives of Americans, but Americans‟ 
sense of freedom, their very identity as Americans.  The collective “we” is intertwined 
with freedom, for without freedom and democracy, Americans are not themselves.   
Agon: Deliberate and Evil Killings by Terrorist Enemies Committing Acts of War 
Bush relies upon the generalized term “American” to refer to the collective we, 
which consists of all people living in the United States.  According to Bush‟s 9/11 
rhetoric, the people living in the United States are peaceful people of character, and their 
very identity is intertwined with the notion of freedom.  Key to each of these cluster 
terms is the way that they work together to build a sense of absolute good as all 
Americans are rhetorically constructed as having been attacked for their desire to ensure 
that others have the right to live their lives as they please.  This characterization of 
absolute good Americans is juxtaposed against the terrorists, who Bush rhetorically 
constructs as being absolute evil, an other who killed Americans without reason or 
remorse.  




While Americans are characterized as “civilized people” (Bush, 2001f), the 
terrorists are labeled as “evil” twelve times in the speeches.  According to Bush (2001f), 
“civilized people around the world denounce the evildoers who devised and executed 
these terrible attacks,” and “this will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil, but 
good will prevail” (Bush, 2001f).  Rhetorically, the juxtaposition of good and evil helps 
to justify the War on Terror.  The collective “we” does not want to see such evil in the 
future, so Americans (i.e., the collective “we”), as good and civilized people, need to take 
action in order to maintain civility.  Important for developing a dramatic narrative, the 
use of labels like good and evil clearly demarcate an us/them split.   
Besides labeling the attackers as “evil terrorists,” Bush develops the idea that they 
are evil by choosing to focus on how calculated and deliberate the attacks were.  On the 
evening of September 11, 2001, Bush (2001a) explains that, “Today, our fellow citizens, 
our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly 
terrorist attacks.”  Keeping in mind the collective “we” from the cluster analysis, through 
this statement Bush (2001a) is showing how all Americans and “our way of life” were 
attacked, and that these acts of murder were acts of “deliberate and massive cruelty” 
(Bush, 2001h).  The evil of the terrorists in the agon is thus developed by showing a cold, 
calculating enemy who plots to destroy as much of the collective “we” as possible.   
Rhetorically, through labeling the attacks “acts of war,” Bush (2001f) serves to 
reinforce the notion of the United States as a peaceful nation, a construction that I 
examined in the cluster analysis of this chapter.  Through explaining the deliberate and 
evil actions of the terrorists as “acts of war,” the president puts the United States into the 




role of defender/responder.  The “war” is made to be entirely the fault of the attackers.  
The people of the United States are merely defending themselves against future evil.  
“They” started it, and “they,” following the rhetoric, left “us” with little choice in how to 
respond.  In the next portion of this chapter, I use Burke‟s (1969a) pentad to explore the 
ways in which the agent constructions change between the war in Afghanistan (where the 
narrative closely mirrors that of the September 11
th
 rhetoric) and the war in Iraq (where 
the narrative undergoes a noticeable shift) in an effort to understand why the President 
loss unity with the populace. 
Pentad Analysis 
 Beginning on September 11, 2001, Bush constructed a dramatic narrative 
centering on the idea that good Americans were attacked by evil others, and good 
Americans needed to support the proposed War on Terror in order to avoid being 
attacked again.  As press accounts show, a large number of people identified with the 
President and with his rhetorical construction of the events of September 11, 2001.  
Moreover, a large number of Americans also identified with the President as he entered 
the US into a war in Afghanistan.  However, in order to better understand both why much 
of the populace was unified with the President during the Afghanistan war and why many 
people failed to identify with the President in the Iraq war, I offer a closer comparative 
analysis of the narratives of the Afghanistan war rhetoric and the Iraq war rhetoric, 
focusing on the shifting roles of American agents and the unchanging role of the enemy 
others.  Any discussion of agent will be enhanced by Burke‟s (1969a) pentad.  I discuss 
the pentad in the following order: Act/Scene, Agent, Agency, and Purpose.  I conclude by 




offering some remarks on the President‟s construction of a moral persona and how he 
constitutes (or fails to constitute) a moral community in his War on Terror rhetoric. 
Scene and Act: A Shifting Relationship  
For Burke (1969a), scene refers to “the background of the act, the situation in 
which it occurred” (p. xv).  The scene is the context in which an act occurs, and, although 
it may not be featured in the rhetoric, it is always present (Burke, 1973).  For Burke 
(1969a), the act refers to “what took place in thought or deed” (Burke, 1969a, p. xv).   
Burke (1969a, 1984) discussed the interplay between scene and act through his 
action/motion dichotomy.  Basically, agents can either act (“action”) or be acted upon 
(“motion”).  
The action/motion dichotomy and its relationship to scene and act has been 
explored by Burkean scholars.  As Ling (1970) and Tonn, Endress, and Diamond (2005) 
found, a focus on scene can absolve an agent of guilt by reducing action to motion.  A 
scenic focus makes what is happening to the actor the result of outside forces over which 
the person has no control.  He/she is simply being acted upon, and there is nothing that 
she or he can do about it.   
The relationship between a scenic focus and an act focus discussed by Ling 
(1970) and Tonn, Endress, and Diamond (2005) is particularly clear in Bush‟s War on 
Terror speeches.  I have placed the act and the scene together in order to illustrate a 
possible reason that Bush lost the public‟s support as he entered the country into a war 
with Iraq.  In keeping with the rhetorical drama, there are two sets of acts and two scenes 




discussed, one for the American side and one for the rhetorically constructed enemy side.  
I discuss each in turn. 
The American Homeland: A Place to Preserve, A Place to Inhabit 
 Since all Americans in the collective “we” were affected by the September 11
th
 
attacks, every person in the collective “we” is an active agent who can help to rebuild the 
country.  As I will show throughout the remainder of this chapter, American civilians are 
only active agents in the Afghanistan speeches, so the actions that the people can 
undertake are only discussed in the Afghanistan texts.  In the Afghanistan speeches, the 
President explains how American civilians can help to rebuild the United States: 
All of us can become a September the 11th volunteer by making a commitment to 
service in our own communities.  So you can serve your country by tutoring or 
mentoring a child, comforting the afflicted, housing those in need of shelter and a 
home.  You can participate in your Neighborhood Watch or Crime Stoppers.  You 
can become a volunteer in a hospital, emergency medical, fire or rescue unit. . . . 
Americans have a lot to offer, so I‟ve created a task force to develop additional 
ways people can get directly involved in this war effort, by making our homes and 
neighborhoods and schools and workplaces safer.  And I call on all Americans to 
serve by bettering our communities and, thereby, defy and defeat the terrorists. 
(Bush, 2001e) 
 
 Rhetorically, the President‟s rhetoric builds the idea that through small actions like 
“tutoring or mentoring a child” (Bush, 2001e), the people are helping to rebuild the 
United States and are doing their part to help with the war effort.  Through being 
consubstantial with the President, the people, like their leader, are doing everything 
possible to help rebuild the country.  In the President‟s Afghanistan war narrative, every 
person can take an active part in restoring America to what it was on September 10, 2001.  
Through their “compassion” (Bush, 2001e), American civilians are given a way to join 
the fight for their country.   While the military is over in Afghanistan engaging in combat 




to preserve freedom, people in the United States are “renewing and reclaiming our strong 
American values” (Bush, 2001e) through their selfless acts, which shows that sacrificing 
of oneself for the betterment of the country is, for Bush, an American value.  Since all 
American agents were affected by the attacks, all American agents can take part in the 
effort to rebuild the country after the attacks.   Through their selfless actions, the people 
are able to regain some of the feelings of confidence and control that they lost on 
September 11
th
.   
 While the President encourages all Americans to “become a September the 11
th
 
volunteer” (Bush, 2001e) in the Afghanistan speeches, American citizens are hardly 
given any overt opportunity to act in the Iraq speeches.  In fact, the people as active 
agents are only mentioned in a couple of places, and only in the first of the two addresses.  
Bush (2002a) points out how, “Many Americans have raised legitimate questions: about 
the nature of the threat; about the urgency of action—why be concerned now; about the 
link between Iraq developing weapons of terror, and the wider war on terror. . . . Some 
citizens wonder, after 11 years of living with this problem, why do we need to confront it 
now?”   In other words, the only action ascribed to civilian Americans is that of asking 
the President why war is necessary.  Through phrasing opposition as questions, the 
President is able to be positioned as the all-knowing agent, as it is the President who can 
provide the answers.  Obviously, if the people are rhetorically constructed as being 
ignorant and the President is rhetorically constructed as having the answers that the 
populace does not, there is a loss of consubstantiality between Bush and the people.  




In keeping with the consubstantiality shift explained above, the President and the 
military with which he is consubstantial in the Iraq war speeches are quite active in the 
rhetoric, so active in fact that the President and the military act on behalf of American 
civilians who are not given opportunities to act on their own accord.   Bush (2002a) and 
the US military “will act with allies at our side, and we will prevail. . . . We will secure 
our nation, protect our freedom, and help others to find freedom of their own. . . . [Both 
are] committed to defending the international security that protects the lives of both our 
citizens and theirs.”  Bush and the US military are thus rhetorically constructed as being 
the only ones who can keep the United States safe from another 9/11 attack.  Moreover, 
Bush (2003) is the ultimate active/powerful agent.  For though the military is working to 
keep America safe, Bush (2003) explains how it is “On my orders, coalition forces have 
begun striking selected targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein‟s 
ability to wage war.”  Bush ultimately controls the military, the same military that is 
singlehandedly keeping America safe.  Contrary to the Afghanistan speeches, the 
American people are not ascribed any sort of action that they can undertake to help 
rebuild and secure the United States.   
In fact, American civilians are reduced merely to part of the American scene.  The 
President dedicates his Iraq speeches to explaining how Iraq is a continued threat to the 
safety and security of the United States:  
We know that Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy—
the United States of America. We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-
level contacts that go back a decade. . . .  And we know that after September the 
11th, Saddam Hussein's regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on 
America. Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical 
weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists. Alliance with terrorists could 




allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints. (Bush, 
2002a) 
 
Importantly, the focus is on the United States‟ land, not necessarily on the people who 
inhabit that land.  The President mentions “the terrorist attacks on America,” how “the 
Iraqi regime [could] attack America” (Bush, 2003 [italics added]).  These references do 
not focus on Americans, but rather on America.  In other words, the focus is on the scene 
of American land rather than on American people/agents.  It may be because of this 
scenic focus that the people of the United States are not given the chance to act on their 
own behalf.  Rather, they are part of the American scene that was attacked on September 
11
th
, and they are a part of the American scene that is vulnerable to future attack if 
Saddam Hussein is not stopped.  The people can only wait to either be attacked or to have 
the US military act on their behalf. 
The loss of the ability to act could definitely account for why so many people 
were not unified with the President in the Iraq war speeches.  The people are stripped of 
their ability to heal their 9/11 wounds through taking an active part in the rebuilding and 
protecting effort, reduced to a vulnerable scene that would most certainly suffer another 
attack if not for the actions of the military and the President with whom the military is 
rhetorically consubstantial. 
The Enemy Bases: A Place of Plotting and Planning 
 While Bush‟s descriptions of America and Americans shifts from an act focus in 
the Afghanistan speeches to a scenic focus in the Iraq speeches, the rhetoric for the 
enemy others has a strong act focus throughout.  Bush (2002a) explains how the terrorists 
in Afghanistan are working to “train new recruits and coordinate their evil plans” to “kill 




all Americans, kill all Jews, and kill all Christians” and to “destroy our freedom and 
impose its views.”  Common to all of these descriptions of the enemy other in 
Afghanistan is the idea of actively plotting to attack the United States.  The very 
activeness of the evil other, in fact, is what is driving the President to make the most 
dramatic act of the speeches, that of going to war.  Following the rhetoric, the other in 
Afghanistan is actively working to destroy the United States, so the United States needs 
to act in response. 
 Like the terrorists-harboring Taliban in Afghanistan, Saddam Hussein is 
rhetorically constructed as being actively working to destroy the United States.  
Following Bush (2002a), “Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons and 
is increasing his capabilities to make more. And he is moving ever closer to developing a 
nuclear weapon. . . . Hussein would be in a position to pass nuclear technology to 
terrorists,” which should be easy, given that “Saddam Hussein is harboring terrorists and 
the instruments of terror, the instruments of mass death and destruction” (Bush, 2002a).  
Saddam Hussein is thus rhetorically constructed to be actively stockpiling weapons of 
mass destruction to give to terrorists, terrorists who would then use them to destroy the 
United States.  Much like with the discussion of the terrorists in Afghanistan, the rhetoric 
about Saddam Hussein focuses on an actively plotting agent.  The focus is on the act and 
on the potential to act.  And, once again, the rhetoric unfolds by showing that the 
possibility of the enemy‟s act necessitates that the United States undertaking the dramatic 
act of going to war. 




 In keeping with Burke‟s (1969a) pentad, the enemy others‟ scene is present, 
though, importantly, it is not featured in any of the rhetoric about the enemy other.  The 
scene of the other is merely the backdrop for the actions described above, evidenced by 
the fact that, in Bush‟s (2001e) claim that “This is a different war from any our nation has 
ever faced, a war on many fronts, against terrorists who operate in more than 60 different 
countries.”  The focus in all of the speeches remains on the acts that the others have done 
and are planning, not on the places in which they are planning.  The President chooses to 
focus on only two of the “60 different countries” because the focus is not on the countries 
per se but rather on the terrorist activities going on inside of them.   
 The President‟s shifting focus as he discusses the United States does not have a 
corresponding shift as he explains the enemy others and their scene.  And this shift may 
help to account for why so many Americans who identified with Bush in the Afghanistan 
conflict no longer felt consubstantial with the President during the Iraq conflict.  Recall 
that the people of the United States go from being agents who can act by “becom[ing] a 
September the 11
th
 volunteer” (Bush, 2001e) in the Afghanistan speeches to the victim-
in-waiting in need of military protection in the Iraq speeches.  In Burkean terms, they are 
reduced from active agents to part of the scene.  However, the enemy agents are not 
rhetorically constructed as experiencing a similar loss in their ability to act.  In both the 
Afghanistan speeches and the Iraq speeches, the enemy others are rhetorically 
constructed to be actively plotting another attack on the United States.  And yet, 
American civilians in the Iraq speeches are not left with a way to work towards ensuring 




the future survival of themselves and their country, which could account for part of the 
reason that Bush lost consubstantiality with his populace. 
Agent 
 For Burke (1969a), agent refers to the “person or kind of person [who] performed 
the act” (p. xv).  In keeping with Burke‟s (1973) requirements for a rhetorical drama, 
there are two sets of agents in these speeches, American agents and enemy agents, and I 
discuss each one in turn.  However, unlike the other chapters in this dissertation, the 
status of Bush-as-agent shifts dramatically.  In the Afghanistan speeches, the President is 
consubstantial with the populace, but in the Iraq speeches the President is consubstantial 
with the military.  This shift is addressed as it relates to the President‟s faltering 
identification with the populace and as it relates to the agent status of the enemy other. 
Bush‟s Shifting Agent Status and the Resulting (Dis)Identification with the American 
Public 
 Bush‟s Afghanistan rhetoric makes the President consubstantial with Americans.  
The President explains how “as we have learned, so suddenly and so tragically, there can 
be no peace in a world of sudden terror” (Bush, 2001b), for “We have endured the shock 
of watching so many innocent lives ended in acts of unimaginable horror.  We have 
endured the sadness of so many funerals” (Bush, 2001e).   Like the rest of the people 
living in the United States, the President was directly affected by the attacks of 
September 11
th
.  The President is thus consubstantial with Americans, and the 
consubstantiality is built through the references to the 9/11 attacks.  The President‟s 
identification with the American populace is reinforced through the President‟s 




references to the collective “we.”  From the above quotes, it is clear that “we” suffered a 
terror attack, that “we” saw many innocent people die, that “we” had to go to many 
funerals for terror victims.  The collective “we” rhetorically shows that the President is 
identifying with all Americans, for all Americans, Bush included, comprise the collective 
“we.” 
 Keep in mind that, for Burke (1969a), agent also encompasses the “kind of person 
[who] performed the act” (p. xv).  All of the collective “we,” Bush included, are 
rhetorically constructed as being people of “character.”  Bush (2001c) explains how after 
the 9/11 attacks, Americans became “awakened to service, and citizenship, and 
compassion.”  For example,  
Financial donations to the victims‟ families have reached more than a billion 
dollars.  Countless Americans gave blood in the aftermath of the attacks.  New 
Yorkers opened their homes to evacuated neighbors. . . . Children across America 
have organized lemonade and cookie sales for children in Afghanistan. . . . Our 
children have sent in more than $1 million for the children of Afghanistan. (Bush, 
2001e) 
 
The American populace is thus comprised of good, caring people, people who are 
sacrificing their money, their time, even their blood to help the United States rebound 
from the attacks.  Everyone in the United States can do something to help America 
rebuild.  Like the citizens described above, members of the military are also developed as 
sacrificing of themselves to better the country: “We ask a lot of those who wear our 
uniform. We ask them to leave their loved ones, to travel great distances, to risk injury, 
even to be prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice of their lives” (Bush, 2001b).  
Importantly, this idea of good and innocent Americans working together to rebuild the 
country continues the narrative that the President constructed in the days following the 




9/11 attacks.  Good Americans were victimized, but they are going to work together, with 
their President, to overcome the adversity that was thrust at them by the enemy. 
 While Bush is consubstantial with all Americans in the Afghanistan speeches, 
there is a dramatic shift in Bush‟s agent status in the Iraq speeches.  The President 
focuses his rhetoric on the United States military as the active agent.  Bush (2002a) 
explains, “Terror cells and outlaw regimes building weapons of mass destruction are 
different faces of the same evil. Our security requires that we confront both. And the 
United States military is capable of confronting both.”  In other words, while the country 
is still, in keeping with the narrative, in great danger from “terror cells,” the ability to 
deal with the threat is now isolated to the US military.  In fact, the American public, so 
important in the earlier War on Terror narrative, is nearly absent in the Iraq war rhetoric.  
It is the military that is in “the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free 
its people, and to defend the world from grave danger” (Bush, 2003).  In other words, 
military agents are protecting the country from “terrorism” and helping to continue the 
rebuilding effort. 
Furthermore, in the Iraq war rhetoric, the President is consubstantial with the US 
military.  Bush (2002a) discusses how “We will plan carefully; we will act with the full 
power of the United States military; we will act with allies at our side, and we will 
prevail.”  We does not refer to all Americans, but to the we that is undertaking the 
military action in Iraq, that is, American and coalition military forces and the President 
who authorized the military action.  While Bush is still part of a consubstantial “we,” the 
“we” now refers to the military.  Via the “we will act with allies at our side” (Bush, 




2002a), Bush rhetorically constructs himself as being a part of the military action.   
Importantly, both the US military and the President are rhetorically constructed as the 
good and powerful agents who are working to ensure that the country remains safe from 
terrorism.  The members of the military are people of “skill and bravery” who are of 
“honorable and decent spirit” (Bush, 2003).  By virtue of being consubstantial with them, 
the President rhetorically becomes brave and decent and willing to sacrifice as well.  
Moreover, the military (and, by extension, the President who is consubstantial with it), is 
constructed as the absolute good, as the one who “the peace of a troubled world and the 
hopes of an oppressed people now depend on” (Bush, 2003).   
However, the citizens of the United States, the same citizens who were made 
consubstantial with the President and his effort to rebuild the US in the Afghanistan 
speeches, are excluded as active agents from the rhetoric.  In fact, the only time that the 
civilian citizens of the United States are addressed is when the President (2003) explains 
how “I want Americans and all the world to know” about the threat and the military effort 
in Iraq (Bush, 2002a).  The American populace is thus nearly put into the role of the 
ignorant agent, the agent that needs to be informed by a wiser, more powerful agent.  The 
people of the United States are given no other task than to listen to the President to learn 
what is really going on in Iraq. 
Bush, without being consubstantial with any other agent, sets himself into the role 
of the knowledgeable and powerful agent.  At times Bush breaks away from his 
consubstantiality with the military and rhetorically places himself as the most powerful 
agent, for it is “On my orders, coalition forces have begun striking selected targets of 




military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein‟s ability to wage war” (Bush, 2003).  
Following the rhetoric, while the military is considered to be good and willing to sacrifice 
for the betterment of the country, it is President Bush who is ultimately in charge of the 
military as he is the only one who can order them to war.     
Through shifting from being consubstantial with the masses to being 
consubstantial with (and even in charge of) the military, the President changes the entire 
narrative of the War on Terror.  The collective “we” created in the dramatic narrative 
Bush spoke in the days following 9/11 and carried through the Afghanistan manifestation 
of the War on Terror emphasized that every person living in the United States was 
affected by the 9/11 attacks, so everyone can (and should) do something to help with the 
rebuilding effort, as helping is what “compassionate” Americans of “character” do (Bush, 
2001e).  Through focusing on the shared pain that all Americans felt and the shared 
ability that all Americans have to rebuild the country, the President‟s narrative creates a 
community that is vulnerable to terrorism yet resilient in the face of a continued threat, a 
narrative that empowers Americans to continue enacting American values of sacrifice 
and character.  This narrative of empowerment begins in the days following the attacks 
and continues throughout the Afghanistan war.  However, the narrative shifts with the 
commencement of the war in Iraq.  Through focusing on the military and his role as 
Commander-in-Chief, the President changes the agent roles in his narrative.  The people 
of the United States are no longer included as active agents in the rhetoric.  This shift in 
agent status alone may help to account for why Bush lost support between Iraq and 




Afghanistan, but, through an examination of the unwavering other/enemy agent status, 
the loss of agent status experienced by most Americans becomes even more profound. 
Dangerous Others‟ Unchanging Agent Status 
 While the agent status of American citizens changes from the Afghanistan 
speeches to the Iraq ones, the President‟s description of the enemy agents does not 
change.  In discussing the Taliban in Afghanistan, the President explains how the 
terrorists in Afghanistan “have threatened other acts of terror” (Bush, 2001b).  Similarly, 
in explaining Saddam Hussein, Bush states “Iraq is continuing to finance terror and gives 
assistance to groups that use terrorism. . . . Iraq could decide on any given day to provide 
a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists. Alliance with 
terrorists could allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without leaving any 
fingerprints” (Bush, 2002a).   In both sets of texts, then, the enemy agents are rhetorically 
constructed to be dangerous, and if they are not stopped, they will engage in “other acts 
of terror” (Bush, 2001b), possibly through the use of “a biological or chemical weapon” 
(Bush, 2002a).   In all four speeches, the enemy agents are rhetorically constructed as 
having killed Americans and as plotting to kill many more. 
Moreover, the enemy others are rhetorically constructed as, to use Bush‟s (2001e, 
2002a, 2003) word, “evil.”  To illustrate the evil of the enemy others, the President 
explains how they disregard and destroy not only the lives of Americans, but also the 
lives of people living in their own country.  Under Taliban rule, there are “starving and 
suffering men and women and children of Afghanistan” (Bush, 2001b) who live in 
constant fear of leaders who “target innocent civilians,” leaders “who celebrate the 




murder of innocent men, women, and children” (Bush, 2001e).  The Afghan leaders are 
rhetorically constructed as barbarians who gleam joy from torturing children and cause 
suffering for most people living in the country.  Likewise, in Iraq, “On Saddam Hussein's 
orders, opponents have been decapitated, wives and mothers of political opponents have 
been systematically raped as a method of intimidation, and political prisoners have been 
forced to watch their own children being tortured” (Bush, 2002a), and Saddam Hussein 
has “attempt[ed] to use innocent men, women and children as shields for his own 
military” (Bush, 2003).  Like the Afghanistan leaders, Saddam Hussein is rhetorically 
constructed as a callous leader who tortures and murders innocent children to assert his 
own dominance.  In both the Afghanistan and Iraq speeches, then, the enemy others are 
rhetorically constructed as evil others who torture and kill their own people even as they 
plan how to torture and kill Americans.  They have, in Bush‟s (2001e) terms, no respect 
for life. 
 In discussing the tortured others, Bush makes American citizens rhetorically 
consubstantial with the Afghani and Iraqi citizens.  Like the citizens of Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the people of the United States have suffered extreme loss at the hands of the 
uncivilized leaders and their weapons of violence.  Basically, in a war built on the idea of 
protecting the United States from future attack, the people within those countries are 
made to be victims much like the people living in the United States.  The 
consubstantiality with the people of Afghanistan and Iraq reinforces the President‟s claim 
that “The United States of America is a friend to the Afghan people, and we are the 
friends of almost a billion worldwide who practice the Islamic faith” (Bush, 2001b), and, 




specifically, “America is a friend to the people of Iraq” (Bush, 2002a).  The war is not 
against the people in the country, and they are not the active agents in the texts.  They 
are, as was explained in the previous section, part of the scene on which the war is being 
fought.  Importantly, as was discussed in the scene section of this paper, in the Iraqi texts, 
the American people are, like their consubstantial Iraqi counterparts, reduced to being 
part of the scene.  American citizens, Afghanistan citizens, and Iraqi citizens have all 
suffered at the hands of the enemy others, and war is the only way that any of them can 
avoid attack from the enemy others in the future. 
 What is particularly striking about the nemeses‟ agent status is that it does not 
change at all from the Afghanistan speeches to the Iraq ones, even as the American 
people‟s agent status shifts dramatically.   As I showed, the American people were 
rendered less active agents in the Iraq speeches.  Consequently, the narrative should show 
a similar shift in the nemeses‟ agent status.  As it stands, the rhetoric leaves the masses in 
the United States with very little ability to act (and thus very little agent status), but the 
rhetorically constructed evil others are still as powerful and as cunning as they were on 
September 11, 2001.  Lay citizens of the United States are thus still rhetorically 
constructed as being at risk from the “evil” others, but the citizens can do very little to 
ensure their own safety.  This rhetorical shift, from active agent protecting the US to 
passive citizen protected by the military, could account for one reason that Bush lost 
unity with the American populace between the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.     
 
 





 According to Burke (1969a), agency refers to “the means or instruments” (Burke, 
1969a, p. xv) used to carry out an act.  In keeping with Burke‟s (1973) requirements for a 
rhetorical drama, Bush and the enemy others both rely upon agency, though the fact that 
the enemy others‟ agency does not change could account for some of the public‟s waning 
identification with the President and his policies.  To better explain how, I begin by 
describing Bush‟s agency and the US populace‟s agency, and then I detail the unchanging 
agency ascribed to the enemy others. 
Bush‟s Agency: Official Authority and American Values 
 In order to justify his decision to go to war in Afghanistan, the President relies 
upon his official authority.  In the first sentence of his “Address to the Nation on Initial 
Military Operations in Afghanistan,” Bush (2001b) tells his American audience, “On my 
orders, the United States military has begun strikes against Al Qaeda terrorist training 
camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.”  It is only on 
order from the President that the military is able to act.  In other words, the President 
relies upon his official authority to declare and justify the war.  Bush (2001b) continues, 
“At my request, many governors have activated the National Guard to strengthen airport 
security.”  The President‟s authority allows him to tell the governors how states can work 
to keep the country safe.  Bush‟s official authority is really what gives him the ability to 
act and the right to be heeded by state governments and the US military.  Moreover, 
Bush‟s official authority allows him to serve as a leader to the people at a time when they 
all need to come together.  It is Bush (2001e), via his position as President, who is able to 




“create a task force to develop additional ways people can get directly involved in this 
war effort, by making our homes and neighborhoods and schools and workplaces safer.”  
The President‟s official authority allows him to create outlets to bond Americans together 
in the common cause of defeating terrorism in the days following the 9/11 attacks 
through the war in Afghanistan.  
 The people are empowered through the President and his official authority in the 
Afghanistan speeches.  As active agents in their own right, American civilians also have 
agency in the Afghanistan rhetoric.  Specifically, Bush (2001e) tells Americans: 
One way to defeat terrorism is to show the world the true values of America 
through the gathering momentum of a million acts of responsibility and decency 
and service. . . . And I call on all Americans to serve by bettering our 
communities and, thereby, defy and defeat the terrorists. Our great nation—
national challenge is to hunt down the terrorists and strengthen our protection 
against future attacks.  Our great national opportunity is to preserve forever the 
good that has resulted.  Through this tragedy, we are renewing and reclaiming our 
strong American values. 
  
 Thus, Americans can work to overcome terrorism through enacting American values, 
making values the agency by which every American can do his/her part to beat the 
terrorists.  It is through “American values” that Americans can undertake the acts of 
volunteerism and sacrifice described in the act section above. 
 Bush‟s agency does not change in the Iraq war speeches.  It is still “On my 
orders” that “coalition forces have begun striking selected targets of military importance 
to undermine Saddam Hussein's ability to wage war” (Bush, 2003a).  Much like in the 
Afghanistan speeches, Bush‟s official authority, granted to him through his position of 
President of the United States, is the means by which he is able to order a military action 




against Iraq.  Moreover, it is because of his position as President that Bush is able to 
inform the American populace that 
I want to take a few minutes to discuss a grave threat to peace, and America‟s 
determination to lead the world in confronting that threat. The threat comes from 
Iraq. . . . Many Americans have raised legitimate questions: about the nature of 
the threat; about the urgency of action—why be concerned now; about the link 
between Iraq developing weapons of terror, and the wider war on terror. These are 
all issues we‟ve discussed broadly and fully within my administration. And 
tonight, I want to share those discussions with you. (Bush, 2002a) 
 
Through his office, the President is able to be more knowledgeable about the situation in 
Iraq than lay citizens.  It is through his position as President that Bush is able to not only 
know the “truth” about what is going on in Iraq, but also why he is in a position to 
enlighten American civilians about the threat and his chosen course of action.  Without 
his official role, Bush would not be privy to such information or be in a position to share 
his knowledge with the masses.  Bush‟s official authority is thus the means by which the 
President knows about the threat and shares it with the masses, making it a form of 
agency. 
Interestingly, the focus on American values as a way to combat terrorism does not 
appear in the Iraq speeches, so the only agency left to American civilians is taken away.  
Of course, since the people are reduced to part of the scene and stripped of their right to 
act in the Iraq speeches (discussed in the act/scene section above), the absence of an 
agency for them makes sense.  After all, for Burke (1969a), agency refers to the means 
used to carry out an act.  Thus, lacking an ability to act, the people simultaneously lose 
any agency. 
 




Enemies‟ Agency: Illegitimate Authority and Murder 
 While Bush‟s authority is legitimate, granted to him by the people of the United 
States,
13
 the enemies are rhetorically constructed as not having legitimate authority in 
their countries.  In discussing the Taliban in Afghanistan, Bush (2001b) asserts that, 
I gave Taliban leaders a series of clear and specific demands: Close terrorist 
training camps. Hand over leaders of the Al Qaeda network. And return all 
foreign nationals, including American citizens, unjustly detained in your country. 
None of these demands was met. And now, the Taliban will pay a price. By 
destroying camps and disrupting communications, we will make it more difficult 
for the terror network to train new recruits and coordinate their evil plans. 
 
The Taliban in Afghanistan is not given any sort of recognition as a legitimate authority.  
Rather, the President discusses the Taliban as merely a part of the “Al Qaeda network” 
that presumably attacked the United States on September 11, 2001.  The ruling group in 
Afghanistan is rhetorically constructed as an illegitimate leader, one that is offering no 
contribution to the world stage, serving instead as a training ground for terrorists who 
want to plan and carry out another terrorist attack against sovereign nations.  The Taliban 
is discussed as more of a terrorism-enabler than a legitimate governing authority.  It is 
through this illegitimate authority that the Taliban is able to provide “terrorist training 
camps” on which the terrorists are (allegedly) planning future attacks (acts discussed in 
the act/scene section of this chapter). 
 Similarly, Bush (2002a) discusses how Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein “has chosen 
to build and keep these weapons despite international sanctions, U.N. demands, and 
isolation from the civilized world.”  Unlike the U.N. and the “civilized world” that it 
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 Perhaps because of the events of September 11
th
, the 2000 election fiasco was no longer in the headlines.  
Some may claim that Bush was falsely relying upon legitimate authority, but Bush builds his rhetoric 
around the idea that, unlike his adversaries, his authority is legitimate and official. 




recognizes, Saddam Hussein is rhetorically constructed as a leader who is not recognized 
by a legitimate authority like the U.N.
14
  Lacking such recognition puts Saddam 
Hussein‟s Iraq into a category opposite that of the “civilized world,” a compilation of 
nations where the leaders meet with the U.N. to decide how to proceed rather than 
meeting with “Iraqi nuclear scientists, a group he [Saddam Hussein] calls his „nuclear 
mujahedeen‟ -- his nuclear holy warriors” (Bush, 2002a). Basically, unlike Bush and the 
rest of the “civilized world,” which rely upon U.N. sanctions and recognized channels for 
dealing with conflict, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein relies upon a group that, to the masses 
in the US who do not speak any Arabic, sounds very similar to the name of the terrorist-
linked “jihad.”  Of course, as a rhetorically constructed illegitimate authority, Saddam 
Hussein really does not have any recognizable group from which to seek assistance as the 
recognizable groups, like the U.N. and other bodies representing the “civilized world,” 
have turned their backs on him. 
 Both the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq are using their 
(rhetorically constructed) illegitimate authority to torture and murder their own people 
and to threaten the United States.  Because of the Taliban, the masses in Afghanistan are 
“starving and suffering  . . . oppressed” (Bush, 2001b) by leaders who have instituted 
policy that makes “free expression grounds for execution” (Bush, 2001e).  Likewise, in 
Iraq, “On Saddam Hussein‟s orders, opponents have been decapitated . . . political 
prisoners have been forced to watch their own children being tortured” (Bush, 2002a).  
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 Ironically, Bush himself went against U.N. suggestions when he decided to enter into a war with Iraq.  
The U.N. wanted to try additional sanctions against the country before entering into an armed conflict 
(Bruni, 2002).  In other words, Bush‟s construction of events begins to unravel even as he utters them, for 
Bush himself is operating without the sort of legitimating U.N. approval that he chastises Saddam Hussein 
for lacking. 




And the enemy others who are using torture in their own countries to maintain their 
power have now focused their aggression on the United States.  As Bush (2002a) 
explains, “Our enemies have threatened other acts of terror” (Bush, 2001e), and, more 
specifically, “Saddam Hussein is harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the 
instruments of mass death and destruction.”  Through continuing threats of torture and 
murder, the enemy others are trying “to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat” (Bush, 
2001a).  
Torture and murder, or “evil,” thus become the means by which the enemy others 
remain a constant threat to the United States and keep the masses in line in their own 
countries, thus making torture and murder their agency.  In keeping with the dramatic 
narrative, the rhetorically constructed evil of the enemy others, others who use torture 
and murder to accomplish their goal of dominating their own people and the world, 
stands in stark contrast to the rhetorically constructed good of the Americans, who are 
using their “American” values of sacrifice and character to combat terror. 
 Overall, Bush‟s discussion of the Taliban regime does follow his 9/11 narrative.  
The Taliban regime in Afghanistan was a murderous regime that actively supported 
terrorism (Frank & Rehman, 2003; Neamatollah, 2002).  The Taliban was not an 
officially recognized governing body, for it was not granted formal recognition on the 
world stage (Frank & Rehman, 2003; Neamatollah, 2002), and no one perceived the 
Taliban to be a legitimate governing body.  The President‟s War on Terror narrative thus 
began by constructing an enemy who had no autonomous connection to any country.  It is 
possible that people really identified with the idea of an isolated other, an enemy that 




does not have a government agency to fall back on, an enemy totally disengaged from 
society.  The other constructed in the 9/11 rhetoric and the Afghanistan rhetoric was an 
unstable and illegitimate other who did not have any formal authority in the countries that 
it was inhabiting (like Afghanistan) or trying to destroy (like the United States). 
 The idea of an enemy who is gaining control through illicit means, without any 
sort of formal authority, thus grounds the President‟s War on Terror narrative.  However, 
the narrative may have shown a fissure as the War on Iraq neared.  While Saddam 
Hussein was certainly not the leader most Americans (or probably most Iraqis for that 
matter) would choose, he was, by Iraqi standards and by the Arab League‟s standards 
(Arab League, 2009), a legitimate leader.  Saddam Hussein was widely regarded as the 
leader of Iraq, and he had held such a post for 24 years (MacFarhquar, 2006).  Hence, 
another possible reason for the loss of public identification with the President as the Iraq 
war neared could have come from the fact that the narrative centering around a 
controlling enemy who lacked official authority, a narrative that began in the days 
following the September 11
th
 attacks, simply did not hold up in the case of Iraq.    
Purpose 
 For Burke (1969a), purpose refers to why an action is undertaken, and for 
Charland (1987), the audience is actively constituted through the rhetoric, and through 
the constitutive rhetoric the people form a collective identity.  This constitution of a 
collective identity (or furtherance of a certain ideology) can be read as a purpose of the 
rhetoric.  In Bush‟s War on Terror rhetoric, the purpose of the rhetoric shifts from the 




Afghanistan addresses to the Iraq addresses, but the purpose of the enemy agents does not 
change. 
Bush‟s Shifting Purpose: From Empowering the Masses to Furthering a Militaristic 
Conservative Ideology 
 As explained in the cluster portion of this chapter, Bush‟s rhetoric shows how all 
Americans were affected by the 9/11 attacks.  Consequently, as I explained in the agent 
and act portions of this chapter, since all were affected, all can help with the rebuilding of 
America and the fight against terrorism.  Bush (2001e) explains how, “I call on all 
Americans to serve by bettering our communities and, thereby, defy and defeat the 
terrorists. . . . All of us can become a September the 11th volunteer by making a 
commitment to service in our own communities.”  In giving the people a way to help 
with the War on Terror, the President empowers the people.  American citizens are given 
the chance to help with a war effort that is rhetorically constructed as being the only way 
that Americans can  once again experience “the freedom of people everywhere to live and 
raise their children free from fear” (Bush, 2001e).  In other words, every American can 
do something to ensure that s/he is not the victim of another terrorist attack.  The ability 
to live “free from fear” was stripped away from Americans on the morning of September 
11, 2001, but in the Afghanistan speeches, the President provides a way for the people to 
regain their sense of safety through helping with the War on Terror.  Empowering the 
masses to become more involved in their communities and to work together to overcome 
the tragedy of September 11, 2001 is the purpose of the Afghanistan war rhetoric. 




 The empowerment of the masses is not the purpose of the Iraq addresses.  As 
explained in the scene and agent portions of this chapter, American civilians are not 
granted agent status as they are not given the ability to act.  Rather, they are reduced to 
part of the vulnerable scene.  The rhetorically constructed vulnerability of the American 
scene is crucial to understanding Bush‟s purpose in the Iraq war speeches.  Bush (2003) 
wants “military operations to disarm Iraq.”  Basically, Bush does not want Saddam 
Hussein to have the ability to build weapons that could in turn be used against the United 
States.  The President‟s purpose in the Iraq war speeches can thus be interpreted as 
promoting a militaristic conservative ideology.  As Diamond (1995) explains, 
conservatives have, historically, relied upon a show of military force to combat perceived 
threats to national security and to assert the correctness of their own way of life.  
Conservatives believe that armed conflict can keep the country safe from those perceived 
to be a threat (the most prevalent example prior to Bush‟s administration was the 
communism threat, against which America troops were sent into countries to fight those 
whose political framework did not align with the USA).   To tie this ideology back to the 
war with Iraq, Iraq was not responsible for September 11
th
.  However, following the 
rhetoric, the country did present a threat to the United States.  This “they could attack us 
so let‟s attack them first” logic has been a hallmark of militaristic conservatism 
(Diamond, 1995).   By using the same sort of framework to justify the US-led invasion of 
Iraq, Bush is reinforcing and furthering the ideology.  Importantly, in a militaristic 
conservative ideological narrative, the masses are left out of the decision making process, 
acted on behalf of rather than acting on their own accord (which again puts Bush right in 




line with the militaristic conservative ideology, for, as I explained in the agent and scene 
section above, American civilians are stripped of their right to overtly act and, as a result, 
their agent status). 
   Thus, if people identified with the President and his original War on Terror 
narrative, then the overall shift in the purpose of the Iraq war rhetoric could have led to 
disunity between American civilians and the President.  The idea that the War on Terror 
is a community effort, something with which all Americans can help, and, in the process 
of helping, regain some of the security lost on the morning of September 11, 2001, is 
completely negated in the Iraq war speeches as American civilians are reduced to 
ignorant non-agents who merely need to be informed by the all-knowing President and 
agree with his war.   
The decision to attack an autonomous country (see previous section) who had not 
attacked the United States first completely disrupts the initial War on Terror narrative 
that the President constructed in the days following the 9/11 attacks.  While the initial 
narrative focused on a retaliatory strike “against terrorists who operate in more than 60 
different countries” (Bush, 2001b), the President‟s Iraq war narrative focuses instead on 
attacking one country who may attack the United States at some point.  In other words, 
the narrative undergoes a dramatic shift that puts the United States into the role of the 
aggressor rather than the defender.  It may be that many Americans who had identified 
with the defender role simply could not identify with the aggressor role that the new Iraq 
war narrative brought with it. 
 




Enemy Other‟s Unchanging Purpose: Assert Ideological Superiority through Violence  
 In discussing both the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the 
rhetorically constructed purpose of the enemy other is the same.  Bush (2001b) explains 
how in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan,  
the terrorists do not believe women should be educated or should have health 
care, or should leave their homes.  We value the right to speak our minds; for the 
terrorists, free expression can be grounds for execution.  We respect people of all 
faiths and welcome the free practice of religion; our enemy wants to dictate how 
to think and how to worship even to their fellow Muslims.  
 
Likewise, “Saddam Hussein‟s regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on 
America. . . . [Now] Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. . . . [and] that 
could bring sudden terror and suffering to America” (Bush, 2002a). In each of these 
enemy agent constructions, the purpose of the enemy other is the same.   Each wants to 
assert the ideological superiority of their own belief system, and each of the enemy others 
is willing to “kill all Americans, kill all Jews, and kill all Christians” (Bush, 2001e) to 
further their ideology worldwide.  And the violence for noncompliance is not limited to 
the United States and US allies.  The Taliban in Afghanistan are leaving the people 
“oppressed” (Bush, 2001b).  Likewise, in Iraq, “opponents have been decapitated” (Bush, 
2002a).  People everywhere, both in the enemy other countries and abroad, are expected 
to adhere to the regulations put in place by the Taliban and by Saddam Hussein or face 
the deadly consequences.  The enemy other believes that their ideology is so superior that 
it is worth killing for. 
What is perhaps the most shocking about Bush‟s shift to a militaristic 
conservative ideology is that it nearly mirrors the rhetorically-constructed purpose of the 




enemy others.  Bush‟s rhetoric develops the idea that the enemies‟ purpose is to establish 
the superiority of their own beliefs.  However, upon analysis, it becomes clear that 
Bush‟s purpose in Iraq is very similar.  Bush (2003) is sending troops into Iraq “to disarm 
Saddam” and to “help Iraqis achieve a united, stable, and free country,” similar to the 
rhetorically constructed freedom that people living in the United States enjoy, 
democracy.   In other words, Bush‟s form of government (democracy) is so superior that 
he is relying upon war /violence in order to establish it in Iraq.  And, as discussed above, 
the President, much like the enemy others, does not care if the masses do not agree with 
his decision.  Thus, the narrative that Bush builds in the days following September 11
th
 
and continues through the Afghanistan addresses crumbles so badly towards the end of 
the Iraq addresses that the rhetorically constructed hero and the rhetorically constructed 
villain are depicted as being involved in the same act of plotting against an autonomous 
country, and they are doing so with the same goal of asserting the superiority of their own 
belief system.  This dramatic change in the narrative, and the unflattering light in which it 
casts President George W. Bush, could help to account why much of populace no longer 
identified with the President. 
Conclusion 
 In the days and months following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
majority of the people in the United States identified with the President and his policies.  
This identification may come from the narrative that Bush created on the evening of 
September 11, 2001.   In that narrative, all Americans were affected by the attacks, and 
all were doing their respective part to help the country rebuild.  Americans were 




rhetorically constructed as being dramatically different from the attackers.  While the 
attackers‟ hate fueled their violent acts that resulted in “thousands of lives [being] 
suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror” (Bush, 2001a), Americans “responded 
with the best of America. With the daring of our rescue workers, with the caring for 
strangers and neighbors who came to give blood and help in any way they could” (Bush, 
2001a).  Basically, Americans responded to the terror attacks by enacting the American 
value of compassion for others.  The initial 9/11 narrative thus focused on how all 
Americans could enact American values to defeat terrorism. 
 The narrative of American civilians enacting American values to defeat terrorism 
continued as the President discussed the war in Afghanistan.  The President‟s rhetorical 
narrative maintained that all Americans were affected by the attacks, and all could do 
something to help with the rebuilding effort, all could “become a September the 11
th
 
volunteer” (Bush, 2001b).  Thus, in Burkean (1969a) terms, every American was an 
agent with the ability to act.   In fact, it was through overt acts that the people could, 
following the rhetoric, help with the war effort and regain some of the feelings of safety 
that were threatened on September 11
th
.  The fact that the war in Afghanistan narrative so 
closely mirrors the September 11
th
 narrative cannot be overlooked, for in both of these 
sets of texts, the people identified with the President and his policies. 
 The President‟s faltering identification with the public as the Iraq war began was 
the focus of this chapter.  The people are not accorded the ability to overtly act in either 
of the Iraq war speeches.  As a result, they are stripped of their agent status.  The 
President places American civilians into the role of the ignorant other, the other that the 




President needs to enlighten about the situation in Iraq.  American civilians merely 
become part of the scene that is vulnerable to attack from Saddam Hussein and others 
consubstantial with terrorism.  This dramatic shift in the narrative, a shift that serves to 
disempower the masses, leaves the people with no way to actively pursue their own 
continued survival, and could help to explain why fewer people identified with the 
President during the war with Iraq.   The people are rhetorically constructed as being 
entirely reliant upon Bush and the US military, and there is nothing that they can do at 
home to help with the ongoing war effort.  There is no discussion of a role for the former 
“September the 11
th
 volunteers” (Bush, 2001b).   
Thus, in response to the main question guiding this chapter, I believe that Bush‟s 
shifting discussion of Americans as active agents helps to account for why so many 
people who identified with the President during the Afghanistan war failed to identify 
with him during the Iraq war.  The terrorists had already left the masses feeling 
disempowered and vulnerable, and in the Iraq war, Bush reaffirmed this position.  The 
people are vulnerable and there is nothing that they can do about it but rely upon the 
military.  It is not terribly surprising that the masses no longer identified with a leader 
who was rhetorically placing them in the same position that they had been in on the 
morning of September 11, 2001.    
 I asked two other questions designed to help tie this chapter to the dissertation: 
What moral persona does Bush construct in his War on Terror addresses?  Does he 
constitute a moral community to follow him?  As may be apparent by this point, the 
answers to those questions vary from the Afghanistan speeches to the Iraq ones.  In 




Afghanistan, Bush‟s moral persona is more utilitarian (see Mill, 2009).  Following the 
rhetoric, not only will the war in Afghanistan help to ensure the future safety of 
Americans, it will also give much needed food, monetary aid, and medical assistance to 
the people of Afghanistan.   The terrorists and the Taliban who harbor them will, if the 
war effort is successful, die or be permanently detained, but innocent people in the United 
States, in other coalition countries, and in Afghanistan will benefit.   Following the 
rhetoric, the masses will be able to live a life free from the fear of terror, even if terrorists 
have to die in the process.  The war is thus rhetorically constructed as being good for the 
vast majority of people, and in utilitarian ethics, an ethical act is one that ensures the 
greatest good for the greatest number of people (Mill, 2009). 
  The President‟s framing of the war in Afghanistan as a communal effort allows 
him to construct a moral community to follow him.  Following the utilitarian moral 
persona that Bush develops (discussed above), American citizens are some of the people 
who will reap the greater good if the war is successful.  Moreover, Americans can help 
with the war effort, which means that they can help to ensure that themselves and others 
reap the greater good.   All Americans can enact the American value of sacrificing for the 
greater good of the country.  In this case, the President explains how Americans can 
sacrifice time and money to help with the war effort and to send aid to Afghanistan.   It is 
through recognizing Americans as agents and giving them overt acts to help with the 
moral effort that the President constructs a moral community to follow him into the 
Afghanistan war.   The people are united with the President as all Americans are 
rhetorically constructed as working together for the common, greater good.  Together, the 




President and the American populace can combat terrorism through showing their 
generous character and their willingness to help others in need. 
 Interestingly, the President simultaneously constitutes a moral community that is 
united around the idea of fear.  While Bush mainly focuses his rhetoric on what 
Americans can do at home to help with the war effort abroad, there are parts in the 
speeches that highlight the fact that the only reason the President is able to constitute a 
moral community in response to September 11
th
 is September 11
th
.  As I have shown, 
throughout the War on Terror rhetoric the people are united through, and in many ways 
acting as a response to, their fear of another terrorist attack.    
Conversely, in Iraq, the President relies more on what I have termed “elitist 
ethics.”  Recall the ways in which American civilians are reduced to part of the scene, 
stripped of their agent status and the ability to overtly act that accompanies agent status.  
The main agents in the texts are President George W. Bush and Iraqi leader Saddam 
Hussein (the US military is also an agent, though it is only acting on the President‟s 
orders, making the President the most active agent).   The ethical struggle is thus between 
two world leaders, made elite by their official positions, the money that accompanies 
their official positions, and the authority and power that accompanies their official 
positions.   
 Framing the ethical struggle as being between himself and Saddam Hussein does 
not allow the President to constitute a moral community to follow him.  Morality fits 
squarely under Burke‟s (1969a) agent, as agent refers not only to the person who 
performed the act, but the type of person who performed the act, in this case a moral 




person.  When Bush reduces the people from active agents to part of the scene, he robs 
them of their right to actively constitute a moral community, for communities are made 
up of people, and the people in the community actively work to ensure its continuity.  
The people are still rhetorically constructed as being part of a community gripped by fear, 
but, in the case of Iraq, there is nothing that they can do to deal with that fear.  They are 
not given a space in which to act, which makes it impossible to act morally (or 
immorally).  The people, a community formerly unified around sacrificing of themselves 
for the greater good of both Americans and Afghanis, are reduced to the powerless role of 
the ignorant scene-filler. 
 In the next chapter, I analyze the moral persona that Bush develops in his same-
sex marriage addresses, addresses where the President ultimately relies upon elitist ethics 
as he frames the issue of same-sex marriage as being a battle between himself and 
“activist judges” who are ruling that gays and lesbians have a constitutional right to 
marry.  In the process of focusing mainly on himself and the activist judges in the 
rhetoric, the President serves to disempower the people actually affected by the decision, 
















ETHICAL DEFINITIONS?: PURPOSIVE APPEALS TO ACT AND AGENT AS THE 
DENIAL OF ETHICAL CHOICE IN BUSH‟S SAME-SEX MARRIAGE ADDRESSES 
“I strongly believe that marriage should be defined as between a man and a woman.  I 
am troubled by activist judges who are defining marriage” (Bush, 2004a). 
Introduction 
 In chapter 2, I analyzed the moral persona that Bush developed in his embryonic 
stem cell research addresses, addresses with which the majority of Americans, including 
many in the pro-life base, could not identify.  The embryonic stem cell research rhetoric 
was interesting not only because of the way that it led to many people feeling less 
identification with the President, but also because it was one of the issues that people 
would expressly identify as a “moral values” issue in Bush‟s first term.   
 In May 2004, the first legally-recognized same-sex marriages were performed in 
the state of Massachusetts.   The state‟s Supreme Court had ruled that the state‟s 
prohibition of same-sex marriage was unconstitutional according to the state‟s 
constitution (Kranish & Johnson, 2004).  In July 2004, just four months before the 
presidential election, President Bush (2004c) made one of his most controversial first-
term announcements: “The Administration strongly supports Senate passage of the 
Marriage Protection Amendment.”  Democrats called the President‟s proclamation an 
election-year ploy aimed at ensuring votes from conservative Christians, for the 
Democrats knew that the proposed same-sex marriage ban was all but guaranteed to fall 




short of the necessary votes in Congress and in the Senate, meaning that the measure 
would never pass on a federal level (Kaufman & Allen, 2004; Kirkpatrick, 2004).  The 
President nonetheless openly encouraged both houses of Congress to pass a 
Constitutional Amendment defining marriage as being between one man and one woman, 
and he vowed to do everything in his power to “protect” marriage in America.   
 Ultimately, “the Republican-controlled Senate blocked a proposed constitutional 
amendment to bar same-sex marriage” (Dewar, 2004).  In other words, even with his own 
party controlling the Senate, Bush “couldn‟t muster the 67 votes necessary to approve a 
constitutional amendment” (Milligan, 2004, p. A1).  Bush‟s vow was thus legally a 
failure, and, in the eyes of some journalists a loss that was “handing President Bush a big 
election-year defeat” (Dewar, 2004, p. A3).  However, symbolically, Bush‟s adamant 
stand behind a Constitutional Amendment that most agree he knew would ultimately fail 
helped the President construct a rhetorical narrative that created consubstantiality 
between the President and a majority of the populace.  In this chapter, I assess the ways 
in which the President‟s same-sex marriage narrative fostered identification between 
himself and many Americans.   In addition, to tie this chapter to the dissertation, I address 
two additional questions in the conclusion: 1) What moral persona does President Bush 
create in his same-sex marriage rhetoric? 2) Does he constitute a moral community to 
follow him? 
Text Selection 
 On February 28, 2004, following the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruling 
regarding same-sex marriage, President Bush offered comments to the press and to the 




president of Tunisia about the issue of same-sex marriage.  At that time, Bush (2004a) 
said, “I strongly believe that marriage should be defined as between a man and a 
woman,” and discussed his views about same-sex marriage.  President Bush was 
discussing the issue more in-depth in the United States.  That same week, on February 24, 
2004, the President stated that “our nation must enact a constitutional amendment to 
protect marriage in America. . . . [because] some activist judges and local officials have 
made an aggressive attempt to redefine marriage” (Bush, 2004b).  This was the earliest 
statement where Bush discusses “activist judges” as being responsible for the redefinition 
of marriage, a characterization that, as I show in this chapter, is important for 
understanding the rhetorical narrative being put forth in the texts.  In June 2004, Bush 
addressed the Southern Baptist Convention, a group who was consubstantial with the 
President because of their shared Christian beliefs.  In speaking to this group, Bush 
(2004c) noted that, “My administration is defending the sanctity of marriage against 
activist courts and local officials who want to redefine marriage forever.”  As I explain 
throughout this chapter, even when addressing a conservative Christian audience, the 
President still discusses the activist judges as the main culprits in the same-sex marriage 
debate, which is surprising, given that, especially with this particular group, the President 
could have re-stated the position taken by the Christian Right in the Culture Wars, that 
being gay is a sin (see Diamond, 1995; Hunter, 1991).  The rhetorical implications of this 
omission are explored in the pentadic analysis.  In his July 10, 2004, radio address, the 
President summarized how the Massachusetts Supreme Court was changing the definition 
of marriage and how the only way to stop such a shift in the meaning of marriage was to 




amend the U.S. Constitution by adding, “an amendment that defines marriage in the 
United States as a union of a man and woman as husband and wife” (Bush, 2004e).  
Finally, the President publicly stated his support for the Marriage Protection Amendment 
in his “Statement[s] of Administration Policy,” one of which was directed to the House of 
Representatives, the other of which was directed to the Senate.  
Justification of Burkean Tools 
 If press accounts are right, and Bush‟s vow to work to ban same-sex marriage was 
more a symbolic gesture of conservatism than a promise of action, then Kenneth Burke‟s 
theories are particularly apt for studying Bush‟s anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric.  Keep in 
mind that identification was a key idea in Burke‟s work.  Burke (1969b) was interested in 
the ways in which audiences identified with a rhetor and his/her rhetoric.  This idea was 
further developed by Charland (1987), who posited that audiences are actively constituted 
through the rhetoric, for it is through rhetoric that collective identities/ideologies form.  
In Bush‟s anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric, Burke‟s (1973) cluster/agon method allows 
for a better understanding of the narrative that Bush constructs in explaining the need for 
the  Marriage Protection Amendment, a narrative that puts Bush in opposition to the 
activist judges who are “redefining the fundamental institution of marriage” (Bush, 
2004g).  While the cluster/agon analysis helps to reveal the narrative that helps to 
constitute collective identities (Charland, 1987), in order to more fully understand the 
moral persona that the President creates in his rhetoric, and to assess whether or not he 
constitutes a moral community to follow him, I rely upon Burke‟s (1969a) pentad tool to 
better understand how (or if) lay citizens in the United States are being constituted as 




agents and given the right to act in a way that would allow them to constitute a moral 
community.   
Cluster Analysis 
 Bush‟s same-sex marriage addresses contain in them both a cluster and an agon.  
For Burke (1973), the use of a cluster and a corresponding agon build a rhetorical drama 
by constructing a story centering around “good” (represented by the terms in the cluster) 
and “evil” (represented by the terms in the agon) (see also Berthold, 1976).  Per both 
Burke (1973) and Berthold (1976), I will discuss the cluster first and then the agon, 
showing how the two rely upon one another for strength. 
Both the cluster and the agon are clustering their terms around the idea of defining 
marriage, though how each side does so differs dramatically.  The definitional 
differences between the two drive the elements of the pentad and, upon analysis, reveal 
the deeper meaning of the rhetoric. 
Cluster: Marriage is a Sacred Union Between a Man and a Woman to Form Families that 
are Fundamental to Society 
 For Bush, marriage is, first and foremost, “a union between a man and a woman” 
(Bush, 2004a).  In his remarks with the Tunisian president, Bush (2004a) explains that, “I 
strongly believe that marriage should be defined as between a man and a woman. . . . I‟ll 
support a law to protect marriage between a man and a woman.”  This statement already 
shows that Bush intends to “protect” what he takes as the traditional definition of 
marriage.  The word “protect” is rhetorically powerful in this case as it sets the stage for 
the rhetorical drama (to be discussed shortly) that Bush‟s later anti-same-sex marriage 




rhetoric creates.  “Protect” develops the idea that there is more at stake than mere 
definition, for a mere word/definition does not warrant extreme measures being taken to 
protect it.  Indeed, “protect” functions rhetorically to build the President‟s narrative that 
the attempted re-definition of marriage is putting all of society at risk.  The President and 
those who identify with him need to protect traditional marriage in order to protect 
society. 
The reason that Bush works to hard to protect his definition is aptly summarized 
in his radio address: 
The union of a man and a woman in marriage is the most enduring and important 
human institution . . . the most fundamental institution of civilization . . . and the 
law can teach respect or disrespect for that institution.  If our laws teach that 
marriage is the sacred commitment of a man and a woman, the basis of an orderly 
society, and the defining promise of a life, that strengthens the institution of 
marriage. . . . Marriage [has strong] cultural, religious, and natural roots. . . . For 
ages, in every culture, human beings have understood that traditional marriage is 
critical to the well-being of families.  And because families pass along values and 
shape character, traditional marriage is also critical to the health of society. . . . 
And changing the definition of traditional marriage will undermine the family 
structure. (Bush, 2004e) 
 
Basically, Bush believes that retaining his definition of marriage, by defining marriage as 
only being between one man and one woman, is fundamental to the continuance of 
American society.   
For the President, marriage between one man and one woman forms the basis of 
families, and without this sort of family structure, America will crumble as it is families 
that pass along moral values to the next generation.
15
  Following the logic of Bush‟s 
narrative, with a change in the meaning of marriage, Americans will experience a change 
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 While moral values may come from sources other than the family, the President does not address this 
possibility in his anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric, nor does he address the fact that same-sex couples can 
and do raise morally upstanding children. 




in the meaning of family as well, and this shift in meaning will result in a loss of 
character.  Of particular interest, given the persona that Bush constructs throughout the 
entirety of his first term, is the way in which society becomes inextricably linked to the 
Christian God here.  In Bush‟s (2004c) own words, “The union of a man and woman is 
the most enduring human institution, honored and encouraged . . . by religious faiths.”  In 
other words, marriage is rhetorically tied to religion, and, as I have shown throughout the 
dissertation, Bush identifies religion with the Christian God.  The President thus 
rhetorically constructs himself as working to uphold a definition of marriage that aligns 
with the definition of marriage put forth by the Christian God, a definition that is 
fundamental to society.  Following the rhetorical narrative the President constructs, by 
working to protect the institution of marriage, Bush is working to protect all of American 
society from losing its stability and structure.  
The ways in which the President will protect the institution of marriage become 
clear in the addresses that he makes in the following months.  In his July 10, 2004, radio 
address, Bush (2004e) expands upon how he will protect marriage between one man and 
one woman.  He begins by explaining that “in 1996, Congress overwhelmingly passed 
the Defense of Marriage Act, and President Clinton signed it into law.  That legislation 
defines marriage, for the purpose of federal law, as a union between a man and a woman” 
(Bush, 2004e).  However, as the President explains, the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
ruling allowing same-sex marriage shows that the Defense of Marriage Act is simply not 
doing enough to protect marriage: “Four judges on the [MA] state‟s highest courts have 
ordered the issuance of marriage licenses to applicants of the same gender” (Bush, 




2004b).  Consequently, because marriage “should be defined as between a man and a 
woman” (Bush, 2004a), President Bush (2004e) explains that “I urge members of the 
House and Senate to pass, and send to the states for ratification, an amendment that 
defines marriage in the United States as a union of a man and a woman as husband and 
wife.”  The President thus continues to build his rhetorical narrative in a way that 
identifies himself, his policies, and his supporters with conservative ideology.  
Conservatives, especially Christian conservatives, have been fighting against rights for 
same-sex couples for years (Diamond, 1995).  Moreover, the President‟s rhetoric 
reinforces the conservative Christian narrative that liberals are infiltrating the courts to 
eliminate Christianity and its institutions (like “traditional” marriage) (Hunter, 1991).  
Following Christian conservative ideology, good Christians need to identify with their 
God-given leaders (like Bush), in order to protect God and his plan for America.  
Taken together, the cluster terms reinforce a Christian conservative ideology in 
which marriage between a man and a woman is a creation of the Christian God, and, as 
such, maintaining it in its current form is fundamental to the functioning of the society 
that God created.   If the listener identifies with this narrative and with the President who 
is telling it, then the listener may feel compelled to stand by Bush in his quest to protect 
this God-given institution, work to ban same-sex marriage, and, following the rhetoric, 
act morally and in accordance with the will of the Christian God.  However, if the listener 
does not identify with Bush‟s narrative and his plan to ban same-sex marriage, then the 
listener is, following the narrative, acting immorally and against the will of the Christian 
God.  At first reading, then, Bush‟s rhetoric fosters an identification with conservative 




Christians as it furthers narratives that have been building the conservative Christian 
ideology for years.  However, Bush‟s narrative also fosters an identification with those 
who do not share his religious views, mainly because Bush‟s narrative reaches those who 
fear experiencing a strong and detrimental change in society.  Allowing same-sex 
marriage will, following Bush‟s rhetorical narrative, lead to the downfall of society as 
Americans know it, and Americans will find themselves living in an America where there 
is no stability, no real family, no tradition.  Hence, the President‟s builds his narrative in 
such a way that identifying with it is made to seem like the commonsensical course of 
action, for failure to identify with the President will result in the downfall of American 
morality and, ultimately, American society.   
Agon: Marriage is the Evolving Paradigm of a Legal Contract that is Devoid of Tradition 
 For the “activist judges,” Bush‟s nemeses in this rhetorical drama, marriage is “a 
legal contract” (Bush, 2004e) between two people, regardless of their gender, which, 
according to Bush, shows how the judges view marriage to be “an evolving paradigm” 
(Bush, 2004e).  Keep in mind that, for Burke (1973), cluster terms and agon terms stand 
in opposition to one another, and this fact is particularly clear here.  Recall from the 
cluster analysis that Bush‟s rhetoric focuses on the ways in which opposite-sex marriage 
is fundamental to the continuation of society as we know it.  Consequently, in the agon, 
the President‟s rhetorical narrative shows how the activist judges are working to change 
society.   If the President is working to keep what has worked for centuries the same, then 
his nemeses are working to change it, largely by viewing society as malleable, or, in the 
words of the President, as “an evolving paradigm” (Bush, 2004e).   




In the cluster, the President‟s rhetorical narrative showed the importance of 
traditional marriage, a union between a man and a woman that is stable and enduring.  In 
the agon, where the judges are working to redefine marriage as a legal contract between 
two people, Bush (2004e) discusses how, “an activist court that strikes down traditional 
marriage would have little problem striking down the Defense of Marriage Act.  
Overreaching judges could declare that all marriages recognized in Massachusetts or San 
Francisco be recognized as marriages everywhere else.”  The President‟s narrative shows 
how society is already beginning to change as federal and state laws could be overturned 
by “overreaching judges.”  With the change in the definition of marriage, society begins 
to change, which is exactly the fear that is being set up in the cluster portion of the drama. 
Of particular note for showing the contrasts between the two groups in the 
rhetoric, for Bush and those who identify with him, opposite-sex marriage is considered 
to be a union, but for the activist judges and those who identify with them, same-sex 
marriage is considered to be a legal contract.  This difference in terms serves to de-
legitimize same-sex couples and their unions.  “Union” implies that the people are joined 
together completely.  “Legal contract,” by contrast, makes those involved in the contract 
seem distanced, in this case reducing a marriage to nothing more than a legally-binding 
agreement rather than a complete joining together of two people.  Interestingly, by 
focusing on legality versus morality, the President‟s rhetoric builds the idea that legal 
rulings have no tie to morality.  Law itself very nearly becomes the agonistic term to 
morality.  Either people are moral (like the President and those who are consubstantial 




with him), or they are legalistic (like the “activist judges” and those who are 
consubstantial with them). 
Because for the activist judges marriage is nothing more than a legal contract, it is 
“cut off from its cultural, religious, and natural roots, [and] the meaning of marriage is 
lost, and the institution is weakened” (Bush, 2004e), which “sends a message to the next 
generation that marriage has no enduring meaning, and ages of moral teaching and 
human experience have nothing to teach us about this institution” (Bush, 2004e).  For 
Bush, the activist judges in the agon are stripping marriage of all of its traditional 
meaning, which becomes important because of the ways in which Bush identifies 
traditional marriage as being fundamental to society.  Recall that in the cluster analysis, I 
showed how Bush wants to protect so-called traditional marriage because such marriage 
is rhetorically constructed as being fundamental to society, as being pertinent to teaching 
traditional moral values and family values to the next generation.  Consequently, in the 
agon, Bush (2004e) shows how the redefinition of marriage as a legally-binding contract 
between two people will serve to strip marriage of all of its tradition, which will prove 
detrimental to American society.  Following Bush‟s rhetorical narrative, stripping 
marriage of tradition, like the activist judges are doing, will result in “redefining the 
fundamental institution of marriage” (Bush, 2004g), which will change society for the 
worse. 
Rhetorically, Bush‟s agon terms serve to make identifying with him and his 
narrative seem like the commonsensical course of action.  The activist judges are trying 
to destroy the basis of American society by changing “the most fundamental institution of 




civilization” (Bush, 2004e), heterosexual marriage, which has taught people moral values 
for centuries.  Following the rhetorical narrative, changing the definition of marriage will 
strip the next generation of moral teaching, and if the listener identifies with this narrative 
and the conservative ideology therein, then the listener should desire to ban same-sex 
marriage to protect traditional morality. 
Dramatic Tension 
 As Burke (1973) explains, rhetors who employ the cluster/agon framework have 
simultaneously told a story of good versus evil that creates a dramatic tension.  Bush 
constructs a dramatic narrative in his statements, and he does so by relying upon the 
classic good versus evil framework.  As may be apparent from this analysis of the cluster 
and agon constructions in Bush‟s statements on same-sex marriage, the President 
constructs a rhetorical drama where Bush is the hero and the activist judges are the 
villains. 
 Bush does not mention judges who do not support same-sex marriage at all in his 
rhetoric.  At first glance, then, it almost seems as though the President is labeling all 
judges as “activist,” but upon closer reading of the rhetoric, it becomes apparent that the 
President is only considering those judges who do not share his views to be “activist,” 
and it may be that only the “activist” judges are mentioned in the rhetoric because they 
are the rhetorically-constructed villains. 
 For Bush, the villains are the “activist judges” who are “redefining the 
fundamental institution of marriage” (Bush, 2004g).  The so-called “overreaching judges” 
(Bush, 2004e) are abusing their official position to fundamentally change society by 




stripping marriage of its ties to religion and culture (see Bush, 2004e).  The judges “have 
taken it on themselves to change the meaning of marriage” (Bush, 2004e), a change that 
will, following the President‟s rhetoric, have detrimental effects on society, including the 
demise of families, morality, and religious tradition.  Thus, the President constructs the 
judges as having too much power already, for “American democracy, not court orders, 
should decide the future of marriage in America” (Bush, 2004e), but the judges‟ 
overreaching power is allowing them to bypass the public‟s will and change the meaning 
of society‟s “most fundamental institution” (Bush, 2004g).  Furthermore, it seems that the 
judges want to exercise their power to the greatest possible extent, for they will not be 
satisfied until “the Defense of Marriage Act [is] struck down by activist courts” (Bush, 
2004b).  These power-hungry judges are working to ruin America by destroying families 
and robbing the next generation of moral fiber.  Subtly, and in keeping with Burke 
(1969b), Bush‟s narrative is identifying with mainstream Americans here.  The listeners, 
lay citizens of the United States, are the ones who are at risk of losing their moral fiber, 
of having their society fundamentally changed, of having their family structure altered, 
irrevocably for the worse.  The appeals to society-at-large could rhetorically serve to 
draw the listener in.  While the President (oddly) abstains from inclusive language,
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attempt at identification is present nonetheless.  Everyone who lives in society could face 
a much different nation if the activist judges are not stopped. 
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sorts of terms are the attempts at identification that are most likely to go unnoticed.  In the anti-same-sex 
marriage rhetoric, Bush relies mainly upon his own authority and a doomsday narrative that constitutes 
Americans as being on the verge of losing their very way of life.  The importance of Bush‟s reliance upon 
his own authority will be explored more in-depth in the pentad analysis portion of this chapter. 




Having established the villains in his narrative, the President then juxtaposes 
himself against the villains in the drama, setting himself up as the rhetorically-
constructed hero.  Following Bush‟s narrative, the villainous activist judges are working 
to destroy American society by changing the definition of marriage, which will alter the 
family structure, which will result in the children of the next generation having no basis 
to form moral values or character as these are developed through traditional nuclear 
families.  Consequently, Bush, as the hero, is working to protect society from 
overreaching judges by advocating for the passage of a Constitutional Amendment, for 
“when judges insist on imposing their arbitrary will on the people, the only alternative 
left to the people is an amendment to the Constitution—the only law a court cannot 
overturn” (Bush, 2004g).   
 The President‟s narrative builds the idea that the populace is being stripped of 
their power, for the judges are using their judicial authority to change society through 
redefining its “most fundamental institution” (Bush, 2004e), and they are doing so 
without justification or cause, as is shown through the word “arbitrary.”  Through the use 
of the word “arbitrary,” the judges‟ decision is made to seem illogical, as though it is not 
based on case law or constitutionality at all.  Rather, the ruling is rhetorically constructed 
to be made on the whim of a few judges.  American citizens, on the other hand, are left 
with little recourse for acting on their own accord, as the activist judges are “imposing 
their arbitrary will on the people” (Bush, 2004e), “and unless action is taken, we can 
expect more arbitrary court decisions” (Bush, 2004b).  The people are being acted upon, 
and, in Burke‟s (1969a, 1984) terms, are rhetorically constructed as being reduced from 




action to motion at the hands of the judges.  Consequently, in his rhetorical narrative, 
Bush (2004a) explains how “marriage ought to be defined by the people.”  The hero 
wants to protect society and give Americans the right to define “the most fundamental 
institution” (Bush, 2004e) in their society. 
Bush advocates taking a drastic step like amending the Constitution in order to 
“defend marriage” (Bush, 2004e) and the traditional families that come with it, traditional 
families that “pass along values and shape character,” making “traditional marriage 
critical to the health of society” (Bush, 2004e).  Following the narrative, the hero is doing 
everything in his power to stop the villains from destroying society as the collective we 
knows it.  Once again, identification is key to the success of the rhetorical narrative.  The 
President needs for his listeners to feel concerned over the threat to their long-term well-
being so that they will stand behind him, adopt his moral values, and support the 
proposed Amendment if given the chance to do so. 
Pentad Analysis 
 From an analysis of the cluster terms and the agon terms, I have shown that there 
is a strong tension between two sets of agents, Bush and the “activist judges,” both of 
which are trying to define marriage (which will be discussed shortly as an act).  Each side 
is trying to redefine marriage to, following the narrative, alter society, which is 
purposive.  In other words, through an analysis of the cluster and agon terms in Bush‟s 
anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric, a cursory pentadic analysis becomes evident, though it 
needs to be examined more in-depth to fully understand the moral persona that the 
President constructs for himself in the rhetoric and to assess whether or not he constitutes 




a moral community to follow him.  Thus, I now examine Bush‟s anti-same-sex marriage 
via Burke‟s (1969a) pentad.   I show how Bush‟s rhetoric leaves the debate over same-
sex marriage in the hands of an elite few, and, importantly, completely out of the hands 
of those directly affected by it, gays and lesbians living in the United States.  To better 
explain how this disempowerment occurs, I begin by explaining the scene, then I discuss 
the act and the agents.   To complete the pentad analysis, I analyze the agencies employed 
for each side and the ideologically-driven purpose of each side.   I conclude by assessing 
the moral persona that the President constructs and assessing whether or not he 
constitutes a moral community to follow him. 
Scene 
 Recall that, for Burke (1969a), scene refers to “the background of the act, the 
situation in which it occurred” (p. xv).  In keeping with the cluster/agon drama, in Bush‟s 
anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric, there are two scenes, one for Bush and one for the 
judges, and they stand in stark opposition to one another. 
Bush‟s Scene: The Legislature 
 Bush (2004b) begins by discussing how “Eight years ago, Congress passed, and 
President Clinton signed, the Defense of Marriage Act, which defined marriage for 
purposes of federal law as the legal union between one man and one woman as husband 
and wife. The Act passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 342 to 67, and the 
Senate by a vote of 85 to 14.”  In other words, in 1996, the U.S. legislature formally 
defined marriage in the United States as being between one man and one woman.  Now, 
in 2004, following the rhetoric, “the Administration urges both houses to pass the 




Marriage Protection Amendment” (Bush, 2004g), which “defines marriage in the United 
States as a union of a man and woman as husband and wife” (Bush, 2004e).  In both 1996 
and 2004, both houses of the United States Congress and the President‟s office are the 
places in which marriage is defined.  Thus, the legislature is rhetorically constructed as 
the place where the meaning of marriage is legitimated for all of American society. 
Activist Judges‟ Scene: The Courtroom‟s Judicial Bench 
Following the rhetorical narrative, there is now a competing place where marriage 
is being defined in the United States.  As Bush (2001b) explains, “some activist judges 
and local officials have made an aggressive attempt to redefine marriage. In 
Massachusetts, four judges on the highest court have indicated they will order the 
issuance of marriage licenses to applicants of the same gender in May of this year.”  In 
other words, the courtroom‟s judicial bench is becoming another place in which marriage 
is defined.  For Bush (2004e) the courtroom scene is simply not the place in which 
marriage should be defined, and the judges are “overreaching” with the actions that they 
are undertaking in their judicial scene. 
 What is striking about both of these scenes is that they are completely removed 
from mainstream American society.  Recall in the cluster/agon analysis, I discussed on 
how, following Bush‟s narrative, a change in the meaning of marriage will result in 
changes throughout all of society.  However, society is only mentioned in passing.  The 
places where the action occurs, the scene in Burke‟s (1969b) sense of the word, are 
bureaucratic locations where only an elite few can have their say and really make a 
difference in society.  The rest of society is merely stuck with the decision that is reached 




in these locations.  Bush‟s scenic descriptions thus serve to reduce mainstream 
Americans from active agents to passive motion.  Either Americans are affected by what 
is decided in the legislature, or they are affected by what is decided in the courtroom.
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Either way, they are not left with very much opportunity to act on their own accord.  The 
ramifications of this disempowerment are discussed more in the act section and in the 
conclusion of this chapter. 
Act 
 For Burke (1969a), the act refers to “what took place in thought or deed” (p. xv).  
In keeping with Burke‟s (1973) cluster/agon drama, there are two sets of acts in these 
addresses, the good acts and the evil acts.  And, in keeping with the requirement for a 
rhetorical drama, the two acts are working against each other. 
Bush‟s Act: Define Marriage to Protect Society and Preserve Democracy 
 Following the narrative developed in the cluster/agon analysis, Bush‟s anti-same-
sex marriage rhetoric is very act-driven, but only for a handful of people.  Bush makes 
two dramatic acts in his anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric.  The first and most obvious is 
clearly stated in his July 10, 2004, radio address: “The process has now begun in 
Congress.  I urge members of the House and Senate to pass, and to send to the states for 
ratification, and amendment that defines marriage in the United States as a union of a 
man and a woman as husband and wife” (Bush, 2004e).  The President is “support[ing] a 
law to protect marriage between a man and a woman” (Bush, 2004a).  Bush‟s first overt 
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the repercussions of this elitism in the concluding portion of this chapter. 




act is thus to publicly voice his support for a Constitutional Amendment defining 
marriage as being between one man and one woman.  And, as I showed in the 
cluster/agon analysis, Bush‟s support for such an Amendment carries with it an implicit 
act of protecting society by protecting “traditional marriage” (Bush, 2004e), as marriage 
between a man and a woman is “critical to the well-being of families . . . [that] pass along 
values and shape character” (Bush, 2004e).  Bush‟s act of supporting a Constitutional 
Amendment banning same-sex marriage is thus rhetorically constructed as a 
simultaneous defense of American society, which is itself an act.  
The rhetorically constructed process required to pass a Constitutional Amendment 
illustrates Bush‟s second act.  Bush (2004e) justifies the Constitutional Amendment by 
explaining that “all people deserve to have their voices heard.  And that is exactly the 
purpose behind the constitutional amendment process.  American democracy, not court 
orders, should decide the future of marriage in America,” for “marriage ought to be 
defined by the people, not by the courts” (Bush, 2004a).  The President expresses his 
desire for the people to have a say in what happens in their  country (which, given the 
overarching narrative about how all of society stands to be negatively affected if same-
sex marriage were allowed, makes sense).  And for Bush, the best way for the people to 
get a say in how marriage is defined in the United States is through a Constitutional 
Amendment process, which, following Bush‟s narrative, will give the people the right to 
vote on the issue.  Following the rhetoric, Bush wants to give the people the chance to 
decide how to proceed through the democratic process of passing a Constitutional 
Amendment, a right that the activist judges are taking away from the people.  In his 




rhetorical narrative, Bush explains how he is working to preserve democracy and to give 
the people a voice by standing up to the activist judges.  Thus, Bush‟s second act can be 
read as preserving democracy by ensuring that the people have the right to vote on an 
issue that is fundamental to their society. 
However, by focusing only on the legislature as the way to retain the traditional 
definition of marriage (see scenic discussion above), the President really does not give 
lay citizens an obvious opportunity for overt action.   In fact, the closest that any of the 
people come to having their voices heard deals with their ability to reach their elected 
representatives through phone, email, or letters.  And even this ability is very limited as 
many congressional representatives will, ultimately, vote according to their conscience.  
For example, in 2004, at the time of the proposed Marriage Protection Amendment‟s 
congressional vote, I lived in Colorado.  The House bill was written by Marilyn 
Musgrave (Bush, 2004h), a Republican Congresswoman representing the fourth district 
(govtracks.us, 2009).  Musgrave did not represent my district, so I had no reason to tell 
her to support or oppose the bill.   My representative, Mark Udall, had no intention of 
supporting the Federal Marriage Amendment, and he made this quite clear, so I really had 
no need to contact him either.   The author of the Senate bill was Colorado Senator 
Wayne Allard, a Republican (Bush, 2004g).  While Colorado voters could have contacted 
him, they already knew how he felt (he did help to draft the Marriage Protection 
Amendment after all), so it would have been futile.  Basically, many of the elected 
representatives already had their minds made up, so Bush‟s claim that this process would 
give the people a voice seems specious, at best.  




Activist Judges‟ Act: Define Marriage to Fundamentally Alter Society and Undermine 
Democracy 
 The activist judges are rhetorically constructed to make two dramatic acts.  Much 
like with Bush, and in keeping very true to Burke‟s (1973) notion of dramatic tension, the 
activist judges‟ most overt act stands in direct contrast to Bush‟s most overt act as they 
are defining marriage in the way that they see fit.  As Bush (2004a) explains, “activist 
judges . . . are defining marriage,” and this redefinition serves to “strike down traditional 
marriage” (Bush, 2004e).  The first act of the activist judges, then, is very similar to the 
first act taken by Bush as the judges are, like the President, voicing their belief of what 
constitutes a marriage.  And, much like Bush‟s vocal act, the judges‟ vocalization of what 
constitutes a marriage comes with implications for society.  As was discussed in the agon 
analysis above, the judges‟ redefinition of marriage will have dire repercussions as 
America will become a society in which the  
next generation [will believe] that marriage has no enduring meaning, and that 
ages of moral teaching and human experience have nothing to teach us . . . human 
beings have understood that traditional marriage is critical to the well-being of 
families. And because families pass along values and shape character, traditional 
marriage is also critical to the health of society. (Bush, 2004e) 
 
Basically, the activist judges‟ redefinition of marriage could create a society in which 
children are raised without traditional families, without religion, and without values and 
character.  The judges are thus taking the action of fundamentally altering society by 
destroying “traditional marriage” and the social benefits that accompany it. 
And, in continuing to stand in stark contrast to the rhetorically-constructed hero, 
the activist judges‟ second act is to deny Americans their basic voting rights, rights that 




Bush‟s narrative appears to grant to the people, as was discussed in the analysis of Bush‟s 
act earlier in this section.  Following the rhetoric, “the future of marriage in America 
should be decided through the democratic constitutional amendment process, rather than 
by the court orders of a few” (Bush, 2004g).  The judges‟ act of defining marriage is 
simultaneously an act stripping the people of their right to vote for how they would like 
society to progress.  And, given that voting is fundamental to democracy, the judges‟ act 
thus becomes rhetorically constructed as circumventing democracy, quite a horrid act to 
undertake in a supposedly-democratic society.  The activist judges are taking away the 
people‟s right to voice their opinion through voting.  Bush‟s (unsubstantiated) vow to 
give the people a voice through the Constitutional Amendment process, then, makes 
sense when considered as being part of a larger dramatic narrative.  The act of giving 
people a voice is yet another way in which Bush makes himself the hero for American 
society as he is fighting villainous, power-hungry judges who want to bypass the people 
and use their own power to change society. 
What is striking about both of these sets of acts is exactly who has the right to 
define at all.  Regardless of how one feels about same-sex marriage, the vast majority of 
the country is excluded from the very process being explained in the texts.  Bush (2004a) 
explains how “activist judges are defining marriage” through their rulings that have 
granted marital rights to same-sex couples.  The President disagrees with activist judges 
who define marriage and impose this definition upon all of society.  He explains how the 
judges have violated the basic rules of American democracy by leaving the masses out of 
the process, for “marriage ought to be defined by the people” (Bush, 2004a).  However, 




the President similarly takes it upon himself to unilaterally define marriage: “I urge 
members of the House and Senate to pass . . . an amendment that defines marriage in the 
United States as a union of one man and one woman as husband and wife” (Bush, 2004e).  
The President devotes nearly all of his July 10 radio address to explicating the ills that 
will befall society if his definition of marriage is not accepted as the legal definition of 
marriage in all 50 states.  Bush himself wants to formally define marriage and have his 
definition accepted nationally, which is the same sort of disempowering act that he 
accuses the “activist judges” of undertaking.  In the following agent analysis, I will more 
thoroughly examine the agent roles not only of Bush and the “activist judges” but also the 
rest of the people living in the United States, those who, as was just shown, are denied the 
right to define marriage. 
Agent 
 For Burke (1969a), agent refers to the “person or kind of person [who] performed 
the act” (p. xv).  In keeping with Burke‟s (1973) cluster/agon drama, there are competing 
agents in these texts.  As is apparent from the cluster/agon analysis, the two main agents 
in the rhetoric are Bush and the “activist judges.”  While I will explain each one 
momentarily, I would like to call attention to the fact that mainstream Americans, 
including gays and lesbians and heterosexuals, are not accorded agent status at all in the 
texts.  This exclusion of agent status for gays and lesbians reveals the elitist ethics in the 
rhetoric, an implication that I examine in the conclusion portion of this chapter. 
 
 




Bush as Agent 
 Importantly, as I showed in the cluster and agon analysis, there are really only two 
sets of agents in these speeches.  The first agent is President George W. Bush.  As I 
explained in the cluster/agon analysis, Bush sets himself up as the hero in his good versus 
evil drama, and the future of American families are at stake.  Bush constructs himself as 
the ultimate good, as the one who is working tirelessly to make sure that “traditional 
marriage [which] is critical to the well-being of families [that] pass along values and 
shape character” (Bush, 2004e), will not be “fundamentally redefined” (Bush, 2004e).  
Bush rhetorically constructs himself as a savior of society as Americans know it.  The 
President will do everything in his power to ensure that future generations have the moral 
backing that comes from traditional marriage.  He is working against the judges who, as 
will be shown momentarily, want to destroy society as Americans know it. 
Activist Judges as Agents 
 In the cluster/agon analysis, I discussed how the activist judges are rhetorically 
constructed as the evil other in Bush‟s same-sex marriage rhetoric.  The judges are 
causing “the meaning of marriage [to be] lost, and the institution [to be] weakened” 
(Bush, 2004e).  Following Bush‟s narrative, the judges‟ ruling will result in the 
breakdown of traditional families, and since families are critical in teaching the next 
generation about values, culture, and religion, society as a whole will be “fundamentally 
redefined” (Bush, 2004g).  The judges are thus rhetorically constructed as “overreaching 
their power” (Bush, 2004e), and one way in which the judges can tangibly observe the 
effects of their ever-increasing power is through changes in families and in society.  




Following the rhetoric, then, the activist judges are power-hungry and destructive agents 
who place more importance on their own careers than on the betterment of society. 
The Rest of Americans as Non-Agents 
 While Bush and the “activist judges” are clearly constructed as agents in Bush‟s 
anti-same-sex marriage addresses, the vast majority of the American populace is not 
accorded agent status in the rhetoric.  Following Bush‟s rhetoric, the President serves as a 
mouthpiece for the majority of the American population, as the one advocating that 
“marriage ought to be defined by the people” (Bush, 2004a).  But the American 
population is left with only a vague promise of the ability to act: “All people deserve to 
have their voices heard.  And that is exactly the purpose behind the constitutional 
amendment . . . I urge members of the House and Senate to pass, and send to the states 
for ratification, an amendment that defines marriage in the United States as a union of 
one man and one woman as husband and wife” (Bush, 2004d).  Plausibly, the people in 
the states could have the chance to ratify the Marriage Protection Amendment, and, in 
Bush‟s (2004e) words, “have their voices heard.”  However, as I explained in the act 
portion of this chapter, the very process for passing the amendment fails to fully 
constitute the people as agents as the most that they can do is contact elected 
representatives who have, in most cases, already made up their minds.   
Even more telling is the fact that the people who are directly affected by the 
rhetoric, that is, gays and lesbians living in the United States, are completely excluded as 
agents in the rhetoric.  Rather, they are referred to in passing: “In Massachusetts, four 
judges on the state‟s highest court have ordered the issuance of marriage licenses to 




applicants of the same gender.  In San Francisco, city officials issued thousands of 
marriage licenses to people of the same gender” (Bush, 2004e).  Upon close analysis, it 
becomes apparent that gays and lesbians are not given the ability to act at all, for the 
descriptions of the marriage licenses leave all of the action up to the judges who 
“ordered” and the officials who “issued.”  Gays and lesbians are first acted upon by the 
activist judges who are issuing licenses to them (no mention in the rhetoric of how the 
gays and lesbians will be given the right to act with the licenses), and then they are acted 
upon by Bush who wants to take away said licenses.  In Burke‟s (1969a) terms, they are 
reduced from action to motion, stripped of the ability to act on their own accord, and, as 
will be explained shortly, reduced to agency for the activist judges.    
Interestingly, in all seven of the same-sex marriage texts (Bush, 2004a, 2004b, 
2004c, 2004d, 2004e, 2004g, 2004h), the only active agents are the President and the 
activist judges.  As I explained in the scenic portion of this chapter, both the President 
and the judges are conducting their actions in the bureaucratic sphere.  Through not 
focusing on the people involved in the actual marriages, the President‟s rhetoric takes an 
intimate act and reduces it to a bureaucratic struggle, which simultaneously differentiates 
the President‟s anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric from the anti-same-sex relationship 
rhetoric put forth by conservatives, especially those in the Christian Right.    
As Diamond (1995) and Hunter (1991) explain, conservative Christian Right 
activists interested in protecting morality in the United States have traditionally opposed 
same-sex marriage because they believe that same-sex relations are a sin, and any society 
that condones the  marriage of two people of the same gender are condoning their sin.  In 




other words, prior to Bush‟s anti-same-sex marriage statements in 2004, anti-same-sex 
marriage rhetoric focused on the individuals involved in the proposed marriages, and, in 
doing, so, they kept the focus on traditional morality (i.e., these individuals are not, 
following Christian beliefs, acting “right”).  Through focusing on the activist judges who 
are allowing the marriages, the President takes the focus off of the (im)morality of gays 
and lesbians seeking to marry, focusing instead on the few judges who have the right to 
allow said marriages.   This completely changes the anti-gay-rights narrative that really 
began to take form in the 1960s and 1970s.  The effects of focusing on bureaucrats who 
pass laws rather than people who want to marry will be addressed more thoroughly in the 
conclusion of this chapter when I assess the moral persona that Bush develops in his anti-
same-sex marriage rhetoric. 
Agency 
 According to Burke (1969a), agency refers to “the means or instruments” (Burke, 
1969a, p. xv) used to carry out an act.  In keeping with the dramatic narrative, both Bush 
and the activist judges are rhetorically constructed as having means for protecting and 
expanding their definition of marriage throughout society.   Bush relies upon dramatic 
processes and appeals to tradition whilst the activist judges rely upon their official 
authority and same-sex couples. 
Bush‟s Agency: The Democratic Process and Fear of Change 
 Following Bush‟s rhetorical narrative, “marriage ought to be defined by the 
people,” and the best way to ensure that the people have a say is to have “both houses 
pass the Marriage Protection Amendment and submit it to the states for ratification” 




(Bush, 2004g).   The Constitutional Amendment process allows “American democracy, 
not court orders, [to] decide the future of marriage in America (Bush, 2004e).  American 
democracy thus becomes the means by which American citizens are allowed to have 
some say in the future of their own society.  It is the agency. 
 In addition, Bush‟s anti-same-sex rhetorical narrative utilizes fear of change, 
which allows those who are afraid of a major change in society to identify with the 
rhetorical narrative and the conservative ideology that it perpetuates.  At the time of the 
Bush‟s speeches, same-sex couples in Massachusetts were just being given the right to 
marry, and they were the first ones in the entire country, yet Bush (2001f) claims that 
“traditional marriage is critical to the well-being of families. . . . [T]raditional marriage is 
also critical to the health of society.”  However, because of the fact that such marriages 
had never been allowed in the United States, the President simply did not have concrete 
proof that same-sex marriage would prove as detrimental to the United States as his 
narrative alleges it would.  Lacking any proof, the rhetorical narrative relies instead upon 
fostering an identification with people based on a shared fear of how things might 
change.  No one wants to live in a society in which looser definitions of marriage could 
“weaken the good influence of society” (Bush, 2004b) by “undermin[ing] the family 
structure” (Bush, 2004e), and, ultimately, threatening “the stability of society” (Bush, 
2004b).  The narrative gains force through appealing to the fear of a change in society, a 
change that is rhetorically constructed as being nearly inevitable if same-sex marriages 
are allowed to continue.  These fear appeals allow people to feel consubstantial with the 
President who is, following his narrative, working to ensure that same-sex marriage is not 




allowed so that society does not change for the worse.  The fear of change thus becomes 
the means by which logic and proof are circumvented in the narrative and yet 
identification with the narrative and the conservative ideology it perpetuates is still 
possible.  The appeals are functioning as agency.   
Activist Judges‟ Agency: Overreaching Official Authority   
 As I showed in the cluster/agon analysis, the “activist judges” are rhetorically 
constructed as redefining marriage to the detriment of society.  Bush (2004e) explains 
how “activist judges . . . have taken it upon themselves to change the meaning of 
marriage,” and, in the process, these judges have “struck down traditional marriage . . . 
imposing their arbitrary will on the people.”  It is only because of their official authority 
to grant court orders, granted to them by the Governor of Massachusetts (Constitution of 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Ch.2, Section1, Article IX), that the judges are 
able to redefine marriage.  The activist judges‟ main agency is thus their official 
authority, authority that they are rhetorically constructed to be increasing for their own 
power-hungry benefit.  Bush (2004b) explains how “some activist judges and local 
officials have made an aggressive attempt to redefine marriage. . . . [And] attempts to 
redefine marriage in a single state or city could have serious consequences throughout the 
country.”  In other words, following the rhetoric, the activist judges who are redefining 
marriage through their official authority are in a position to affect the entire country.  The 
judges‟ official authority is thus the means by which they are fundamentally changing 
American society, and they are using said authority to strip America of its families, 




traditions, and values, with the added benefit of personally increasing their own judicial 
reach. 
Purpose 
 For Burke (1969a), purpose refers to why an action is undertaken.  Charland 
(1987) expanded upon Burke‟s definition of purpose.  For Charland (1987), the audience 
is actively constituted through the rhetoric, and through the constitutive rhetoric, the 
people form a collective identity.  This constitution of a collective identity (or ideology) 
can be read as a purpose of the rhetoric.  Basically, purpose is linked to ideology.  In the 
case of same-sex marriage, the purpose of both sides is to reaffirm distinct positions in 
one of the key culture war debates that has been going on for decades (see Diamond, 
1995; Hunter, 1991): What rights should same-sex couples have? 
Bush‟s Purpose: Reaffirm the Conservative View of the Sanctity of Marriage 
 The President is interested in “defending the sanctity of marriage against activist 
courts and local officials who want to redefine marriage forever . . . [because] the union 
of a man and woman is the most enduring human institution, honored and encouraged . . . 
by religious faith” (Bush, 2004c).  The President‟s purpose is thus to reaffirm the 
conservative Christian view that marriage is a sacred, religious commitment between a 
man and a woman.  This is part of the same ideology that conservative groups, especially 
conservative Christian groups, have been espousing for years.  Same-sex marriage is 
simply not acceptable because, following the Christian religion, marriage is to be 
reserved for “one man and one woman” (Bush, 2004a).   




Conservative ideology believes that same-sex relationships are detrimental to 
American morality and, as a result, American society (Diamond, 1995; Hunter, 1991).  
Following this same ideology, Bush believes that if America‟s families are being 
restructured via a redefinition of marriage, it could leave “the next generation [believing] 
that marriage has no enduring meaning, and that ages of  moral teaching and human 
experience have nothing to teach us about this institution” (Bush, 2004e).  American 
society is rhetorically constructed as being on the verge of a fundamental change in 
which the most basic meanings of family and morality will change, and as family 
changes, society will change for the worse.  This threat of a fundamental change in the 
America is what leads Bush (2004e) to make his declaration: 
Senators are considering a constitutional amendment to protect the most 
fundamental institution of civilization, and to prevent it from being fundamentally 
redefined. . . . I urge members of the House and Senate to pass, and send to the 
states for ratification, an amendment that defines marriage in the United States as 
a union of a man and a woman as husband and wife. 
 
Through purpose, the President‟s rhetoric aligns with the conservative/orthodox ideology 
in the culture wars, in which rights for same-sex couples run contrary to mandates from 
the Christian God.   
Activist Judges‟ Purpose: Assert that Same-Sex Couples Deserve Equal Rights 
 The activist judges represent the ideological opposite to the President and those 
who identify with his anti-same-sex marriage narrative.  The “activist judges” want to 
grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples, which is something that, prior to 2004, had 
never been done in the United States.  Bush rhetorically constructs the judges as asserting 
the progressive ideology that same-sex couples deserve the same rights as heterosexual 




couples.  As people, gays and lesbians have fundamental rights, including the right to 
marry the people that they love.  The activist judges thus reinforce the liberal/progressive 
ideology that same-sex couples deserve the same civil rights as heterosexual couples.  Of 
course, in keeping with the good versus evil narrative, the President shows how the 
liberal ideology could cripple the country if allowed to continue. 
Conclusion 
 In July 2004, Bush delivered the last overtly-moral speeches of his first term 
(Kornblut & Milligan, 2004; Speilvogel, 2004).  In these texts, the President publicly 
encouraged both Houses of Congress to ratify the Federal Marriage Amendment, an 
amendment that would ban same-sex marriage in the United States.  Bush uses his anti-
same-sex marriage rhetoric to thoroughly develop a hero/villain rhetorical drama, where 
Bush the hero is working to save American society from being forever changed by a few 
activist judges looking to redefine marriage in order to increase their own power. 
In other words, to come back to the issue guiding this chapter, the way in which 
the President constructed a narrative with which many Americans could identify comes 
back to the fear-based narrative that the President constructs.  Bush‟s narrative develops 
the idea that if same-sex marriages are allowed, American families could crumble, which 
will result in dramatic shifts in every aspect of American culture.  The fear of losing 
stability in the American family and social structure allows many Americans, 
conservative or otherwise, to identify with the President‟s narrative and the rhetorically 
constructed hero role that Bush himself plays in that narrative.  Conservatives can 
identify because they, like the President, are staunchly opposed to same-sex marriage on 




religious grounds (Diamond, 1995; Hunter, 1991).  Less conservative Americans can 
identify with the President‟s narrative because they do not want their society to change 
for the worse. 
In addition to the guiding issue discussed above, I asked two questions designed 
to tie this chapter to the rest of the dissertation.  The first question involves assessing 
what sort of moral persona the President constructs in his anti-same-sex marriage 
rhetoric.  Following the rhetorical narrative, activist judges are redefining marriage, 
which will destroy the moral fiber of America and grant the judges more power.  Bush, 
the hero, argues on behalf of retaining the traditional definition of marriage.  In other 
words, only Bush and the activist judges are afforded the ability to act at all, and the rest 
of the people become tools (agency) in the power struggle, with gays and lesbians 
becoming the means for the activist judges to exert their judicial authority, and the rest of 
the American populace becoming the means by which Bush furthers a conservative 
ideology.  The moral conflict is thus set up as being between Bush and the “activist 
judges” that he demonizes throughout the texts.   
The battle over same-sex marriage is thus left in the hands of an elite few, Bush 
and the “activist judges,” all of whom hold a lot of power in society.  Gays and lesbians 
(those who are directly affected by the issue), are denied the right to make their own 
moral choice about whether or not to marry.  Bush wants to make the decision for them.  
Those who actually feel the effects of the “moral” decision in their daily lives are denied 
their right to make their own decisions.  I have termed this sort of “morality” elitist ethics 
as ethics and morality are reduced to a power struggle between an elite few.  I believe 




that Bush, the “moral values” president, constructs an elitist moral persona in his anti-
same-sex marriage rhetoric.  By trying to ban same-sex marriage, Bush is not allowing 
people to make choices about their own lives.  It is as though he does not trust gays and 
lesbians to do what he believes is “right” (i.e., enter into a “traditional” marriage), so he 
makes sure that they are not able to participate in the wrong, and he uses his official 
power to do so.   
 Ethics and morality are made to seem non-existent to the judges, who are 
portrayed as increasing their own power through destroying traditional morality.  The 
only person, following the rhetoric, who is absolutely moral is Bush himself.  He is 
working to preserve traditional marriage and the morality that comes with it, even if he 
has to take away other people‟s rights to make their own decisions.   
    The way that Bush frames the ethical struggle as being only between himself and 
the activist judges helps to answer the second question that I posited in the introduction 
regarding whether or not the President constitutes a moral community to follow him.  
Instead of appealing to traditional morality, to the orthodox claim that it is morally wrong 
for two people of the same sex to be married, the President builds his rhetorical narrative 
around the idea of power-hungry judges who are expanding their reach through changing 
the definition of marriage.    
Throughout the culture wars of the 1980s and 1990s, those who identified as 
conservative/orthodox rallied against civil rights for same-sex couples on the grounds 
that same-sex couples were acting immorally and against the will of God (Diamond, 
1995; Hunter, 1991).  The orthodox narrative of the 1980s and 1990s thus created a space 




in which those who identified with the narrative could act.  People who identified with 
the moral claims of the orthodox conservatives could act morally by not having sex with 
someone of the same gender and, if they were so inclined, by taking an active role in 
grassroots initiatives aimed at limiting civil rights for same-sex couples (for more on 
these initiatives, see Diamond, 1995).   
Bush‟s rhetoric takes away this space for action.  As I explained in this chapter, 
the President focuses on the activist judges who are granting the marriage licenses rather 
than the gays and the lesbians who are applying for and using said licenses.  This change 
in the enemy agent changes the narrative with which the conservative base had identified 
for years.  Simultaneously, it removed the conservative base‟s ability to act.  While not 
having sex with or marrying someone of the same gender was one way that the orthodox 
base could enact their morality and build their own moral community during the culture 
wars, there is nothing that they can really do about the “activist judges” the President is 
describing (save, support the elite‟s efforts to take away the activist judges‟ power).  The 
people are reduced to part of the contested scene, left to powerlessly suffer the effects 
that the President claims will result from same-sex marriage.  I consider the implications 















 In November 2004, President George W. Bush won re-election as the “moral 
values” candidate, according to exit polls taken on election day 
(www.cnn.com/election/2004).  In this dissertation, I have attempted to assess the moral 
persona that the President developed during his first term in office.  In order to assess this 
moral persona, I used Burke‟s cluster and pentad to critically examine three incidents in 
Bush‟s first term that the elite press (i.e., Boston Globe, New York Times, Washington 
Post) identified as being explicit “moral values” issues: namely, the President‟s decision 
to partially ban/partially fund embryonic stem cell research, 9/11 and the ensuing War on 
Terror, and the President‟s adamant stand behind a proposed Constitutional amendment 
banning same-sex marriage. 
 A cursory view of the three issues shows that they align with the orthodox 
position described by James Hunter (1991).  As Hunter (1991) and later Diamond (1995) 
explain, those with an orthodox viewpoint believe that morality is fixed, an absolute 
unchanging right (and corresponding wrong), written by a higher being and codified in 
religious texts (mainly the Bible).  Hunter (1991) traces the orthodox movement as 
having begun in response to some of the most pressing issues of the 1960s and 1970s, 
most notably the continued threat of communism, the rise of feminism, and the increase 




in support for same-sex rights.  For those in the orthodox community, all three issues 
were contrary to the will of the Christian God, against the holy texts, and thus immoral.   
 The orthodox organized together to help ensure that pro-life, anti-gay, pro-God 
leaders would be elected to all levels of government.  As Diamond (1995) explains, they 
were more successful in local elections than in national ones.  In other words, while 
orthodox voters were able to help pro-life state representatives get elected, they never 
really achieved their ultimate goal, that of putting a pro-life, pro-God, anti-gay man
18
 in 
the White House.  While Reagan seemed to match their beliefs, his presidency did not 
result in the reversal of Roe v. Wade or a decrease in the rights granted to same-sex 
couples (Hunter, 1991). 
  When George W. Bush was declared the winner of the 2000 election, it seemed 
to many in the orthodox camp that they had finally gotten the President that they had 
wanted for years.   Bush was a conservative man who identified himself as pro-life (Fox, 
2001; Toner, 2001), opposed to same-sex marriage (Bush, 2004a), and an outspoken 
Christian (Buruma, 2004; Steinfels, 2006), all of which are key values for Christian 
conservatives. 
Throughout this dissertation, I have shown how Bush, in many ways, negates 
some of the key principles upon which the orthodox movement was founded.  While, as 
Hunter (1991) explains, the majority of the work in the orthodox movement is carried out 
by elites in academia and the clergy, lay people are still given agency, a space in which to 
act.  For instance, while the elites were the face of the orthodox movement, it was 
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grassroots activism on the part of mainstream conservatives that led to the 1994 
Republican takeover of both houses of Congress.  Moreover, the rhetoric of the orthodox 
movement, I contend, creates a space in which people can act.  While it is the elites who 
are claiming that it is wrong to have an abortion or to be gay, their rhetoric contains 
within it the opportunity to act, or agency.  Those who align with the movement are given 
the task of reading the holy texts for themselves and acting accordingly (Hunter, 1991).  
This gives the people agency. 
However, as I have shown throughout this dissertation, Bush, whose rhetoric 
constructs what I have termed an “elitist” moral persona, strips the people of this space to 
act in three of his most overtly “moral” issues.  In the embryonic stem cell research 
addresses, the President frames the rhetoric as being between himself and the scientists 
conducting the research.  The people who would actually be seeking the treatments, that 
is, people living with debilitating ailments that could, potentially, benefit from stem cell 
procedures, are not mentioned in the rhetoric as active agents but as part of the scene that 
the scientists and Bush are fighting to control.  The rest of the populace is similarly 
reduced to being part of the contested scene.   Following the rhetoric, the only people 
granted the right to act are Bush and the scientists.    
In the 9/11 and War on Terror rhetoric, the President shifts away from his elitist 
moral persona momentarily.  He focuses the 9/11 and Afghanistan war rhetoric on how 
all Americans, elite and commoner alike, were affected by the September 11
th
 attacks, 
and, as a result of their shared victimhood, all Americans can help America to rebuild 
through enacting the American value of sacrificing for the country.  However, as time 




wears on and the President begins discussing the Iraq war, the President shifts his moral 
persona back to that of an ethical elitist.   The war is framed as being between Bush and 
Saddam Hussein, and American civilians are once again relegated to the role of inactive 
scene-occupiers, waiting to have others act on their behalf.  Once again, the space for 
overt action is taken away as the President and Saddam Hussein are the only completely 
active agents in the rhetoric. 
Finally, in the anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric, the President relies upon an elitist 
moral persona very similar to the one that he uses in the embryonic stem cell research 
addresses.  The President once again frames the moral conflict as being between himself 
and a few elite individuals, in this case “activist judges.”  Gays and lesbians, the people 
actually affected by the rhetoric, are not treated as active agents in their own right.  They 
become merely the means by which the activist judges are exerting their own authority 
and fundamentally altering the meaning of the American family.  Heterosexual 
Americans are not mentioned as active agents in the rhetoric either.   Rather, heterosexual 
Americans are the ones who are living in a society on the verge of a fundamental change, 
and to avoid a devastating change, the only thing that they are asked to do is to support 
their President.    
The findings of this dissertation have implications for orthodox conservatives.  
Those who identified with Bush on the grounds that he was the “moral values” candidate 
may need to re-think what constitutes a “moral values” candidate.  As I have shown, in 
the case of George W. Bush, “moral values” had less to do with individual moral choice 
and more to do with widespread restrictions, restrictions that took away the people‟s 




rights to make personal, private, and, yes, moral decisions about their own healthcare and 
their own domestic living situation.  “Moral values” became less about personal morality 
and more about constraining others.  If “moral values” really entails people being 
equipped with the “truth” to help them make the right decisions, then a leader who blocks 
the need to make the moral decision is not furthering the cause of orthodox morality. 
Moreover, the findings of this dissertation have implications for those interested 
in the study of rhetorical ethics.  I have argued throughout this project that Bush‟s moral 
persona does not clearly align with any sort of moral persona discussed in ethical theory.  
To illustrate, Johannesen (2002) asserts that “dominant traditional ethical theories 
[consist] of categorical imperatives, prima facie duties, justice as fairness, and 
utilitarianism” (p. i).  Each of these traditional theories, as I will show, fails to explain the 
moral persona developed in President Bush‟s first term rhetoric. 
Mill‟s (2009) utilitarianism begins with the assumption that the consequences of 
an action determine whether the action is moral or not.  An action that results in positive 
consequences is moral while an action that results in negative consequences is immoral.  
A moral action is one that maximizes the positive and minimizes the negative, or, more 
simply, a moral action is one that results in the greatest good for the greatest number of 
people.  Bush falls short of constructing a utilitarian moral persona most clearly in his 
embryonic stem cell research addresses.  Bush (2001d) himself claims that the existing 60 
stem cell lines could be replicated numerous times.  In other words, one embryonic stem 
cell could, plausibly, save several lives.  However, the President opposes embryonic stem 
cell research on the grounds that it destroys a (potential) human life.  That one (potential) 




human life could aid many who are already living.  Thus, allowing and funding 
embryonic stem cell research would have been the greatest good for the greatest number 
of people, so utilitarianism fails to explain Bush‟s moral persona.   
In response to and in disagreement with utilitarianism, Kant (2009) discussed both 
duty and categorical imperatives. For Kant (2009), the morality of an act is not in the act 
itself but rather in the intention behind the act.  If people are acting according to their 
duty to do right, then the act is moral.  As rational beings, humans impose duty on 
themselves.  If the requirements to act morally are coming from an outside source, then 
the person following the outside rules is not really acting morally as the inclination to act 
is a result of external rather than internal forces.  This requirement of internal inclination 
is quite absent in the first term rhetoric of President George W. Bush.  Through taking 
away the right of people to make their own moral decisions, Bush legislatively limits the 
rights of people to act according to their own internal inclinations.  While Bush may or 
may not be acting according to his own internal drives, by limiting the rights of others to 
do the same, it becomes obvious that Bush‟s moral persona is not fully explained through 
a duty-based moral model. 
For Kant (2009), there are certain rules that always must be obeyed in a moral 
world.  Kant (2009) called these rules categorical imperatives.  Kant‟s universality 
categorical imperative asserts that there are universal laws of humanity.  His respect 
categorical imperative claims that people should never be used as a means to an end but 
rather as ends in and of themselves.  Obviously, categorical imperatives do not fully 
explain the moral persona the Bush constructs in his rhetoric.  As I illustrated in the 




same-sex marriage chapter, Bush‟s rhetoric reduces gays and lesbians to agency (or 
means), rendering them nothing more than tools in a power struggle between Bush and 
the “activist” judges in their quest to define marriage and levy their respective definition 
on all of American society. 
Rawls (2009) discusses justice and fairness.   Rawls (2009) asserts that the only 
way to know what is just is to consider all points of view.  In deciding what is fair, an 
individual needs to understand that there are various positions in society, and no one 
knows for sure which position he or she will assume.  From this unknown position, it is 
in every person‟s best interest to ensure that individual liberties are not infringed for any 
reason, even if the denial of one individual‟s rights would benefit society as a whole.  
This first principle is called the principle of equal liberty.  With the difference principle, 
Rawls (2009) claims that inequality is permissible if both the advantaged and the 
disadvantage will both benefit from the inequality.  The principle of fair equality and 
opportunity asserts that it is just for all to have the opportunity to achieve an advantaged 
position.  Under this principle, all forms of discrimination are wrong as discrimination 
denies some people the chance to reach their full potential.  Obviously, the justice and 
fairness doctrine fail to explain Bush‟s moral persona in his anti-same-sex marriage 
rhetoric as gays and lesbians are not given the same rights as heterosexual people.    
There is a reason that the major ethical theories identified by Johannesen (2002) 
fail to fully explain the moral persona constructed in Bush‟s rhetoric.  Each of these 
theories has its focus on the individual.  All of these ethical theories start with the 
assumption that the individual is going to face the ethical dilemma and act as a result.  




Elitist ethics, however, does not focus on the individual at an ethical crossroads.   The 
elitist overseeing those at the ethical crossroads struggles with other elites, and those at 
the ethical crossroads are only left to feel the effects of an “ethical” decision being made 
by the elite few.  The individual at the ethical crossroads is not given the chance to act 
morally or immorally at all.  In other words, an elitist ethical lens takes the focus off of 
the individual. 
Because the focus is removed from individual actors, elitist ethics are inherently 
disempowering and undemocratic.  Through focusing on an ethical conflict as only being 
between a select group of people, even if the conflict affects millions more, the ethical 
elitist takes away the people‟s right to act.  In doing so, the masses are invalidated, their 
individual experiences muted in favor of the version of events constructed by the ethical 
elitist.  An ethical elitist takes debate and deliberation out of the public sphere, severely 
limiting the counterarguments and other viewpoints to which the masses are exposed, and 
this is contrary to the ideals of deliberative democracy. 
Bush is not the only ethical elitist.   In fact, in a future project I would like to 
explore other ethical elitists, people or groups who occupy a rhetorical space that they 
believe is so superior to other alternatives that they silence or severely limit the voices of 
others.  As one possible research idea, when I presented an early draft of the embryonic 
stem cell research chapter at NCA, one of the anonymous reviewers thought that ethical 
elitism may be an interesting lens through which to analyze all pro-life rhetoric.  As 
Diamond (1995) explains, Operation Rescue and other Right to Life groups have the 
ultimate goal of overturning Roe v.  Wade, which, following the group‟s logic, will 




dramatically decrease the number of abortions in the United States.
19
  In other words, 
members of Right to Life groups want to re-criminalize abortion.  The elitist ethics 
become apparent upon a closer examination of what re-criminalizing abortion would 
mean for women.  Those who wish to re-criminalize abortion are basically assuming that 
women cannot be trusted to make the “right” decision (i.e., not have an abortion), and so 
the ethical elites want to take this right away.  In the case of abortion, they want to use 
the law to do so, which draws a personal moral decision back into the bureaucratic 
sphere, a move that I asserted Bush made in his anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric. 
As another example (and another possible project), Hunter (1991) discusses how 
some members of the orthodox community have fought to remove art that is too erotic 
(conservatives label it “pornographic”) or that promotes homosexuality.  To tie these 
efforts back to elitist ethics, those who wish to remove the art may believe that the 
masses simply cannot be trusted to make the “right” decision and not view such 
“offensive” and “immoral” material, so the ethical elitists would like to take away the 
right to view the art.  The ethical elites have tried to use legislation to do so (which draws 
the issue back into the elite courtroom and out of the hands of the masses).  It would be 
interesting to trace the relationship between orthodoxy and elitist ethics.  It may be that 
the belief in absolute Truth leads to the infringement of others‟ rights. 
However, while harder to find, there are examples of liberals/progressives who 
construct an elitist moral persona.  As an example, in 1984 lawyer Catherine MacKinnon 
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women having abortions after the practice was decriminalized.   Before the decriminalization, women 
would either have illegal abortions or go to another country to obtain a legal one. 




and academic Andrea Dworkin argued that pornography, defined as material that 
graphically showed the sexually explicit subordination of women, men, and children, was 
harmful to women in society.  They drafted legislation in Indianapolis to give those 
harmed by pornography, either in the making and trafficking of it or as a result of 
violence inflicted by men after watching it, the right to seek civil damages (Durkin, 
1999).  While the legislation was promptly overturned on First Amendment grounds, the 
actions of the two women could be interesting to analyze through an elitist ethical lens.   
The women were both in positions of authority, and they inserted themselves into a 
legislative battle with First Amendment scholars.  The ethical struggle was thus between 
an elite few.  The effects of the ethical struggle, however, were forced upon the people of 
Indianapolis.  It was as though the two women could not trust porn viewers to control 
themselves, and so they wanted to take away the viewers‟ right to watch pornography, 
and the two used their authoritative positions to limit people‟s rights to view it.  In other 
words, it could be argued, in the name of progressive feminism, Dworkin and 
MacKinnon assumed an elitist moral persona.  
Finally, this project has implications for rhetorical scholars.  First of all, it shows 
that Burke‟s cluster and pentad analytical tools complement one another and allow a 
rhetorical critic to better understand how featured terms (discovered in the cluster 
analysis) function pentadically in the rhetoric.  In surveying the literature, I only found 
two other studies where the two tools were used together to analyze rhetoric (Bobbitt, 
2004; Peterson, 1988).  This project serves as another example that the two methods in 
tandem can help to reveal the deeper meaning of the rhetoric.    




Moreover, the pentad analysis itself adds to the corpus of literature that discusses 
how active agents can be reduced to part of the scene.  Blankenship, Fine, and Davis 
(1983), for instance, posit that in his 1980 Presidential win, Ronald Reagan was 
transformed from an agent in the 1980 Republican primary campaign to part of the scene 
of the campaign itself.  However, as the authors assert, Reagan moved himself to the 
foreground and made himself part of the scene (Blankenship, Fine, and Davis, 1983).  In 
other words, while a study has acknowledged that agents can become part of the scene, 
the focus of that study dealt with how the agent chose to become part of the scene to 
increase his agency.   Conversely, in my study, the populous is turned into the scene and, 
as a result, loses their choice and their agency.   
Tonn, Endress, and Diamond (2005) and Ling (1970) both discuss how reducing a 
culpable agent to part of the scene can absolve the agent of guilt for his or her 
wrongdoing.   However, in both of these studies, the agent being reduced from agent to 
scene is guilty of wrongdoing and thus benefits from being stripped of their active agent 
status.  On the other hand, in my study, I show how people are denied their agent status 
before they have the opportunity to engage in any rhetorically-constructed wrongdoing.  
As I show throughout the dissertation, especially in the embryonic stem cell research 
chapter and the same-sex marriage chapter, those directly affected by the issue may suffer 
as a result of their reduction from active agent to passive scene.  In other words, my study 
shows how reducing people to part of the scene can have very negative effects for those 
involved. 




Understanding how people become reduced to scene and agency is particularly 
important for understanding Burke‟s notion of morality, a notion that has not fully been 
explored in the literature.  In Grammar of Motives, Burke (1969a) asserts that “when one 
talks of the will, one is necessarily in the field of the moral; and the field of the moral is, 
by definition, the field of action” (p. 136).  Morality is further tied to the act in Burke‟s 
(1969a) discussion of personal action as moral freedom in which morals are possible only 
to the extent that people are free to act.   This linkage between the act and morality is also 
discussed in the appendix to Permanence and Change.  In his discussion of behavior and 
action as being opposed to motion, Burke (1984) makes the following footnote: “human 
behavior [is] in the realm of morals” (p. 274).  Behavior is an act.  Here, as in other 
places, Burke blatantly links morality with the act.  The two are closely related, and, 
given that this appendix was written some 40 years after the first appearance of Grammar 
of Motives, it seems that this is one of the key linkages that Burke, with his focus on the 
act, retains throughout his career.  As I have shown throughout this dissertation, Burke‟s 
(limited) claims about the links between the act and morality can be reinforced through 
critical examination of rhetorical texts.  For instance, in the rhetorical texts I analyzed, 
through taking away the right of the people to act, Bush simultaneously takes away their 
right to act morally (or immorally). 
 If, as Burke first proposed in 1969, the act is tied to morality, then George W. 
Bush may have been the “moral values” candidate.  Morality, it would seem, lies in the 
individual‟s ability to act.  Moral theorists would posit that morality addresses what an 
individual ought to do (see, for instance, Kant, 2009).    However, throughout this 




dissertation I have used the term “elitist ethics.”  Ethics, as Rawls (2009) shows, lies with 
how the individual ought to act when the act is going to affect others.  When Bush‟s 
personal morality was forced upon the rest of the country, his views ceased to be about 
morality and entered into the realm of ethics—elitist ethics.  Elitist ethics reduce the 
citizenry to passive pawns in a power-struggle between the elite few and are thus contrary 
to the ideals of deliberative democracy.  For this reason, voters should be cautious of 
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